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Davis v. Delaware Health Social Service

Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County
Apr 6, 2010
Civil Action No. 5187-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2010)

Summary

dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but permitting Section 1902 transfer to the Family Court

Summary of this case from Taylor v. George

Opinion

Civil Action No. 5187-VCP.

Date Submitted: March 8, 2010.

Date Decided: April 6, 2010.

Mr. Timothy L. Davis, Wilmington, DE.

Brenda L. Sammons, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE.


Dear Mr. Davis and Counsel:

I have reviewed the pleadings submitted by the parties and, for the reasons stated in this Letter Opinion, I hereby order Davis's claim to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice so that Davis may file his claim in the appropriate court. Plaintiff, Timothy L. Davis ("Davis"), filed his Complaint on January 4, 2010 in the Court of Chancery seeking reinstatement of his driver's license after it was suspended by Defendant, Delaware Health and Social Services/Division of Child Support Enforcement ("DCSE"), for Davis's failure to pay child support. Davis avers that the State owes him a duty of care and breached that duty by suspending his license, thus causing him harm. Davis further challenges the constitutionality of the statutes authorizing the actions of DCSE.

DCSE answers Davis's Complaint by, among other things, asserting that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because subject matter jurisdiction is nonwaivable, courts have an obligation to independently review whether they possess proper subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of this litigation.

Appriva S'holder Litig. Co. v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Del. 2007).

The core of Davis's claims is that DCSE wrongfully suspended his driver's license with CDL endorsements. To the extent Davis contends the agency abused its discretion or otherwise acted improperly in suspending his license, the Court of Chancery lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Davis's claims arise from a decision by DCSE to suspend Davis's driver's license for failure to pay child support. The Delaware Legislature created DCSE as a division of the Department of Health and Social Services in 1997 to qualify for federal funds from the Office of Child Support Enforcement, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. As a Delaware agency, DCSE follows procedures outlined in the Delaware Administrative Procedures Act ("DAPA"). Pursuant to DAPA, any person seeking review of a DCSE decision in a specific case must appeal that decision to the Delaware Family Court. The Family Court has jurisdiction "in a pending proceeding related to child support, [to] order the removal of any or all restrictions on licensed privileges . . . imposed related to a failure to pay child support. . . ." The Family Court's jurisdiction over "[a]ctions concerning appeals from administrative decisions of the Division of Child Support Enforcement" is exclusive. Therefore, to the extent Davis's claim effectively amounts to an appeal of the decision of DCSE, the Court of Chancery lacks subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.

Id. §§ 10102(4), 10142(a).

10 Del. C. § 921(13).

In Davis's Complaint, he also raises constitutional challenges to DCSE's actions in suspending his license. Some of Davis's claims challenge the constitutionality of DCSE's application of 28 U.S.C. § 1738(B) and 13 Del. C. § 2216(d) to deprive him of his license (the "as applied challenges"). Other claims aver that, on their face, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(B) and 13 Del. C. § 2216(d) are unconstitutional (the "facial challenges"). Because the analysis of these two categories of constitutional challenges differs, I address them separately.

I focus first on Davis's as applied challenges of DCSE's actions. Specifically, Davis alleges that DCSE violated his Due Process rights under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment by suspending his driver's license "without saying if it's being done as punishment or motivation," thereby depriving him of the ability to earn income. Davis also alleges that in exercising its authority under the relevant statutes in his case, DCSE violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Any claim that an agency has unconstitutionally applied a statute to a particular person questions the agency's use of its discretion, and is subject to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. Therefore, to the extent Davis's claims are as applied challenges, he must follow the appeals procedures of the administrative agency and DAPA. In other words, Davis must pursue those claims within the agency and the Family Court, if appropriate.

Republic Indus., Inc. v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We commit to administrative agencies the power to determine constitutional applicability. . . .") (quoting 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 74 (1958)).

See 29 Del. C. §§ 10102, 10142 (stating that "[a]ny party against whom a case decision has been decided may appeal such decision to" the Family Court if it is an appeal from a DCSE decision); Moynihan v. City of Seaford, 2006 WL 2389333, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 2006) (stating that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine requires "that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will either review any action by the agency or provide an independent remedy").

The remainder of Davis's claims are facial constitutional challenges to either 28 U.S.C. § 1738(B) or 13 Del. C. § 2216(d). Ordinarily, "no one is entitled to judicial relief . . . until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." However, "a facial constitutional attack on the statute in question [makes] the [exhaustion of remedies] doctrine inapplicable." Because many of Davis's claims are facial constitutional attacks on the statutes that enabled DCSE to suspend his license, Davis need not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief on those claims.

Republic Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d at 293 (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).

State of Del. v. Bennet, 697 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (D. Del. 1988); Republic Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d at 295 (stating that "we do not commit to administrative agencies the power to determine constitutionality of legislation") (quoting 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 74 (1958)).

In certain circumstances, both the Family Court and the Court of Chancery have jurisdiction over facial constitutional attacks to legislation. In Ward v. Ward, the Family Court ruled that it had "the power, if not the duty, to address the constitutional" challenge to a Delaware child visitation statute. In Ward, the plaintiffs challenged 10 Del. C. § 950(7), which authorized the Family Court to determine the visitation rights of grandparents, as unconstitutional. As to whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to hear constitutional issues, Judge Robinson held that because Delaware's Constitution grants judges the right and authority "to determine and decide every question of law, necessarily arising in the progress of a trial, of which the court has jurisdiction from the nature of the cause of action," including constitutional issues that arise, "the Family Court . . . ha[d] the power, if not the duty, to address" the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to section 950(7).

See Mekler v. Delmarva Power Light, Co., 1975 WL 1268, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1975) (determining the constitutionality of House Bill 544); Kelley v. Mayor City Council of City of Dover, 314 A.2d 208, 215 (Del. Ch. 1973) (holding unconstitutional a weighted voting provision in the Dover City Charter); Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987).

This section was redesignated 10 Del. C. § 1046 in 1993. See 69 Del. Laws ch. 335, § 1 (1993).

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over child support matters under 10 Del. C. § 921. Davis's cause of action relates to remedies imposed by DCSE for Davis's failure to meet certain child support obligations. The remedy Davis challenges is authorized by 13 Del. C. § 2216(d). Because Davis's claims arise out of action DCSE took pursuant to its authority over child support matters, and the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, the Family Court properly may decide Davis's facial challenges to the statutes involved.

The only issue remaining is whether this Court may dismiss Davis's claims and allow the full action to be heard by the Family Court. I conclude that it can. Section 342 of title 10 limits the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction to only those matters where there is no "sufficient remedy [to] be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction" in Delaware. Because both this Court and the Family Court conceivably could hear the constitutional challenges Davis asserts here, and because the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction over matters in which other courts may grant sufficient remedies, the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction depends on whether the Family Court can provide an adequate remedy.

Davis seeks equitable relief in the form of reinstatement of his driver's license and a pronouncement that the statutes authorizing removal of his license are unconstitutional. If appropriate, the Family Court can provide such relief. The Family Court's jurisdiction to grant equitable remedies extends to "any civil action `where jurisdiction is otherwise conferred upon' it." Thus, the Family Court may grant equitable remedies in cases over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. In this case, 10 Del. C. § 921(3) grants the Family Court exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement "of any law . . . or regulation promulgated by a governmental agency . . . for the . . . support of children." Because Davis's claims relate to laws or regulations relating to the enforcement of child support obligations, both his legal and equitable claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court pursuant to section 921(3), and the Family Court can provide an adequate remedy. Because Davis has an adequate remedy at law for his facial challenges to the constitutionality of the applicable statues, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.

Wife, S. v. Husband, S., 295 A.2d 768, 770 (Del. Ch. 1972); 10 Del. C. § 925(15).

See id. at 771 (holding that the Family Court has authority and jurisdiction to specifically enforce provisions of a written separation agreement because 10 Del. C. § 921 grants the Family Court exclusive jurisdiction over such matters).

Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902, Davis has 60 days to file a written election of transfer of his claims to the Family Court. For those of Davis's claims that require him to exhaust his administrative remedies, Davis may have to initiate his appeal according to the requirements set forth by DAPA and DCSE.


Summaries of

Davis v. Delaware Health Social Service

Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County
Apr 6, 2010
Civil Action No. 5187-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2010)

dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but permitting Section 1902 transfer to the Family Court

Summary of this case from Taylor v. George
Case details for

Davis v. Delaware Health Social Service

Case Details

Full title:Timothy L. Davis v. Delaware Health and Social Service/Division of Child…

Court:Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County

Date published: Apr 6, 2010

Citations

Civil Action No. 5187-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2010)

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