Opinion
No. 03-CV-6501L.
March 23, 2005
DECISION ORDER
The above-captioned matter has been referred to the undersigned for the supervision of pre-trial discovery and the hearing and disposition of all non-dispositive motions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(A) and (B). (Docket # 17).
On October 14, 2003, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Docket #1). According to plaintiff, Correctional Officer Castleberry grabbed his penis and sexually harassed him during a routine pat-frisk at the Southport Correctional Facility, the facility in which he is incarcerated. Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied recreational time in retaliation for filing a grievance regarding the allegedly improper pat-frisk. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that various of the defendants retaliated against him by ignoring or failing to properly address the issues raised in his grievances. (Docket #1). Currently pending before this Court are plaintiff's motions to amend his Complaint (Docket # 36) and to compel the production of documents (Docket # 49). I. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff moves to amend his complaint for the purpose of "add[ing] new facts of ongoing retaliation, discrimination and conspiratorial acts." (Docket # 36 at ¶ 2). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he is being denied access to law library materials in a deliberate effort to prevent him from litigating this matter and in retaliation for filing grievances and this pending lawsuit. Plaintiff also alleges that his grievances regarding such matters have been disregarded without action. (Docket # 36).
In addition to the further claim of retaliation, Plaintiff also seeks to join two additional defendants. The first, Robert Murphy, is the correctional guard allegedly assigned to supervise the law library at the Southport Correctional Facility. The second, Angela Bartlett, is the Deputy Superintendent of the Southport Correctional Facility. (Docket # 36).
Under Federal Rule 15(a), once the time for amending a pleading as of right has expired, a party may request leave of the court to amend, which "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by the party seeking leave to amend may be a proper subject of relief, the party should be afforded the opportunity to test the claim on its merits. See United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 889 F.2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir. 1989). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be `freely given.'" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
While the court retains discretion to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a), "[the] outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id. at 182; Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
Here, plaintiff's proposed additional claims of retaliation appear closely related to those retaliation claims alleged in the original Complaint. Likewise, it appears from a review of the pleadings that the additional defendants plaintiff seeks to join were allegedly involved in the events underlying the claims in the original Complaint; thus, common questions of fact will likely arise between the additional parties and the originally named defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a) ("All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action").
Moreover, defendants have not alleged that they will be prejudiced by plaintiff's amendment, nor have they alleged that plaintiff unduly delayed in bring such motion. Instead, defendants address the merits of each claim within the proposed amended complaint and assert that the entire amended complaint "would not withstand a motion to dismiss." (Docket # 48 at ¶ 7). Based upon a review of plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, this Court cannot conclude that the claims are futile, that is, that plaintiff has failed to allege a viable claim. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer Co., 987 F.2d at 131 (finding that when proposed amendment is futile, it is not abuse of court's discretion to deny leave to amend); Santiago v. Steinhart, 1993 WL 410402, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (to determine whether claim is futile, court "must view the claim in the light most favorable to the moving party and determine whether there is a colorable claim for relief"). To the extent defendants argue that the factual record as developed through discovery mandates dismissal of the Complaint, such argument may more appropriately be addressed in a motion for summary judgment.
Indeed, defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment as to the original Complaint, which is currently pending before the district court. (Docket #54).
Accordingly, in view of the presumption that leave to amend be "freely given," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), I find that the underlying facts and circumstances relied upon by plaintiff are a proper subject of relief, and therefore plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to test such claims on the merits. See United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 889 F.2d at 1254.
II. Motion to Compel
On July 22, 2004, plaintiff served upon defendants' counsel a request for production of documents. Defendants responded on August 30, 2004, producing certain documents and objecting to the production of certain others. (Docket # 40). On September 17, 2004, plaintiff moved to compel the discovery materials not provided in defendants' response. (Docket #49).
Currently in dispute are plaintiff's requests for all grievances filed against defendants concerning the "mistreatment of inmates" since July 19, 2003 and a "log and/or computation" of all grievances filed against defendant Castleberry between January 2003 and July 2004 (Requests ## 4 and 5); all documents relating to "infractions" by the defendants (Request # 7); arrest records of defendants (Request # 8); defendants' criminal history reports (Request # 9); and documents regarding the mental health of defendants (Request # 12). These document requests are addressed in turn below.
A. Plaintiff's Fourth and Fifth Requests : Plaintiff's fourth and fifth requests seek all documents relating to grievances filed against the defendants "concerning the mistreatment of inmates" since July 19, 2003, as well as a "log and/or computation" of all grievances filed against defendant Castleberry between January 2003 and January 2004. Defendants object to the requests on the grounds that they are "overly broad and burdensome," explaining that grievances are not maintained or indexed by employee or officer name, but are indexed according to the name of the inmate who filed the grievance. (Docket # 64). In this case, considering that plaintiff's request is for grievances that post-date the challenged pat-frisk, the burden of production outweighs the speculative relevance of the grievances sought. If, however, defendants' personnel files or other files which may be searched by defendants' names contain documents that evidence or relate to complaints of sexual harassment, improper pat-frisks or retaliation by any of the defendants since July 19, 2003, such documents shall be produced. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel production of documents sought in Requests Four and Five is denied in part and granted in part.
B. Plaintiff's Seventh and Ninth Requests : In his seventh request, plaintiff seeks "documentation of infractions incurred on the job or off the job — meaning specifically, any reprimands or citations for abuse and misconduct for all defendants." Similarly, plaintiff's ninth request seeks "all criminal history reports, including rap sheets and complaints written against each and all defendants for misconduct in the workplace and outside the workplace." While reasserting their objections to these requests, defendants have now stated explicitly that no such documents exist. (Docket # 64 at ¶¶ 11, 13). Based upon such representations, plaintiff's seventh and ninth requests are denied as moot. See American Banana Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of New York, 2000 WL 521341, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Court cannot compel production of what does not exist").
C. Plaintiff's Eighth Request : Plaintiff's eighth request seeks documents relating to any arrests of the defendants. Defendants object to this request on the grounds that arrest records are irrelevant to this case. (Docket # 64).
The threshold requirement of discoverability under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is whether the information sought is "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). To be discoverable, the information "need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. The relevance standard, therefore, is commonly recognized as one that is necessarily broad in its scope in order "to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted). See Daval Steel Products, a Div. of Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991) (parties entitled to discovery of any matter that appears "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 122 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (term "reasonably calculated" in Rule 26(b)(1) means "any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action") (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)).
Here, plaintiff has failed to assert, let alone demonstrate, any connection between the records requested and the issues pending in this matter. I thus cannot conclude that the documents sought by plaintiff would be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff's eighth request is denied.
D. Plaintiff's Twelfth Request : In his twelfth request, plaintiff seeks "any and all documents created by any Southport staff member concerning employee mental health and anger management on the job." Defendants object to this request, claiming it is vague, burdensome and overbroad. Defendants further object on the grounds that such documents contain confidential medical information and would be irrelevant. (Docket # 64).
I agree with defendants that the request as written is vague and overbroad. Moreover, any connection between the issues raised in this litigation and unspecified mental health issues of any of the defendants is speculative and attenuated at best. Plaintiff's motion to compel defendants to produce documents responsive to request number 12 is thus denied.