Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-716
07-09-2019
RICKEY LEROY DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. KELLY BIGLEY Defendant.
District Judge Cathy Bissoon/Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that, pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Complaint be dismissed before being served because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Background
Rickey Leroy Davis ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") to pursue a civil rights action against the Honorable Kelly Bigley ("Judge Bigley"), a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. ECF No. 2. The form Complaint for a Civil Case (the "Complaint") is not a model of clarity. However, it is clear that because Plaintiff seeks to sue Judge Bigley for actions that she took in her judicial capacity, Judge Bigley is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed before being served because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Discussion
1. Pre-service dismissals of Complaints proceeding IFP.
Because Plaintiff has been granted IFP status, ECF No. 2, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) apply to his Complaint. See Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App'x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) ("the screening procedures set forth in § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike") (citations omitted); 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) ("the court shall dismiss the case [of a plaintiff granted IFP status] at any time if the court determines that - (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal - (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."). In performing the Court's mandated function of sua sponte review of complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), to determine if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 F. App'x 705 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint may properly be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Under this standard, the court must, as a general rule, accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogation on other grounds recognized in, Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 18-328, 2019 WL 886893 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2019). Moreover, under the 12(b)(6) standard, a "court need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). The court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
The question to be resolved is: whether, taking the factual allegations of the complaint, which are not contradicted by the exhibits and matters of which judicial notice may be had, and taking all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those uncontradicted factual allegations of the complaint, are the "factual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Or put another way, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
Furthermore, because Plaintiff is pro se, courts accord an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
2. Allegations of the Complaint
The complete factual allegations of the Complaint are as follows.
Please order damages that where asses[s]ed to me by the court cost[s] for continuance I neve[r] asked for[.]ECF No. 3 ¶ IV [sic throughout]. Plaintiff claims that the actions of Judge Bigley deprived him of his Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ III.
Please releas[e] from court suspending or reporting the allegge[d] infraction to Penn-DOT that in-turn report to my companies insurance company who promptly refuse to cover me so I lost my job full time status. Due to loss of income from work I need money to sustain myself for at least six months, $5,000.00 will help me pay the cort[']s taxation, repair my car and catch up on bills[.]
We deem Plaintiff to be making a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he is claiming a violation of his rights under the United States Constitution and he does not have a direct cause of action under the United States Constitution. Rather, he must utilize Section 1983 as a vehicle to bring his claims. See, e.g., Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001)("a litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right does not have a direct cause of action under the United States Constitution but must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
We take judicial notice of the fact that Judge Bigley presided over Plaintiff's criminal trial in Commonwealth v. Rickey Davis, CP-02-CR-0007038-2018 (Allegheny CCP). The dockets of Plaintiff's case reveal that Plaintiff was charged with, inter alia, Driving Under the Influence, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802, Driving an Unregistered Vehicle, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1301 and Operating a Vehicle Without a Valid Inspection, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4703. Plaintiff was found guilty on December 13, 2018, of these three crimes in a bench trial before Judge Bigley. On February 4, 2019, Judge Bigley imposed a sentence of six months probation on Plaintiff and also imposed a $ 300.00 fine in addition to imposing court costs. It appears from the criminal case docket that Plaintiff has filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
The dockets of Plaintiff's criminal case are available at:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/docketsheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0007038-2018&dnh=9LKCY07DFecgrXQeobqIDA%3d%3d (site last visited 7/9/2019).
3. Judge Bigley is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
It is clear from the factual allegations of the Complaint and the judicially noticed facts of Plaintiff's criminal case before Judge Bigley that Judge Bigley is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
The doctrine of judicial immunity bars civil suits against judicial officers who are acting in their judicial capacity, i.e., whose challenged actions are taken in the course of their judicial activities and whose actions are not lacking jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam). In determining whether the challenged act is a "judicial act," the court asks two questions: (1) is the act a function normally performed by a judge and (2) did the party aggrieved by the challenged act deal with the judge in her judicial capacity. Id. at 12. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) ("The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."). Moreover, the doctrine of judicial immunity renders a judge not only immune from damages but also immune from suit. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 ("judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.").
There is no allegation contained in the Complaint that Judge Bigley lacked jurisdiction over the criminal trial of Plaintiff, nor could any such conclusory allegation be accepted as true, given that Courts of Common Pleas are courts of general jurisdiction. Miller v. Off. of Children, Youth and Families of Allegheny County, CIV.A. 13-315, 2013 WL 4049546, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2013) ("Judge Walko sits on the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which is a court of general jurisdiction in the Commonwealth.").
It is also clear from reading the allegations of the Complaint quoted above that both prongs of Mireles are satisfied in that the acts of which Plaintiff complains concerning Judge Bigley were functions normally performed by a judge, i.e., assessing court costs, and imposing fines, and, in compliance with legal requirements, causing a notification of Plaintiff's traffic crimes to be reported to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT"). Furthermore, Plaintiff clearly was dealing with Judge Bigley in her judicial capacity in terms of what he cites in his Complaint. Accordingly, Judge Bigley is a judicial officer entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of judicial immunity.
To the extent that Plaintiff's requested relief, seeking to bar the reporting of his crimes to PennDOT, can be construed as a request for injunctive relief against Judge Bigley, such claims for injunctive relief are likewise subject to dismissal. What the district court held in Fox v. Lee is equally applicable here:
Section 1983 precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer "for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that either of these prerequisites to injunctive relief were met, and therefore his claim for injunctive relief is dismissed as well. See Montero v. Travis,171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding injunctive relief against a quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F.Supp.2d 265, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable); Reilly v. Weiss, No. 97-CV-05883, 1998 WL 1110695, at *1 n. 3 (D.N.J. June 15, 1998) (same).Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp.2d 573, 575-76 (E.D. Pa. 2000). See also Miller v. Off. of Children, Youth and Families of Allegheny County, 2013 WL 4049546, at *3 ("Since the enactment of the FCIA, courts universally have held that an individual seeking injunctive relief against a judicial officer pertaining to a judicial act must allege that a declaratory decree was violated, or that declaratory relief was unavailable, in order to overcome the judicial immunity established by that statute."). The Complaint fails to allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, any claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed as well.
Furthermore, because Plaintiff brought his cause of action against a judicial officer pursuant to Section 1983 for her role in conducting his criminal trial, imposing sentences, costs and fines and causing such criminal convictions to be reported to PennDOT, and because state court judicial officers are not proper party defendants under Section 1983 for their adjudicatory actions, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983. See, e.g., In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1982) ("§ 1983 does not provide relief against judges acting purely in their adjudicative capacity, any more than, say, a typical state's libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier or telephone company for simply conveying a libelous message. Just as a dismissal for failure to state a claim would be proper in the latter case, so is it in the former. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).") (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed as against Judge Bigley for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Date: July 9, 2019 cc: The Honorable Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge
RICKEY LEROY DAVIS
7622 Cheyenne St.
Pittsburgh, PA 15218