Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:03-CV-0522-Y
September 10, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Samuel John Major Davis, Prisoner I.D. No. 0603003, is a pretrial detainee presently confined in the Tarrant County Jail pending criminal charges in state court.
Respondent Dee Anderson, is the Sheriff of Tarrant County.
C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Davis has been charged with various sexually-related misdemeanor and felony offenses in state court and is currently awaiting trial in Tarrant County, Texas. By way of the instant federal petition, filed on May 28, 2003, Davis raises various due process and ineffective assistance claims. (Pet. Br. in Support.)
Davis has three pending criminal cases. Trial court cause no. 0858559 is pending in County Court No. 2 and trial court cause nos. 0862558 and 0862559 are pending in 372 nd Criminal District Court. (Resp't Answer at Attachs.) Although Respondent contends the cases were set for trial on August 28, 2003, the Tarrant County District Clerk's Office, via telephonic communication, could not confirm this fact as of this date.
Davis has filed a prior federal petition pertaining to these same offenses, which was dismissed without prejudice on January 21, 2003. Davis v. Anderson, Civ. Action No. 4:02-CV-1052-A.
D. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A state pretrial detainee is entitled to raise constitutional claims in a federal habeas proceeding under § 2241 if two requirements are satisfied. First, the petitioner must be in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). Clearly, Davis, who remains incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail on the pending criminal charges, is "in custody" for purposes of § 2241.
Second, the petitioner must have exhausted his available state remedies. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224. State remedies are ordinarily not considered exhausted so long as the petitioner may effectively present his claims to the state courts by any currently available and adequate procedure. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489. Typically, in order to exhaust, a petitioner must fairly apprise the highest state court of the federal rights that were allegedly violated. SeeDeters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1985). In Texas, this requires that the claims be presented to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals by way of either a petition for discretionary review or postconviction writ of habeas corpus before a pretrial detainee may seek federal habeas corpus relief. See Deters, 985 F.2d at 795; Procunier, 762 F.2d at 432; Feist v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 927, 930 (E.D. Tex. 1995); see also Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1995) (exhaustion of state remedies may be accomplished either directly or collaterally); Lowe v. Scott, 48 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that petitioner who seeks to pursue issue that he failed to raise on direct appeal, must use available state collateral procedures to satisfy exhaustion requirement).
Despite the absence of an exhaustion requirement in the statutory language of § 2241, the courts have developed an exhaustion doctrine, holding that federal courts should abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction until the issues are resolved in state court, either by trial on the merits or by other state procedures available to the petitioner. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973); Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir. 1976); Clark v. Anderson, No. 4:01-CV-723-Y, 2001 WL 1631538, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2001). The exhaustion doctrine applicable to § 2241 was judicially crafted on federalism grounds to protect the state courts' opportunity to resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as well as to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process. See Dickerson, 816 F.3d at 225; Clark, 2001 WL 1631538, at *3.
Either from conviction itself or from the disposition of a preconviction application for writ of habeas corpus. See generally TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 11.07-11.09 (Vernon 1977 Supp. 2002).
A petitioner may be excused from the exhaustion requirement only if he can show "exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency." Id. at 795. Absent exceptional circumstances, a pretrial detainee may not adjudicate the merits of his constitutional claims before a judgment of conviction has been entered by a state court. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489. "Derailing of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court" is not allowed. Id. at 493.
Davis alleges that he has attempted to exhaust his state court remedies, via state writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus, to no avail. However, he provides no proof of his efforts in this regard. (Pet. at 2-3.) Further, in order to excuse his failure to meet the exhaustion requirement, he argues that exceptional circumstances exist allowing "this court to step in." Specifically, he argues the following special circumstances justify federal intervention:
(1) His attorney has not "sat down and explained his side," reviewed the state's file, or spent "any time checking facts";
(2) He cannot get a fair trial because the state court will not require the state to prove each element of the alleged crime(s);
(3) "The probable cause in this case is centered on false information given to the police department by a federal probation officer"; and
(4) His attorney and the state's attorney "refuse to make sure that a nude image recovered from his computer is the alleged victim herself." (Id. at 3-4.)
These circumstances, however, do not warrant federal court interference in the normal functioning of the state's criminal processes. See Garden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980). Even if one or more of Davis's claims constitute possible defenses to the state charges, a federal court should abstain from considering those claims out of deference to the state courts. Texas has adequate and effective state procedures for review of Davis's constitutional claims in the event he is convicted of the present charges. Federal habeas relief should not be used as a "pretrial motion forum for state prisoners." Braden, 410 U.S. at 493; Clark v. Anderson, No. 4:01-CV-723-Y, 2001 WL 1631538, at 4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2001) (not designated for publication).
In summary, Davis has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement as to the claims presented or shown that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting federal intrusion at this juncture. Accordingly, pretrial habeas interference by this court is not authorized. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 493. After the state proceedings are concluded, federal habeas proceedings can be instituted by Davis after he has exhausted his state remedies. This petition should be dismissed without prejudice to his right to seek federal habeas corpus relief after the state proceedings are concluded. Under the circumstances, it appears dismissal is appropriate. See Deters, 985 F.2d at 797.
II. RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore recommended that Davis's petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice.III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until October 1, 2003. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until October 1, 2003, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.