Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ. No. SWJ006945 Bradley O. Snell, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Jodi Vande Witte for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
McKinster J.
David Z. (Father) petitions for an extraordinary writ vacating the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing to consider terminating his parental rights to his daughter, T.Z. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a).) Father contends the juvenile court erred in setting the hearing because substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) provided or offered reasonable reunification services to him. We deny the petition.
All further references to code sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
T.Z. was 12 years old when she was removed from her home. T.Z.’s mother, Tanya M. (Mother), is legally married to Father, but they have been in the process of divorce.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
1. FIRST DETENTION
On January 4, 2007, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Mother and her 18-year-old daughter, T.S., found T.S.’s two-month-old baby not breathing, on a couch in the family’s home. The baby was pronounced dead approximately one hour later. Mother admitted abusing methamphetamines four days prior to the baby’s death. The house was messy, and the baby’s crib appeared to be used for storage rather than for sleeping. A Department employee took T.Z. and Mother’s two sons into protective custody.
2. FIRST JURISDICTION/DISPOSITION
The Department’s search for Father revealed that Father was incarcerated in a California state prison. A Department employee interviewed T.Z. T.Z. stated that she had been living with her Mother’s friend, Wendy, on the Morongo Reservation for the past two years. T.Z. had not had contact with Father for “several years.”
On March 19, 2007, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction hearing in the matter. The court ordered that T.Z. be placed in Mother’s custody, and that the Department provide services to Mother. The court found Father to be the presumed father of T.Z. The Department’s recommended case plan was that Father receive no services. The juvenile court’s minute order reflects the following order: “Case plan read, considered and approved . . . [Father] ordered to participate in services.” It is unclear what services the court was directing Father to participate in, because no services were recommended in the case plan.
3. SECOND DETENTION
On May 31, 2007, Mother was arrested for a parole violation and battery. Mother was incarcerated in state prison. On June 5, 2007, the Department filed a supplemental dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387) alleging that Mother had left her children with no provision for support.
On June 6, 2007, the court held a detention hearing on the supplemental petition. The court ordered that T.Z. be removed from Mother’s and Father’s custody.
4. FIRST SIX-MONTH STATUS REVIEW & SECOND JURISDICTION/DISPOSITION
On October 1, 2007, the juvenile court held a combined six-month review hearing on the original petition and jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the supplemental petition. As to both hearings, the court found returning T.Z. to Mother’s or Father’s custody would place T.Z. at risk for substantial danger. The Department’s jurisdiction/disposition case plan did not recommend any services for Father; however, when making orders as to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered the Department to provide services to Father. As to the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Father receive a visit from T.Z. while in custody, and that the Department file a case plan within 10 days.
In response to the court’s order, the Department filed a case plan. The recommended case plan for Father included (1) parenting classes; (2) substance abuse classes; (3) substance abuse testing; (4) a 12-step program; and (5) individual and joint counseling. The case plan was approved by the court on November 14, 2007.
5. 12-MONTH REVIEW
On December 4, 2007, the Department sent Father a letter addressed to “North Kern State Prison.” The letter reads: “Enclosed with this letter is a parenting education packet entitled Parenting a New Tradition by Steven A. Maybell, Ph.D. Please read the pamphlet. You can also request to attend a parenting education class at the facility. [¶] Also enclosed with this letter is a copy of your case plan. You are required to participate in a substance abuse treatment program. You may be able to participate in this program at your facility. [¶] If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at [phone number].” On January 9, 2008, the Department sent the same letter to Father, but addressed to a different post office box at “Kern Valley State Prison.”
In January 2008, Father completed a Department of Corrections form requesting to participate in parenting classes, and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, Alcoholic Anonymous meetings, or the Substance Abuse Program. Father wrote on the form that his parole date would be June 5, 2008. On January 30, 2008, Father received a response, from the Department of Corrections, informing him that he was on the waiting list for support services, adult education, and the Substance Abuse Program.
On February 3, 2008, Father completed another Department of Corrections form requesting adult education classes or job training. On February 6, 2008, Father received a response, from the Department of Corrections, informing him that he was still on the waiting list for support services, adult education, and the Substance Abuse Program.
On February 13, 2008, Father wrote a letter to the Department. Father wrote that he received the parenting packet sent by the Department, and that he was on the waiting list for parenting classes and drug counseling. Father also noted that his parole date had been changed to May 15, 2008.
On May 8, 2008, the juvenile court held a contested 12-month review hearing. Father’s counsel requested that Father’s services not be terminated. In support of the request, Father’s counsel argued that Father had been writing letters to T.Z. and participating in drug counseling and drug testing. Father’s counsel went on to argue that the Department was required to specifically identify programs for Father to attend at prison, and that the Department failed to do so, and therefore, reasonable services had not been provided to Father.
The Department argued that there was little else it could have done beyond mailing Father the parenting packet and ensuring that Father was on the Department of Corrections waiting lists for classes and programs.
The court found that the Department had complied with the case plan, but Father “failed to make substantive progress or . . . complete the court-ordered case plan.” Additionally, the court found that Father was not capable of caring for T.Z., because he was incarcerated and not scheduled to be paroled for another week. The court terminated Father’s services.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court erred in setting a hearing to terminate his parental rights because substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that the Department provided or offered reasonable reunification services to him. We disagree.
At a 12-month permanency review hearing, if a court rules that a child will not be returned to her parent, then the court must specify the factual basis for why it concluded returning the child would be detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) When the court makes its determination of detriment, one factor to consider is whether reasonable services were offered to the parent. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Reasonable services are services that aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The juvenile court must order reasonable services to an incarcerated parent unless the services would be detrimental to the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).)
The reasonableness of services is judged according to the circumstances of each case. (Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.) “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
An appellate court’s “sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.” (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) When determining whether substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that reasonable services were provided, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) “If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (Ibid.)
After the juvenile court ordered the Department to provide Father with services, the Department contacted Father by mail. The Department sent Father a parenting packet that he could complete by mail. Additionally, the Department informed Father that he could request to attend parenting classes at the prison, and that he may be able to participate in substance abuse counseling at the prison. Father responded to the Department by mail. Father wrote that he received the parenting packet and was on the waiting list for Narcotics Anonymous, the Substance Abuse Program, and parenting classes. Father included evidence that he was on the waiting lists for the programs and classes.
We conclude the foregoing proof provides substantial evidence that the Department provided Father with reasonable services. Ensuring that Father was on the appropriate waiting lists for substance abuse counseling, informing Father that he could request to attend parenting classes, mailing Father the parenting packet, and staying in contact with Father constitute providing reasonable services given the circumstances of this case.
Father argues that the Department was required to identify for Father the exact services that were available to him at the prison. Additionally, the Department was obligated to determine if the programs at the prison would satisfy the case plan requirements. In support of his argument, Father cites the case of Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996 (Mark N.).
In Mark N., the court analyzed the reasonableness of services offered to an incarcerated father. (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010-1015.) The incarcerated father had testified that no services were available to him at the prison. (Id. at p. 1013.) The department did not verify the father’s claim by contacting the prison. (Ibid.) Further, the department social worker could not recall whether she suggested to the father that he inquire of prison officials whether he was correct in believing that services were not available to him. (Ibid.) The court found that the department had not offered reasonable services to the father because it merely accepted the father’s claim that no services were available to him in prison. (Ibid.) The reviewing court found that, at a minimum, the department should have (1) notified the prison that the father was in need of services; (2) determined whether any services were available at the prison; and (3) explored whether changes in the father’s housing would have facilitated his obtaining services. (Ibid.)
Mark N.’s conclusion that a department should determine whether appropriate services are available at a prison simply means that if a parent claims no services are available then the department should confirm such a claim. Mark N. does not impose an obligation on a department to research the exact programs available to an incarcerated parent or an obligation to determine whether a prison’s programs meet the case plan criteria. Accordingly, we find Father’s argument to be unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied.
We concur: Hollenhorst Acting P.J., Gaut J.