Opinion
No. 26409-2-III.
January 15, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 07-2-03433-6, Ellen K. Clark, J., entered August 1, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Kulik, A.C.J., and Sweeney, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Ronald Davenport attempted to sue Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent William Waight in the Spokane County Superior Court in an effort to halt agency action to collect federal taxes owing from 1995. The trial court dismissed the action and Mr. Davenport appealed. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and that this appeal is frivolous. We affirm the dismissal and impose sanctions.
FACTS
Mr. Davenport filed a self-styled "Petition for Common Law Writ of Prohibition" in the Spokane County Superior Court asking the court to stop Mr. Waight from attempting to collect taxes owed the federal government. He claimed to be a "sovereign" over whom the federal government had no jurisdiction. The court promptly denied the writ and dismissed the action since it had no jurisdiction over federal agencies and statutes. It ordered the filing fee returned to Mr. Davenport. He then appealed to this court.
The Department of Justice responded to the appeal and sought an order renaming the case to make the United States government a party instead of its employee, Mr. Waight. Mr. Davenport argues here that he is a "sovereign" to whom the state courts owe a duty to issue the writ to prohibit collection efforts. The IRS contends that this state court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Mr. Davenport's actions are frivolous.
The government sought to have the United States listed as respondent instead of its agency, the Internal Revenue Service. Our Commissioner changed the caption to "United States, Internal Revenue Service, and William Waight" as respondents. While the government still contends that the only proper party is the United States, it did not seek to modify the Commissioner's Ruling and we will leave the caption as ordered.
ANALYSIS
Direct Appeal. This action is barred by sovereign immunity. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 85 L. Ed. 1058, 61 S. Ct. 767 (1941); accord, United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 25 L. Ed. 194 (1878). A suit against an employee of the federal government is a suit against the government and is similarly subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 10 L. Ed. 2d 191, 83 S. Ct. 1052 (1963).
The federal government has not consented to be sued over tax matters. In fact, it has enacted a statute prohibiting lawsuits over tax matters. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) provides in part that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained by any court by any person." This provision precludes actions to enjoin or otherwise stop the tax collection efforts. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 738-739, 40 L. Ed. 2d 496, 94 S. Ct. 2038 (1974).
This statute is the law of the land. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, provides in part that "the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby."
Accordingly, the trial court correctly recognized that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the proposed writ and properly dismissed the action.
Sanctions. Respondent United States seeks sanctions of $3,000 for defending against this action. An appellate court can sanction a party for filing a frivolous appeal or using the appellate process for delay. RAP 18.9. "An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal." Fay v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 194, 200-201, 796 P.2d 412 (1990).
We agree that this action is frivolous under the noted standard. It has long been recognized that efforts of people to exempt themselves from taxation by declaring themselves to be "sovereigns" or the like are utterly devoid of merit. A long line of cases has declared such actions frivolous. E.g., United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sileven, 985 F.2d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); McNair v. Eggers, 788 F.2d 1509, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986). Equally well settled is the fact that the United States has not consented to be sued in state courts. Finally, even if there were such entities as the individual "sovereigns" Mr. Davenport claims to be, he has not attempted to explain why his "consent" to state court jurisdiction also operates as consent for the United States to appear in state court. He has no authority to speak for the federal government or bind it to appear in actions in state court.
For more information about "sovereignty" theory, see generally, J. Jahns and P. Loginsky, Freemen: Armageddon's Prophets of Hate and Terror, at 26-27, 33 (3d ed. June 1999).
This action was utterly frivolous. Mr. Davenport continued the case even after the trial court ordered his money refunded. There was no chance of a differing outcome on appeal. While the $3,000 sought by respondent is reasonable, we exercise our discretion in this matter and award $1,000 to the United States.
The order of dismissal is affirmed. Mr. Davenport shall pay respondent United States $1,000 for bringing a frivolous action.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KULIK, A.C.J. and SWEENEY, J., CONCUR.