Relevant to the objection discussed here, the magistrate judge concluded "to the extent that the claims of a minor were previously litigated on his behalf by parent-next friends, represented by counsel and who acted consistently with the interests of the minor, the limitations period as to the minor's claims was not tolled until the minor reaches majority, because the incapacity of minority was remedied by the next-friend proceeding." Findings Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ("Magistrate's Recommendation") at 11 (docket entry 45) (citing Matter of D.A.S., 951 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 973 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1998); Fite v. King, 718 S.W.2d 345, 346 n.2 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005)). In reaching this result, the magistrate judge reasoned that "where there is no indication that a next friend lacks 'authority to speak for the child,' a litigation decision by the next friend 'binds the child as well.'"

The court of appeals held that Anders is inapplicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings and denied counsel's request to withdraw. 951 S.W.2d 528. In an unrelated proceeding, R.A.H. was found to be a child engaged in delinquent conduct for committing the offense of evading arrest.

The cases cited by Appellees do not establish that a minor can forfeit the protection of the tolling provision through a lawsuit brought by a next friend. See, e.g. , In re D.A.S. , 951 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App. 1997) (establishing that a minor can bring a lawsuit through a next friend without referencing any effect this has on the statute of limitations period). Appellees rely on Ramirez v. Michelin North America, Inc. , No. C-07-228, 2007 WL 2126635 at *4 (S.D. Tex., 2007), for the principle that a next friend's litigation decision "binds the child as well."

Therefore, to the extent that the claims of a minor were previously litigated on his behalf by parent-next friends, represented by counsel and who acted consistently with the interests of the minor, the limitations period as to the minor's claims was not tolled until the minor reaches majority, because the incapacity of minority was remedied by the next-friend proceeding. See Matter of D.A.S., 951 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1997) ("In all legal proceedings, a child is under a legal disability and has no right to bring a cause of action on his own unless this disability has been removed or unless the child is represented by a 'next friend' or guardian ad litem."

Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350.See In re D.A.S., 951 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997)("[A] minor does not have the legal capacity to employ an attorney. . . ."), rev'd on other grounds, 973 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1998); accord, Lee v. Colorado City, Texas, No. 04-CV-00028, 2004 WL 524923 *2 n. 2 (N.D.Tex.

In arguing a legal basis exists for imposition of a duty in this case, 239 JV cites cases addressing the duty to inform a client of matters specifically relating to the agreed-upon representation of an attorney. For example, 239 JV cites Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d 672, 679 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997) (regarding failure to communicate existence of settlement offer), modified, 966 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1998), and Matter of D.A.S., 951 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997) (regarding attorney's failure in appeal from juvenile proceeding to inform client and his guardians of conclusion appeal would be frivolous and to recommend that appeal be dismissed), mandamus granted on other grounds, 973 S.W.2d 296 (1998). Each of these cases correctly discusses an attorney's duty to keep a client informed about an ongoing matter in which the attorney is representing the client.

The Dallas Court of Appeals recognized the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings, but it observed that a child has no right to bring a cause of action and that a child has no legal capacity to hire a lawyer. In re D.A.S., 951 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1997, order). Thus, the court concluded that a child cannot respond to an Anders brief, as anticipated by the Anders process.