Valenciav.Midnite Rodeo, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-665, 2023 WL 7031561, at *7 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 13, 2023) (citing Dao Travels, LLCv.Charleston Black Cab Co., No. 2:14-CV-1967, 2015 WL 631137, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2015) (“It is well-established that individual corporate officers and directors can be held personally liable for violations of the Lanham Act.”).

If the jury so finds, Mr. Perry could be held independently liable for that conduct. Dao Travels, LLC v. Charleston Black Cab Co., No. 2:14-CV-01967-PMD, 2015 WL 631137, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2015); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987); Universal Furniture, Int'l, Inc. v. Frankel, 835 F.Supp.2d 35, 48 (M.D. N.C. 2011) affd, 538 Fed.Appx. 267 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, the Court will deny Defendants' summary judgment motion as to Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims against Mr. Perry.

Defendants, on the other hand, appear to lump the Lanham Act claims and the state law claims under the same argument: that the Scoggins Defendants cannot be held liable for any claims because the corporate veil cannot be pierced on the facts alleged. Still, from the undersigned's review of the law, it seems clear that “[i]t is well-established that individual corporate officers and directors can be held personally liable for violations of the Lanham Act.” Dao Travels, LLC v. Charleston Black Cab Co., 2015 WL 631137, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2015). The Fourth Circuit seems to endorse this principle, stating “[a] corporate official may be held personally liable for tortious conduct committed by him, though committed primarily for the benefit of the corporation[...t]his is true in trademark infringement and unfair trade practices cases.”

Many courts have also denied a motion for preliminary injunction where the plaintiff has failed to make a “clear showing” of likelihood of success on the merits due to an undeveloped record. See, e.g., Dao Travels, LLC v. Charleston Black Cab Co., No. 2:14–cv–01967–PMD, 2015 WL 631137, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2015) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction due to concerns about the limited record before the court); St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Janssen–Counotte, No. A–14–CA–877–SS, 2014 WL 7237411, at *14 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 17, 2014) (noting that there are “far too many open questions and disputed issues of fact to conclude at this juncture” that the plaintiff had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the motion for preliminary injunction); Jones v. Hamilton Cty., 891 F.Supp.2d 870, 889 (E.D.Tenn.2012) (holding that “the record before the Court is far too underdeveloped to adequately analyze” the plaintiff's as-applied challenge to the county's prayer policy under the First Amendment); Nat'l Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 858 F.Supp. 251, 258 (D.D.C.1994) (“Absent a more developed factual record, the Court cannot find that plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits.”).