Opinion
24-CV-3522 (LTS)
09-11-2024
RAPHAEL DANTE, Plaintiff, v. RALPHS SUPERMARKET, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who resides in Hampton, New Jersey, brings this pro se action against Ralphs Supermarket, alleging violation of his rights. By order dated September 7, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action with a one-page complaint captioned for the Los Angeles Superior Court. For the facts of his case, Plaintiff asserts the following:
I was walking up to Ralphs Grocery Store and the security guard had taken out his baton and I tried running away but he caught up to me and then stricken me twice with it and then peppered sprayed me. Then I got away.(ECF 1, at 1.) Plaintiff further asserts that he would like $250,000 in damages and “an apology from the security guard stating I directly hurt you and am sorry.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy Rule 8's requirement that it provide enough factual detail to suggest a plausible claim. Plaintiff, who resides in New Jersey, seemingly brings claims of assault and battery by a security guard at Ralphs Grocery Store, but he does not allege the date on which his claims arose or where the alleged events occurred. In fact, Plaintiff's complaint, which is captioned for the Los Angeles Superior Court, a state court in California, suggests that the alleged events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims may not have happened in New York.
Therefore, it is unclear from the facts alleged whether there is a viable claim of which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff's complaint does not comply with Rule 8, the Court dismisses it for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8 and establishes that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction as explained below.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff brings this action without specifying a basis for subject matter jurisdiction of his claim in federal court. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”).
1. Federal question jurisdiction
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 118889 (2d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint suggest that he may be attempting to assert claims of assault and battery. Such claims generally arise under state law and Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting a viable claim arising under federal law. The Court therefore does not have federal question jurisdiction of this action.
2. Diversity jurisdiction
Plaintiff's claims of assault and battery appear to arise under state law, but he does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of his claims. To establish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he or she is domiciled, which is defined as the place where a person “has his [or her] true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he [or she] is absent, he [or she] has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A corporation is a citizen “of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (a corporation's principal place of business is its “nerve center,” usually its main headquarters). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden of alleging facts showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this action. Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1998) (plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction existed at the time the action was commenced). He indicates that he resides in New Jersey but does not plead any facts about Defendant's citizenship. Nor does Plaintiff meet his burden of alleging to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages, but he does not allege any facts describing the losses he incurred or why Defendant should be held liable for that amount. He therefore does not allege facts plausibly suggesting that she has suffered any damages amounting to the $250,000 he seeks. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this action.
Because Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that the Court has either federal question or diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of this matter, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
C. Venue
Because Plaintiff brings this action without specifying where the alleged events giving rise to his claims occurred, even if the Court has jurisdiction of his claims, it is not clear that this court is the appropriate venue for this action. The applicable venue provision for this action, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), provides that a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Under Section 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).
From Plaintiff's complaint is not clear where the alleged event occurred, where Defendant Ralphs Supermarket resides, or whether Defendant is subject to this court's personal jurisdiction for this action. Thus, it is not clear that this court is a proper venue for this action under any of the provisions of Section 1391(b).Accordingly, should Plaintiff amend his complaint, he must address why this court is a proper venue for this action.
This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to establish a viable claim of which the Court has diversity jurisdiction and demonstrate that this court is a proper venue for this action, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed under the Court's diversity jurisdiction, he must allege facts demonstrating that he and Defendant are citizens of different states and that the value of his claims exceeds $75,000.00.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses this action for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). All other pending matters in this case are terminated.
The Court, however, grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint, as specified in this order. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will enter judgment dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.