Opinion
KNLCV146022886S
04-22-2016
Stephany Daniels v. Skymark, LLC et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DECISION OF COURT RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Timothy D. Bates, J.
On December 6, 2014, Stephany Daniels (hereinafter referred to as " the plaintiff") brought this negligence action based on a " slip and fall" injury which occurred on December 12, 2012 in a shopping center located at 20 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut. She named as defendants Skymark, LLC (hereinafter " Skymark"), the landlord of the shopping center, as well as First Choice Pizza, Inc. and First Choice Pizza, Inc. D/B/A Domino's Pizza, being the corporate and operating names of the tenant in the shopping center which she had patronized prior to her fall (said two entities being referred to herein collectively as " First Choice").
In her complaint, she alleges that she had purchased a pizza to go from First Choice and upon exiting its premises, she slipped and fell. She claims that both Skymark and First Choice were liable for the injuries she sustained in her fall on the basis of premises liability because they each failed to provide adequate means of ingress and egress, they specifically did not properly place wheel stops in the parking lot, and they did not maintain the premises in such a way as to remedy the dangerous conditions they had created.
Both Skymark and First Choice subsequently filed answers and special defenses, denying the claims of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff responded with replies refuting the special defenses. On February 8, 2016, First Choice filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that under the terms of its lease, it did not have any " possession, control, maintenance responsibility or ownership" over the exterior sidewalk where the plaintiff fell. Therefore, it argued it had no liability for the injuries sustained, citing Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 98 (1969), and Hobart v. McDonalds Restaurant of Connecticut, Sup.Ct., JD New Haven at Meriden, 1999 WL 545740, Dkt. #263193 (7/19/1999, Beach, J.).
In support of its claim, First Choice submitted a copy of its lease and specifically noted the terms of Section 13, which reads:
13. MAINTENANCE: Landlord hereby agrees to maintain, (including repair of items as necessary or appropriate) the exterior premises, including the Tenant's dedicated parking areas, if any, stairways, access ways, and grounds in order to keep the premises in a good state of repair. Tenant shall pay forty (40%) percent of the cost of mowing and exterior policing of trash and brush on the grounds.
Based on the wording of Section 13, First Choice submits that it had no legal duty to maintain the area where the plaintiff fell, and therefore any damages incurred by the plaintiff arising from the condition of the exterior walkway and parking lot were the responsibility of the landlord, Skymark.
On March 25, 2016, Skymark filed an objection to First Choice's motion for summary judgment. Skymark notes that the lease referred to by First Choice was executed on January 19, 2000, when Skymark did not exist, and was signed by then landlord Charles P. Weiss. Skymark states that it had come into existence on October 19, 2011, and the lease by its own terms had expired on the last day of July 2005. See Paragraph 1 of Lease (Sometimes referred to herein as the " Weiss lease").
Accordingly Skymark argues that it is not bound by the terms of " an expired contract" to which it was never a party. It submits that it is therefore up to the jury to determine what entity had the " power or authority to manage, superintend, direct or oversee" the exterior sidewalk, citing Bates v. Connecticut Light and Power Company, 130 Conn. 256 (1943), and First Choice's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
ANALYSIS
In opposing First Choice's Motion for Summary Judgment, Skymark does not contest the factual assertions of First Choice, which are based on the terms and conditions of the Weiss lease. Rather, Skymark challenges the relevance and legal enforceability of the terms of the Weiss lease against a successor landlord, which never was a signatory of the lease.
However, in raising this challenge, Skymark overlooks the legal viability of the terms of a hold-over lease. As noted in Am.Jur.2d " Landlord and Tenant" V. 49, Sec. 288, the end of a lease term does not necessarily eliminate the enforceability of its terms and conditions in regards to a hold-over tenant, such as First Choice. When title to property occupied by a tenant at will--which was the status of First Choice at the expiration of the lease term--is passed by deed or lease, the tenancy is terminated and the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance, and the landlord can evict the tenant. Id. Section 232. However, if the tenant, upon becoming a tenant in sufferance, tenders rent, which is accepted by the landlord, the tenant's status changes to that of a " holdover" tenant, which is " governed by the same terms of the original lease." Id. Sec. 284. See also Margolis v. Wise, 91 Conn. 152, 156 (1916), and W.G. Malty, Inc. v. The Associated Realty Co., 114 Conn. 283, 288 (1932).
Connecticut Statute § 47a-3d limits the rights of a hold-over tenant to a month-to-month tenancy, allowing the landlord to terminate the lease upon a month's notice, but this statute does not otherwise abrogate the rights of holdover tenants to rely on the original lease terms. Presumably, Skymark has been accepting monthly rental payments from First Choice, and " The knowing acceptance of rent without any effort to terminate the lease will justify the inference that the landlord has chosen to hold the tenant to the lease. Thus, when a lessee continues to pay base rent under the old lease for over a year after the lease expired by its terms, it is clear that the lessee with the consent of the landlord has held over as a tenant . . . under the terms and conditions of the expired lease." Op. Cit. Am.Jur.2nd Section 289. Also, see Connecticut Landlord and Tenant Law, 2nd Ed., Noble F. Allen, Conn. Law Tribune, " Hold Over Tenancy, " p. A 18 (2014).
Contrary to the assumption of Skymark that Paragraph 13 of the lease--making the landlord responsible for maintenance of the sidewalk area--had lapsed with the expiration of the lease, that responsibility remains in place on a month-to-month basis and frees First Choice as a hold-over tenant from liability to the plaintiff in this case. See also Thompson on Real Property, 2d.Ed., Lexis Nexis, Vol. 5, Section 40-10(b).
Accordingly First Choice's motion for summary judgment is granted.