Opinion
No. 03-CV-377
February 6, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis filed by Plaintiff Lonnie Daniels ("Daniels"). Although difficult to comprehend, Daniels' Complaint appears to allege that various state actors, including the Borough of Media and several of its police officers, and Judge Petrese B. Tucker ("Judge Tucker"), a federal district court judge, violated his due process rights and subjected him to fraud in connection with a civil rights claim he filed in 2000. Daniels seeks this Court's permission to proceed in forma pauperis in filing his claim against all the defendants in the underlying 2000 claim, as well as Judge Tucker, who he alleges violated his rights since he was not represented by counsel during his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. For the following reasons, Daniels' Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Judge Tucker is DISMISSED as a defendant in the instant suit.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2000, Daniels filed a civil rights action against the Borough of Media and several of its police officers in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The case was later removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and assigned to Judge Tucker. Daniels claim was ultimately unsuccessful, as Judge Tucker granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Daniels then filed a motion for appointment of counsel to secure an attorney to appeal Judge Tucker's ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 3, 2001, Judge Tucker granted Daniels' motion and ordered the Clerk of Court to appoint counsel to represent Daniels on appeal. However, after four attempts, the Clerk was unsuccessful in securing counsel for Daniels, prompting Judge Tucker to vacate her April 3, 2001 order for appointment of counsel on October 25, 2001. On March 11, 2002, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Tucker's summary judgment ruling.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Completion of Statement Supporting In Forma Pauperis
In the instant motion, Daniels petitions this Court to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of filing a claim against all the defendants in his 2000 lawsuit as well as Judge Tucker. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a), a federal court may authorize the commencement of a civil action or appeal without prepayment of the requisite fees, provided that an individual submits to the court documentation stating that the individual is unable to pay such fees and listing all the assets that the individual possesses in support of that assertion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(1) Although Daniels provided this Court with a statement in support of his request to proceed in forma pauperis, he neglected to complete question 1. In order to consider Daniels' request fully, we must have a complete application before us. Accordingly, we must DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Daniels' motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Question 1 asks whether the applicant is presently employed. Since Daniels represented that he is not employed, he was prompted to state the date of his last employment and the amount of the salary and wages per month he received. However, Daniels did not answer this part of question one.
Should Daniels choose to pursue his claim and refile his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, we note that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also permits the Court to deny Daniels' motion if the underlying Complaint is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i). Daniels' short, one-page Complaint alleges due process violations and avers fraud that appear to have little factual support or grounding in the law. Thus, we warn Daniels that should this Court deem his Complaint frivolous, we could, sua sponte, dismiss his lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. We suggest that Daniels contact an organization available to assist him in pursuing this claim, such as the Community Legal Services, Inc., 1424 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102, (215) 981-3700 or the Philadelphia Bar Association Legal Reference Service, 1101 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107, (215) 238-6333.
B. Judge Tucker as Named Defendant
In his Complaint, Daniels names Judge Tucker as a defendant and seeks $50 million in damages. However, Judge Tucker is protected from suit by the doctrine of judicial immunity, an absolute bar for any suit seeking damages from a judicial defendant. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). Thus, we must preemptively dismiss Judge Tucker as a defendant in Daniels' case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits the Court to dismiss a lawsuit at any time if the claim "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) (iii)
Although originating in medieval times, judges continue to enjoy absolute immunity from civil suit under the expansive doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9; Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). "The doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability." Antoine v. Byers Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993); see also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 462 U.S. 1137, 1141 (1983). Absolute immunity ensures that judges are free to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of suit, and is not easily overcome. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Allegations of bad faith or malice do not destroy judicial immunity, nor is this immunity lost when accusations of conspiracy are averred. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Dennis, 449 U.S. at 26-27;Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985)
Absolute immunity extends to judicial officials provided the judge performed a "judicial act" within his or her jurisdictional authority.See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Two factors determine whether a judge's act was judicial in nature: (1) if it was a function normally performed by a judge, and (2) if the parties dealt with a judge in his or her judicial capacity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12; Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Mere ministerial or administrative tasks performed by judges are not protected by immunity because they are not sufficiently judicial in nature. See, e.g.,Forrester, 484 U.S. at 221 (determining judge's hiring practices were not judicial in nature). Additionally, a judge will forfeit absolute immunity if he or she acts in complete absence of jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Grove v. Rizzolo, 441 F.2d 1153, 1154 (3d Cir. 1971)
Judge Tucker's order directing the Clerk to appoint counsel for Daniels, and her subsequent order vacating this directive, were actions "normally performed by a judge" and, undoubtedly, judicial in nature.See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Moreover, her orders were fully within her jurisdictional authority. Since she presided over Daniels' case, and presumably had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties and their claims, Judge Tucker could, therefore, address Daniels' motion for appointment of counsel. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (recognizing judicial immunity was absolute when applied to individuals responsible for resolving disputes between parties) Since Judge Tucker is clearly entitled to absolute protection from suit pursuant to the judicial immunity doctrine, we must DISMISS her as a named defendant should Daniels decide to pursue his instant suit.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February 2003, in consideration of the Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis filed by Plaintiff Lonnie Daniels (Doc. No. 1), it is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2. Defendant Judge Petrese B. Tucker is DISMISSED from the above-captioned lawsuit.