Opinion
Case No. A1-02-125
July 22, 2003
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Keenan Daniels, has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that several employees of Stark County, North Dakota, and the City of Dickinson, North Dakota, violated his constitutional rights. Daniels also requested and was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. After an initial review of his complaint, the Magistrate Judge completed a Report and Recommendation recommending Daniels be allowed to proceed on two cognizable claims: (1) deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and (2) unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation in its entirety on April 1, 2003.
Daniels now seeks to amend his complaint. Daniels wants to correct the name of an individual incorrectly identified in his initial complaint, add new claims based on state tort law, and add seven new defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). It is generally left to the court's discretion whether to grant leave to file an amended complaint. Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Little Rock Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 224 (8th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1992).
Unless there is good reason for denial, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment, leave to amend is generally granted. Becker v. Univ. of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1999); Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564, 566. Although a party does not have an absolute right to amend his complaint, such motion should only be denied on the merits if it asserts clearly frivolous claims or defenses. See Becker v. Univ. of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904, 908 (citing Williams v. Little Rock Municipal Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 224 and Gammas-10 Plastics, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1198 (1995)). "Likelihood of success on the new claim or defense is not a consideration for denying leave to amend unless the claim is clearly frivolous." Becker v. Univ. of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904, 908.
Defendants Stark County and Jim Rice argue that since Daniels' proposed amendments go beyond the claims allowed in the Court's April 1, 2003, Order, Daniels' motion to amend the complaint should be denied. Defendants City of Dickinson and Chandra Anderson have not responded to Daniels' motion.
In his initial complaint, Daniels identified the Stark County Sheriff as "Glen Rice." Since the filing of his initial complaint, Daniels has learned the correct name of the Stark County Sheriff is "Jim Rice." The Court finds that justice requires Daniels be allowed to amend his complaint to correctly identify Jim Rice as the Stark County Sheriff.
Daniels also seeks to amend his complaint to include state-law tort claims against various Stark County employees. Daniels has alleged tort claims for "negligence, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional and mental distress." Daniels also seeks to add seven additional defendants to his complaint. The proposed defendants are Larry Buck, Ryan Mahony, and Fern Moser, three Stark County Deputy Sheriffs; Deb Tritton and Carrier Kovash, two Stark County Social Service employees; James Hope, an Assistant Stark County States Attorney; and Mike Sticka, a foster parent employed by Stark County. Daniels seeks to proceed against each of these individuals in both their individual and official capacities, except for James Hope and Mike Sticka whom he names only in their individual capacities.
Defendants Stark County and Jim Rice ("County Defendants") argue that Deb Tritton, Carrie Kovash, and Mike Sticka are individuals with whom Daniels interacted during a child custody dispute taking place the same time the alleged violations of Daniels' civil rights took place. The County Defendants assert that Tritton, Kovash and Sticka were not directly involved with the arrest and search that form the basis of Daniels" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
Daniels acknowledges his proposed amended complaint asserts tort claims rather than additional Section 1983 claims, but he argues that this Court has jurisdiction over supplemental state-law tort claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367(a) provides, in part:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
(emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) sets forth the situations when a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction:
(1)the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3)the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4)in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit has specifically held that district courts may reject jurisdiction over supplemental claims only in the four instances described in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 1994). In McLaurin, the plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a corrections officer had used excessive force. The plaintiff's pro se complaint did not allege state-law tort claims, but on the day of trial, the plaintiff's appointed counsel orally moved to amend the complaint to include the state-law related claims of assault, battery, and outrage. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law tort claims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is mandatory and that federal courts must accept supplemental jurisdiction when the basis for the original jurisdiction is premised on 29 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction, and the state-law claims meet the same case or controversy requirement of § 1367. 30 F.3d 982, 985.
There is no question that this Court has federal question jurisdiction in this case under 29 U.S.C. § 1331. After reviewing the Eighth Circuit precedent of McLaurin, the Court concludes it would also be required to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Daniels' state-law tort claims, if the claims arose out of the same case or controversy. Although the County Defendants argue that Tritton, Kovash, and Sticka were not involved in Daniels' arrest, Daniels contends that each of these individuals took part in the chain of events which led to his arrest. The Court finds that Daniels proposed state-law claims arise out of the same case and controversy as his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
The Court acknowledges that many of Daniels assertions in the proposed amended complaint mirror assertions he made in his original complaint and that this Court allowed him to proceed on only his claims which asserted violations of the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Since his initial complaint, Daniels has articulated the various state-law tort claims included in his amended complaint. Once this Court established that Daniels had alleged a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Daniels had properly presented this Court with an Article III case or controversy, this Court is without the authority to refuse to assert jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims without meeting the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court finds that none of the circumstances in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) exist which would permit the Court to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.
The Court also finds that Daniels has complied with the standards for amending a complaint as set forth in Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Daniels' proposed amended complaint does not assert clearly frivolous claims. Nor does there appear to be a good reason for denial, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment. Given the Eighth Circuit's clear pronouncement in McLaurin v. Prater and the general standard for allowing amended complaints, the Court grants Daniels leave to file an amended complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Daniels' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 24). The Court further ORDERS the Clerk of Court to file the amended complaint Daniels lodged with his motion. The Court also directs the United States Marshal Service to perfect service of the amended complaint on behalf of the Plaintiff, Keenan Daniels.
IT IS SO ORDERED