Opinion
May 11, 1988.
Motor vehicles — Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license — Delay in suspension — Delay by district justice.
1. The suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license will not be rendered invalid by a delay in effecting the suspension order when the delay is not chargeable to the Department of Transportation but was attributable to the district justice who delayed his certification of the operator's conviction. [122-3]
Submitted on briefs March 22, 1988, to Judges MacPHAIL and COLINS, and Senior Judge KALISH, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 3169 C.D. 1986, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation v. Michael John Dancho, Jr., No. G.D. 6774 of 1986.
Motor vehicle operator's license suspended by Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County. Appeal denied. Suspension sustained. CICCHETTI, P.J. Licensee appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Joseph W. Selep, Davis and Davis, for appellant.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Counsel, with him, John L. Heaton, Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Michael John Dancho, Jr. (Appellant) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County which reinstated a suspension of his operating privileges imposed by the Department of Transportation (Department). We affirm.
On May 11, 1984, Appellant pled guilty to a violation of Section 3733 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 3733, and began installment payments on the fine imposed by the district justice. By official notice dated March 31, 1986, Appellant was informed that as a result of his January 20, 1986 conviction of this violation, his operating privileges were suspended for six months. Appellant's subsequent appeal to the common pleas court was denied and his suspension reinstated. He now appeals to our Court.
Appellant argues here, as he did before the trial court, that the Department should be precluded from imposing the suspension. He contends that the suspension was imposed twenty-two months after his conviction, which he asserts occurred on May 11, 1984, and that this delay was unreasonable.
The crux of Appellant's argument appears to be that the Department's failure to enforce the district justice's compliance with the reporting and certifying requirements of the Vehicle Code should preclude the Department from suspending his operating privileges. We agree with the trial court, however, that regardless of any delay on the part of the district justice in the case before us, the Department's imposition of Appellant's suspension was proper.
Appellant claims that the district justice's delay in certifying his conviction until after he had paid his fine violated Section 6322(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 6322(a)(1).
In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Kazil, 97 Pa. Commw. 151, 510 A.2d 148 (1986), this Court was presented with a situation similar to that at bar. There, a licensee's conviction was certified by the district justice to the Department more than two years after the date of his conviction — only after the licensee completed installment payments on the fine. In reversing the trial court's order which sustained an appeal based on delay, we concluded:
A delay cannot be chargeable to DOT before the Department is in receipt of the certification of conviction. . . . Here, the delay was caused by the District Justice, who did not certify the conviction until the last payment was made. Conviction occurs when sentence is imposed. Installment payments of the costs do not postpone the conviction. The delay was that of the District Justice, and not that of DOT.
Id. at 152-153, 510 A.2d at 149 (citation omitted). See also Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Urbasik, 101 Pa. Commw. 646, 518 A.2d 1 (1986); Schultz v. Department of Transportation, 88 Pa. Commw. 43, 488 A.2d 408 (1985).
Likewise, in the case before us, we refuse to hold the Department responsible for delay in processing clearly attributable to the district justice. The Department notified Appellant of his suspension approximately two months after receiving the certification of Appellant's conviction from the district justice. This was not an unreasonable delay on the part of the Department. Accordingly, we conclude that the six-month suspension of Appellant's operating privileges was properly imposed.
Order affirmed.
ORDER
The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County in the above-captioned proceeding is hereby affirmed.