Opinion
Civil Action 1:18-CV-5243-WMR
08-04-2020
WASEEM DAKER, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN DEAL, et al., Defendants.
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
WILLIAM M. RAY, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. Introduction
On August 26, 2019, this Court concluded that Plaintiff Waseem Daker's allegations in his complaint were frivolous and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissed the action. [Doc. 33]. On the same day, this Court sua sponte determined that Daker is an abusive filer and imposed a permanent filing injunction which required him to post a contempt bond with the Clerk before he could proceed with any action in this Court. [Doc. 35]. Plaintiff appealed both orders, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, [Doc. 42], but reversed this Court's imposition of the injunction because this Court failed to give Daker notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Doc. 43]. This Court then issued a show cause order directing Daker to show cause why the injunction should not be reimposed. [Doc. 52].
In response, Daker has filed two motions to exceed the twenty-five page limit that this Court imposed on his response to the show cause order, [Docs. 49, 55], a response to the show cause order, [Doc. 50], a motion to recuse the undersigned, [Doc. 51], a second and supplemental motion to recuse, [Doc. 53], and another response to the show cause order, [Doc. 54]. Having reviewed Daker's responses to the show cause order, this Court concludes that the permanent injunction should be reimposed.
II. Discussion
This Court has already noted that Daker is a notorious serial filer. A review of court records on the Federal Judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“Pacer”) database reveals that Daker has filed well in excess of two hundred federal civil actions and appeals since 1999. Many of these lawsuits and appeals have been dismissed as frivolous, and Daker has now repeatedly been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act because of his frivolous filings. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see, e.g., Daker v. Dozier, 5:17-CV-0025-CAR, 2017 WL 3037420 at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 18, 2017); Daker v. Bryson, 6:16-CV-57, 2017 WL 1053082 at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2017); Daker v. Head, 6:14-cv-47 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2014). Notably, the Eleventh Circuit now recognizes that Daker is a three-striker. Daker v. Jackson, 942 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Daker v. Bryson, 784 Fed.Appx. 690 (11th Cir. 2019).
Daker's inability to obtain in forma pauperis status has not stopped him, however, as he paid the full filing fee in this case. This strongly indicates that his prior assertions of poverty were untrue-yet another reason that a sanction is appropriate-and that Daker's loss of the ability to proceed without paying the filing fee will not necessarily relieve the burden that his frivolous filings have placed on this and other federal courts. Moreover, in cases where Daker has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the three strikes provision, he has repeatedly and frivolously asserted that his claims qualify under the “imminent danger” exception to § 1915(g), and when that fails, he appeals. E.g., Daker v. Bryson, 784 Fed.Appx. 690, 693 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming district court's determination that forced shavings with unsanitized clippers and denial nutritionally adequate food did not qualify as imminent danger); Daker v. United States, 787 Fed.Appx. 678, 681,2019 WL 5546090 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming district court's determination that exposure to fecal matter, inadequate dental care, denial of outdoor exercise, and unsanitary clippers did not qualify as imminent danger). Put simply, it is evident that Daker's status as a three striker has not had the intended effect of limiting his ability to clog the Court's docket.
Daker has sought to proceed in forma pauperis multiple times, but it appears that he has owned ample assets during his entire incarceration. See Daker v. Robinson, Case No. 1:12-CV-118-RWS, [Doc. 3] (N.D.Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (denying Daker's request to proceed in forma pauperis because he had over $50,000.00 in net assets).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions and have a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc). “Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interest of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1993). In devising a means of curbing an abusive litigant, “the only restriction [that the Eleventh] Circuit has placed upon injunctions designed to protect against abusive and vexatious litigation is that a litigant cannot be ‘completely foreclosed from any access to the court.'” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074) (emphasis in original); see also Cofield v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991).
A. Daker's Vexatious Filings Have Improperly Burdened this Court
This Court and others have repeatedly documented and lamented Daker's extensive, abusive and vexatious litigation history. E.g., Daker v. Toole, 736 Fed. App'x 234, 235-36 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that Plaintiff has been “wreaking havoc wherever he goes” by “flood[ing]” the court “with numerous disputes”); Daker v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2016) (Daker is a “serial litigant who has clogged the federal courts with litigation” by “submit[ing] over a thousand pro se filings in over a hundred actions and appeals in at least nine different federal courts”); In re Daker, No. 1:11-CV-1711-RWS, 2014 WL 2548135, at *2 (N.D.Ga. June 5, 2014) (noting that in all of Daker's suits filed up to that point, he had won a two dollar judgment and “short-lived injunctive relief with respect to ‘weekly Ta'lim services'”) (vacated in part on other grounds); Daker v. Dozier, 5:17-CV-0025-CAR, 2017 WL 3037420, at 2 (M.D. Ga. July 18, 2017) (“This Court and other courts have noted that Plaintiff is a serial litigant with a significant history of filing frivolous lawsuits.”); Daker v. Warren, No. 1: 11-CV-1711-RWS, 2014 WL 806858, at *1 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 28, 2014) (“Waseem Daker is an extremely litigious state prisoner[.]”); Daker v. Bryson, 5:15-CV-88-CAR-CHW, 2017 WL 11427081, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2017) (noting that Daker's “claims against the . . . defendants are harassing, vexatious, and constitute a bad faith effort to manipulate the judicial system” and discussing Daker's history of abusive litigation tactics); Daker v. Allen, 6:18-CV-19, 2018 WL 1618285, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2018) (discussing Daker's “well-documented litigiousness,” “the vexatious nature of his motions,” and his “saddling the Court with superfluous pleadings to address”); Daker v. Dozier, 6:18-CV-73, 2019 WL 2497700, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2019) (noting that Daker is “a seasoned vexatious litigant”).
This Court and others have also found Daker to be materially dishonest. E.g., Daker v. Dozier, 6:17-CV-110, 2017 WL 4448234, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2017) (noting that Daker lied about his litigation history); In re Daker, No. 1:11-CV-1711-RWS, 2014 WL 2548135, at *2 (June 5, 2014, N.D.Ga.) (Daker has “repeatedly abused the judicial process by filing IFP affidavits that conceal and/or misstate his true assets and income”); Daker v. Head, 5:14-CV-138-MTT-CHW, 2019 WL 4398508, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2019) (“Plaintiff has not only blatantly misled the Court in this case, he has a documented history of doing so in the other courts in which he prosecutes his claims.”).
Having reviewed many of his pleadings, the undersigned can attest to the fact that, even in the cases in which he has stated a valid claim for relief, Daker routinely files numerous frivolous motions. For example, Daker files motions to recuse the presiding district and magistrate judges assigned to his cases as a matter of course, despite the fact that the motions are frivolous and he has been repeatedly told that he has not met the standard for recusal based on his contention that the judges are biased against him because they do not rule in his favor. Frequently, Daker files multiple motions to recuse in the same case. As discussed by Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinis:
Among Daker's thousand-plus filings have been dozens of motions to recuse the Honorable Richard W. Story. These motions have been brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 and have repeated a set (or subset) of arguments that Judge Story (i) “had ruled against him in several cases,” (ii) “had personal knowledge about the facts in the litigation,” (iii) “was named as a witness” in Daker's most recent state criminal case (but “successfully moved to quash that subpoena”), and (iv) “was friends with the judge in that case.” Daker v. Ferrero, No. 15-13148, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23637 at *4-8 (11th Cir. May 26, 2016). These motions have been repeatedly rejected, both by this Court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Id. See also, e.g., Daker v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., No. 15-11266, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23638 at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 7 2016) (“[T]he district judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to grant Daker's request for recusal. Daker's allegations did not give rise to questions concerning the judge's impartiality.”) (citations omitted); Georgia v. Daker, No. 12-12519, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 26895 at *6-7 (11th Cir. Oct. 9, 2012) (affirming the denial of a recusal motion brought under §§ 144 and 455, noting in particular that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the allegations in Daker's affidavit would not convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists”).
In sum, Daker has litigated and relitigated in multiple cases essentially the same allegations and arguments for the recusal of Judge Story, none of which warrants recusal, for reasons already thoroughly explained to Daker by the Eleventh Circuit and this Court.In re Daker, 1: 16-CV-3745-RWS-CMS, 2017 WL 6626361, at * 1 (N.D.Ga. June 23, 2017); see also Daker v. Robinson, 694 Fed.Appx. 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Daker cannot fabricate an appearance of impropriety to justify his request for recusal.”); Daker v. Poff, CV416-158, 2016 WL 9225031 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2016) (denying Daker's motion to recuse all judges of the Southern District of Georgia); Daker v. Allen, CV 617-079, 2018 WL 9987239, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2018) (“Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse is rife with feeble conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements and over-simplifications of the relevant cases' proceedings and the Court's Orders and reasoning in relation thereto.”); In re Daker, 1:14-CV-3180-RWS, 2018 WL 9986853, at *1 (N.D.Ga. July 20, 2018) (noting that Daker's motions to recuse are routinely denied, “[nevertheless, Daker continues to file such motions, and four more are now before the Court for resolution”).
This Court could give dozens more examples of courts discussing the frivolous nature of Daker's motions to recuse. This Court could likewise provide dozens of examples of Daker filing other types of motions that are frivolous, that repeat motions that have already been denied, and that seek reconsideration or vacation of prior orders without a reasonable basis for doing so.
Particularly troubling is Daker's penchant for falsely claiming that a judge is a witness against him an another action in what is clearly a manipulative and vexatious effort to force the judge to recuse. Such tactics, repeatedly employed, demonstrate the highest degree of bad faith and utter disregard for the judicial system and the interests of justice. Even more troubling is the fact that Daker's frivolous motions serve no purpose other than to require this Court and other courts to dedicate significant time and resources in dealing with them which, of course, impairs this Court's ability to adjudicate the legitimate claims of other litigants.
This Court thus concludes that, absent some compelling argument that Daker may have to the contrary, the imposition of some form of filing restriction against him is appropriate and overdue.
B. Discussion of Daker's Response to the Show Cause Order
This Court will now address Daker's non-frivolous, non-repetitive arguments made in his two responses to the show cause order. [Docs. 50, 54]. In his first response, Daker first argues that the undersigned should recuse for having prejudged the matters at issue. This Court denies Daker's motion to recuse in a separate, contemporaneous order which addresses and discounts those arguments.
This Court will grant Daker's motion to extend the page limitations set in the show cause order so that all of his arguments are considered. As a result, Daker's argument in his second response to the show cause order that this Court improperly limited his response to twenty-five pages, [Doc. 53 at 15 et seq.], is moot.
Daker next contends that this Court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in the previous order imposing the injunction. Daker cites to various cases for the proposition that courts may not rely solely on the number of cases a litigant has filed “but must also consider the nature, motivation, and consequences of the litigation.” [Doc. 50 at 6]. However, as the above discussion demonstrates, this Court has closely considered the nature of the cases that Daker has filed along with his motivation and the consequences of his actions, and those factors weigh decidedly in favor of limiting his ability to continue to file his vexatious pleadings.
Daker, in an entirely conclusory fashion, contends that he has not been vexatious. [Doc. 50 at 7]. This Court submits that Daker has repeatedly shown himself to be vexatious, and his record in this Court fully supports that determination.
Daker further contends that the number of his cases that appear on Pacer which this Court relies on misrepresents the number of cases that he has actually filed. While this Court will acknowledge that cases that are listed on Pacer twice (one case), miscellaneous cases that were converted to civil cases (two cases), cases that were opened based on pleadings that should have been filed in existing cases (two cases), and cases that were transferred to different courts (eight cases) should not be counted toward his total number of cases. This Court, however, disagrees with Daker that the following cases should not be counted toward his total: cases filed by other prisoners in which Daker moved to intervene (ten cases), state criminal cases that Daker sought to remove to federal court (two cases), and habeas corpus petitions (thirty-two). The problem that this Court has identified is that Daker has burdened the judicial system with his repeated, frivolous pleadings, and filing, for example, thirty-two habeas corpus petitions, the vast majority of which were improperly filed, obviously adds to that burden.
Indeed, one court termed the attempted removal of a state criminal case to federal court as “frivolity on stilts.” State of Wis. v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1986). Removal of a state criminal action under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 is limited to cases where the criminal defendant cannot enforce laws providing for the equal rights of citizens in state court, and Daker had no legitimate basis to remove his state prosecutions to federal court.
This Court further strongly disagrees with Daker that it should not count appeals separately. Counting appeals is not “double-dipping” as Daker argues because the filing of a frivolous appeal not only increases the burden on the trial court, but also it spreads the burden to another court. As with his cases filed in district court, Daker has identified a few appeals that should not be counted because of errors in docketing, but the vast majority of Daker's appeals should count towards his total. Moreover, as Daker has stressed, the sheer number of cases and appeals that Daker has initiated is not the primary concern. Rather, the main problem is the manner in which he abused the system, and the above discussion demonstrates that his abusive activities have been significant.
Daker next provides an extensive discussion of the successes he has had in litigating cases and his contention that he has not been vexatious. This Court acknowledges that Daker is obviously a highly-intelligent individual and that he has raised quite cogent and convincing arguments in some of his pleadings. That he has on occasion found success in his litigation is not surprising. Those occasional successes do not, however, make up for or somehow cancel out his abusive behavior.
In response to Daker's contention that he has raised valid claims in his various actions and that he has not been vexatious, this Court points to a habeas corpus action he initiated while he was incarcerated at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center in Marietta, Georgia, Daker v. Warren, 1:10-CV-3815-RWS (N.D.Ga.). In that case, Daker filed a petition in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the petition, Daker raised several claims which all related to his contention that, after he had been arrested in Cobb County for malice murder, the state criminal trial court improperly denied him bond. While Petitioner's chances of success with that claim were negligible, filing a petition which raises that claim is not, in and of itself, a vexatious act. However, the manner in which Daker prosecuted that action was clearly vexatious. After Magistrate Judge E. Clayton Scofield, III, issued his show cause order to the respondent, Petitioner filed (1) a brief in support of his petition, (2) a traverse, (3) an amended petition, (4) a supplemental citation of authority, (5) a brief in support of the amended petition, (6) an emergency motion to expedite proceedings, (7) a motion to expedite consideration of the case, (8) a motion to expedite disposition, (9) a mandamus petition with the Eleventh Circuit seeking, inter alia, an order directing this Court to rule on his petition (dismissed as frivolous), (10) two motions to de-consolidate actions, (11) a supplemental motion to de-consolidate actions, (12) a motion to recuse Judge Richard W. Story, (13) a motion for appointment of counsel, (14) a motion for a permanent injunction or temporary restraining order (seeking access to legal materials at the jail), (15) two motions to expand the record, (16) a motion for an evidentiary hearing, (17) a motion to recuse Judge Scofield, (18) a seven-page, single-spaced affidavit (pointing out the inadequacies of the jail law library) with twenty-three pages of attached exhibits, (19) objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, (20) supplemental objections to the Report and Recommendation, (21) a second supplemental objections to the Report and Recommendation, and (22) a third supplemental objections to the Report and Recommendation.
This particular case does not represent an extreme example of Daker's litigation tactics. Rather, it is the norm for his cases.
The trial court noted Daker's relative wealth and ties to Syria and Canada and concluded that, because he faced a life sentence if convicted, Daker was a flight risk and should be denied bond. Id. Dkt. Ent. 16 at 3. Daker also filed at least five other habeas corpus petitions while he was awaiting trial on the murder charges. See Daker v. Warren, 1:11-CV-1711-RWS, 2013 WL 1345492, at *1 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 28, 2013).
The amended petition was actually a petition that was filed in another case that was consolidated into the case under discussion. See n.9 supra.
After being denied bond in two later bond hearings, Petitioner filed another § 2241 habeas corpus petition challenging those denials. Given the similar nature of the claims in that petition, this Court consolidated the two actions. Daker strenuously objected based on his contention that the consolidation would delay the ultimate disposition of his claim in the first petition. He apparently did not consider the fact that the multitude of filings he made would slow things down even more.
After this Court denied his petition and a certificate of appealability and dismissed the case, Daker filed (23) a fourth supplemental objections to the Report and Recommendation, (24) yet another motion to expedite disposition, (25) a supplemental motion for a preliminary injunction or for a temporary restraining order, (26) a supplemental brief in support of his petition, (27) another motion to recuse Judge Story, (28) an affidavit asserting (falsely) that Judge Story had been listed by the prosecutors in his criminal trial as a witness for the state, (29) a Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (30) a motion for reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing, (31) a motion for de novo review by the district judge, (32) a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a certificate of appealability, (33) a supplemental Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (34) a second supplemental Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (35) a third supplemental Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (36) a fourth supplemental Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (37) a motion for an order that a certificate of appealability is not necessary, (3 8) another petition for a writ of mandamus with the Eleventh Circuit, this time seeking an order requiring Judge Story to recuse (dismissed as frivolous).
Before this Court ruled on Daker's various Rule 59(e) motions and motions to reconsider, he filed (39) a notice of appeal, (40) a motion to expand record and direct respondent to file relevant transcripts, (41) three applications to appeal in forma pauperis, (42) a fifth supplemental Rule 59(e) motion to vacate, (43) another notice of appeal (this one appealing this court's denial of his petition and seventeen of his motions), (44) a supplement to his motion to recuse Judges Story and Scofield, and (45) a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
Not one of Daker's motions were granted, and many of those motions were plainly frivolous. However, this Court had to consider carefully each one of them. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court with respect to everything that Daker challenged, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari. Having reviewed the docket from that case, it suffices to state that, because of Daker's repeated frivolous filings, he unnecessarily turned a fairly simple case into a marathon and dramatically and unnecessarily increased the burden on this Court. As noted in the margin above, many of Daker's cases follow the same pattern, and presiding over his cases has become an unwelcome chore for the staff and judges of this Court. While Daker may well believe that everything that he has filed has been reasonable, that belief is simply wrong, especially when considering his fairly common practice of being untruthful in an effort to get courts to rule in his favor.
Typically, Daker would have filed a raft of post-judgment motions after he had exhausted the appeals process. However, he was convicted of murder even before the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his appeal, thus mooting his claims.
In his second response to this Court's show cause order, Daker again contends that the undersigned should recuse. As noted above that argument is addressed in a separate order. Daker next challenges this Court's “finding”-made in the since- vacated order imposing the filing restrictions-that his prior assertions of poverty were untrue because he was able to pay the filing fee in this case. As an initial matter, this Court points out that it made no such finding. Rather, this Court stated that Daker's ability to pay the filing fee in this action “strongly indicates that his prior assertions of poverty were untrue.” [Doc. 35 at 2]. This Court also cited to a case, Daker v. Robinson, Case No. 1: 12-CV-118-RWS, Dkt. Ent. 3 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 9, 2012), in which Magistrate Judge Scofield denied Daker's request to proceed in forma pauperis because he had over $50,000.00 in net assets. That determination was later affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. Dkt. Ent. 65. As such, it is indisputable that Daker's numerous prior assertions of poverty were untrue. Moreover, contrary to the impression that Daker seeks to create, the fact of his repeated prevarications regarding his inability to pay filing fees is only a small part of this Court's reasoning for limiting his filings in this Court.
In summary, having carefully reviewed Daker's arguments, this Court concludes that Daker has failed to demonstrate that the permanent injunction should not be reimposed.
C. Filing Limitations are Appropriate
In dissenting in Procup, supra, Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit noted that “a court exercising its equitable powers or its inherent powers should do so in a measured fashion, narrowly tailoring the relief to accomplish its intended goal, and proceeding to more drastic means only if necessary.” Procup, 792 F.2d at 1077 n.8 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). It is obvious that the warnings of this and other districts have failed to dissuade plaintiff's abusive behavior. It is also now clear that Daker's status as a “three striker” under § 1915(g) has not had the desired effect of limiting his frivolous filings.
Unfortunately, more extreme action is clearly warranted, and this Court finds that the injunction imposed below properly and narrowly balances the Court's interest in protecting judicial resources against Daker's right of access to the courts. This Court further finds that the injunction is not unduly oppressive. At least three courts have barred frequent litigants from further filings until a bond was posted against which sanctions could be charged. Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 638 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Washington v. Alaimo, 934 F.Supp. 1395, 1400 (S.D. Ga. 1996); In re May, 00-2266-CIV-JORDAN, 2000 WL 1276943, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2000) (imposing a requirement that a serial litigant post a $1,500 contempt bond before he his permitted to file a lawsuit).
III. Order of Permanent Injunction
Accordingly, Daker is henceforth PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from filing or attempting to file any new lawsuit or petition in this Court without first posting a $1,500.00 contempt bond in addition to paying the required filing fee. Daker is hereby ON NOTICE that he must refrain from filing frivolous or duplicative pleadings or motions in this Court, and his failure to so refrain may result in the imposition of sanctions. If any of Daker's future filings is deemed frivolous or duplicative, the presiding judge may, after notice to Daker and an opportunity to respond, impose a contempt sanction against Daker to be paid from the contempt bond. In the event of such a sanction, Daker will not be allowed to file any further lawsuits unless and until the contempt bond is replenished to the amount of $1,500.00.
If Daker is unable to afford the $1,500.00 contempt bond, he may move for modification of the contempt bond requirement. In order to do so, he must file the motion along with any future complaint. In that motion, Daker must set forth a comprehensive accounting of his assets and affirm that the accounting is true under penalty of perjury by including the following language above his signature.
I, Waseem Daker hereby declare, swear and affirm that the foregoing information is true and correct. I understand that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623, “[w]hoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” I further understand that by making any false statement in this motion, I will be subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. I further
acknowledge that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia will, if it suspects that I have provided false information in this motion, turn this motion over to the appropriate federal authorities for the purpose of investigating whether I should be prosecuted in federal court for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. I further acknowledge that if I am convicted in federal court for a violation of § 1623, I face an enhanced sentence because I will have committed my crime while serving a sentence for a violation of law, and the federal sentencing guidelines, as a general matter, call for a longer sentence for those who have committed their crimes while serving a sentence of incarceration, probation or parole.
This Court will consider and rule on any motion for modification of the contempt bond requirement before it considers the merits of Daker's claims or any other motions, applications, or petitions. If the motion for modification is denied, the case will be summarily dismissed and any attached motions summarily denied.
In addition, Daker MUST INCLUDE with every lawsuit he files in this or any other federal court (1) a copy of this order, and (2) a list of each and every lawsuit, habeas corpus petition, and appeal that he has filed in any federal court along with the final disposition of each lawsuit, petition or appeal. Any complaint that Daker submits in this Court without posting the contempt bond (or a compliant motion as described above), without a copy of this order, or without a list of his prior actions in federal court will be summarily dismissed.
If Daker posts a $1,500 contempt bond in connection with a case that he files, the Clerk of this Court will hold the funds (or whatever is left of those funds if sanctions have been imposed) to apply to future cases that Daker files. If Daker does not file any cases in this Court for a one-year period, the Clerk will return the contempt bond funds to Daker. However, the requirement that Daker file a $1,500 contempt bond in connection with any cases he files in this Court will remain in effect until further order of this Court regardless of whether any funds have been returned to him.
Daker's motions to exceed the twenty-five page limit in his response to the show cause order, [Doc. 49, 55], is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.