Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2294-13T2
03-06-2015
DAIZONG LI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN HARRIS, Defendant-Respondent.
Daizong Li, appellant pro se. Brian Harris, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale and Hoffman. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. SC-1820-13. Daizong Li, appellant pro se. Brian Harris, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from a December 10, 2013 judgment entered after a bench trial in the amount of $42 against defendant, his former landlord, in his suit seeking recovery of his $1950 security deposit and statutory penalties for violation of the Security Deposit Act ("SDA"), N.J.S.A. 46:8-19 to -26. We affirm.
We glean the following from the record. Plaintiff rented an apartment from defendant from August 2011 through September 2013. Plaintiff claimed that he "fully cleaned" the unit prior to moving out on September 28, 2013. Nevertheless, defendant confronted plaintiff on that date, telling him "you have to clean the apartment." Plaintiff's wife told defendant to "send us a bill" for the cost of the cleaning.
On October 16, 2013, defendant informed plaintiff that he would be retaining the security deposit, "[d]ue to the extensive nature of the repair work and cleaning . . . ." About two weeks later, defendant sent plaintiff a document setting forth an itemized list of deductions for the extensive cleaning and for the repair of various items in the unit that were damaged. Although plaintiff admitted that he should be "responsible for [any] damage that [he] caused[,]" he contended that defendant had improperly charged him for improvements, claiming that "[t]he unit was renovated much better than the condition when we move[d] in."
According to defendant, when plaintiff moved out, "there w[as] mold and filth and areas that had never been cleaned in the kitchen." In addition, there was "grease all over" the refrigerator and the stove. Defendant obtained multiple estimates for cleaning the unit and repairing the alleged damage, but ultimately completed most of the work with his wife and daughter. Defendant stated that the cleaning required over sixty hours to complete, and the bathroom floor had to be re-grouted due to extensive water damage. Plaintiff disputed defendant's claims, contending that most of defendant's charges were improper and therefore unlawfully deducted from his security deposit.
After defendant failed to return the security deposit, plaintiff filed a complaint in Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part on November 7, 2013. Defendant filed a counterclaim on November 26, 2013, claiming plaintiff caused damages of $1500 beyond the amount of the security deposit.
Both parties testified at trial on December 10, 2013. After reviewing the evidence, the judge issued an oral decision addressing both parties' claims. The judge stated that the invoices submitted by defendant from a home maintenance contractor indicated that defendant paid approximately $1215 for "actual repairs[,]" including "repair of tiles that had become loosened because of water damage, which had to be re-grouted[,] . . . as well as fixing the faucet . . . ." The judge stated that defendant also paid a home heating contractor "$125 to clean out a dryer vent[,]" which was a proper deduction, since it was "an item of normal maintenance" that plaintiff should have addressed during his tenancy. Based on his "review of the facts" and "documents placed in evidence," the judge found that $200 was properly deducted for the cost of cleaning the apartment. Finally, based on defendant's testimony indicating that there were stains on the walls from hair dye, the judge concluded that $400 was an appropriate deduction for re-painting.
Totaling the various items of damage, the judge determined that $1940 was properly deducted by defendant from plaintiff's security deposit, leaving a balance of $10. Pursuant to the SDA, the judge doubled the amount wrongfully withheld and entered judgment in plaintiff's favor for $20 plus $22 in costs, and dismissed defendant's counterclaim.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant violated the SDA when he (1) failed to send an invoice for charges expended within thirty days of plaintiff's departure, and (2) failed to send the invoice "by personal delivery, registered or certified mail," as required by the SDA. Plaintiff further contends that discrepancies in defendant's self-prepared invoice indicate that plaintiff was overcharged for all of the work done in the apartment. He argues that the trial court improperly allowed defendant to deduct costs attributable to normal wear and tear as well as upgrading.
We have carefully considered the record and conclude that defendant's arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief remarks.
"'The scope of appellate review of a trial court's factfinding function is limited.'" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). Ordinarily, the trial court's findings "'are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411-12). Such deference "'is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). "The trial court's legal determinations, in contrast, are reviewed de novo." Sipko v. Roger, Inc., 214 N.J. 364, 379 (2013).
The SDA requires a landlord to return a tenant's security deposit along with accrued interest "[w]ithin [thirty] days after the termination of the tenant's lease . . . less any charges expended in accordance with the terms of [the] lease[.]" N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1. "Any deductions the landlord makes must be 'itemized,' and notice must be forwarded to the tenant." Reilly v. Weiss, 406 N.J. Super. 71, 80 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1). "If the landlord violates this section . . . the tenant may bring suit, and 'the court upon finding for the tenant . . . shall award recovery of double the amount of said moneys, together with full costs of any action and, in the court's discretion, reasonable attorney's fees.'" Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1).
However, recovery under the SDA is only permitted when some portion of the security deposit has been wrongfully withheld, and not merely when a landlord fails to timely notify the tenant, in a procedurally correct way, that some or all of the deposit will be withheld. Penbara v. Straczynski, 347 N.J. Super. 155, 160-61 (App. Div. 2002). Here, the trial judge properly determined that recovery should be limited to double the amount of the security deposit which had been wrongfully withheld, as required by N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1.
We are also not persuaded by plaintiff's contention that discrepancies in defendant's invoice indicate that plaintiff was overcharged for all of the work done in the apartment. The trial judge recognized that some of the charges on defendant's invoice were excessive. Defendant's invoice and accompanying e-mails were the only pieces of evidence presented by plaintiff, and he testified that the amounts requested "did not match the bill[s] that [defendant] paid." Defendant's invoice included $2345 for labor, bringing defendant's overall estimate to $3435. Nevertheless, the trial judge only found $1940 in permissible charges, a clear indication that the judge recognized certain charges as excessive. Since the trial judge did not award the amounts requested in defendant's invoice when determining the amount lawfully deducted from plaintiff's security deposit, any discrepancy between the invoice and the amounts actually paid does not undermine the validity of the trial judge's determination.
Finally, we reject plaintiff's argument that the trial court allowed defendant to deduct costs attributable to normal wear and tear as well as upgrading. The record contains no support for this claim.
The trial judge observed the testimony of the parties. His findings were based upon credibility determinations he made after hearing their testimony and carefully considering the evidence adduced by both sides. Those findings are amply supported by the record and we discern no basis to disturb them. Contrary to plaintiff's claims, we conclude that defendant's contentions of damage to his unit were adequately substantiated.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION