Opinion
C.A. No. 95C-02-011-JEB.
Submitted: July 15, 1999.
Decided: January 14, 2000.
Indian River School District's Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings — Motion Denied —
Donald L. Logan, Esq. of Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for plaintiff
H. Clay Davis III, Esq. of Georgetown, Delaware, attorney for defendant W.B. Venables Sons, Inc.
Vincent G. Robertson, Esq. of Griffin Hackett, P.A., attorney for defendant Indian River School District
Paul M. Lukoff, Esq., of Prickett, Jones Elliott, attorney for defendant Marcis, Hendricks Glascock
Kenneth S. Clark, Jr., Esq., of Georgetown, Delaware, attorney for defendant SHWC, Inc.
Joseph C. Raskauskas, Esq., of Bethank Beach, DE 19930
OPINION
Cross-Claim Defendant Indian River School District ("IRSD") moves for dismissal pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) and for a judgement on the pleadings pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(c) from Defendant W.B. Venables Son's ("Venables") cross-claim against IRSD. Because the Court finds that Venables' cross-claim is sufficiently plead, IRSD's motions are DENIED.
I. FACTS
IRSD is the owner of a construction project known as the Long Neck Elementary School ("the Project"), located in Long Neck, Sussex County, Delaware. Venables was the general contractor on the Project. Plaintiff Daisy Construction Company, Inc. ("Daisy") was subcontracted by Venables to perform site development work on the Project. The site development work was based on a site plan which was supposed to accurately represent the topography of the project site. SHWC, Inc. ("SHWC"), the architect on the Project, and Macris, Hendricks, and Glascock ("MHG"), the civil engineer on the Project, prepared the site plan based on the topographic land survey undertaken by Land Tech, the surveyor on the Project.
On February 14, 1995, Daisy filed a complaint alleging breach of contract by Venables, claiming that Venables had provided Daisy with inaccurate site plans. Daisy also filed a quantum meruit claim against both Venables and IRSD.
On March 16, 1995, Venables filed an answer to Daisy's complaint and a cross-claim against IRSD. Venables' cross-claim against IRSD states as follows:
"Should Defendant W.B. Venables Sons, Inc. suffer any judgement under the Plaintiff's complaint it is because Co-Defendant, Indian River School District, unlawfully and unreasonably refused to honor Plaintiff's claim submitted by Defendant, W.B. Venables Sons, Inc."
Venables' Cross-Claim at ¶ 1.
On May 10, 1995, this Court dismissed Daisy's quantum meruit claim against IRSD.
On June 16, 1995, Daisy filed an amended complaint alleging negligent misrepresentation by SHWC, MHG, and Land Tech in their roles in preparing the site development plans. Daisy alleged that SHWC and MHG negligently prepared the site plans and elevations based on an inaccurate topographical survey taken by Land Tech.
On July 15, 1999, IRSD filed this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and Rule 12(c) motion for judgement on the pleadings.
II. DISCUSSION
When considering a motion to dismiss, all well-pled allegations are accepted as true. An allegation, though vague or lacking in detail, is nevertheless "well-pleaded" if it puts the opposing party on notice of the claim being brought against it. To succeed on its motion to dismiss, the moving defendant must demonstrate that under no set of facts which could be proven in support of its cross-claim would the cross-claimant be entitled to relief. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted if the movant establishes that, based on the pleadings, there are no material issues of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Precision Air, Inc., v. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc., Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (1995).
Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Del., Del. Supr., 269 A.2d 52, 58 (1970); see Super.Civ.R. 8(e)(1) (f).
Del. State Troopers Lodge No. 6 v. O'Rourke, Del. Ch., 403 A.2d 1109 (1979).
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, F.S.B. v. Meconi, Del. Super., 1989 WL 124888, Poppiti, J. (Oct. 3, 1996); See Fagnani v. Integrity Finance Corporation, Del. Super., 167 A.2d 67, 75 (1960) (motion presents a question of law and cannot be granted where pleading raises any material issue of fact).
IRSD argues that Venables' cross-claim is deficient because it fails to allege any specific facts or circumstances that give rise to a cognizable claim against IRSD. IRSD argues that no inferences of wrongdoing by IRSD may be drawn from Venables' conclusory statement that IRSD "unlawfully and unreasonably refused to honor" Plaintiff Daisy's claim, which was submitted by Venables to IRSD.
The Court disagrees with IRSD. Venables' statement in its cross-claim that IRSD "unlawfully and unreasonably refused to honor Plaintiff's claim" is not a conclusion. Rather, it is the premise of Venables' cross-claim. It is a statement alleging wrongdoing by IRSD — namely, a construction project owner's refusal to honor a subcontractor's claim. Thus, Venables cross-claim provides IRSD with the requisite general notice of the claim asserted, which is enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Discovery by the parties will supplement the facts and elaborate on any perceived paucity in the pleadings. Further, IRSD has not satisfied the requirements for a judgement on the pleadings. IRSD has not demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact and that IRSD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, IRSD argues that SHWC, the architect, denied the claim that Daisy submitted, whereas Venables asserts that IRSD refused to honor Daisy's claim. This is certainly a disputed material fact which precludes a judgement on the pleadings.
Ramunno v. Cawley, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 1029 (1998).
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Court finds that Venables cross-claim provides IRSD with sufficient notice of a claim, IRSD's motion to dismiss and motion for judgement on the pleadings are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.