Opinion
10-19-00260-CV
12-01-2021
STEVEN DAHL, Appellant v. WARREN DAHL and TERRI R. DAHL, Appellees
From the 220th District Court Bosque County, Texas Trial Court No. CV 18277
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MATT JOHNSON JUSTICE
This case involves a dispute between cousins as to which of them under competing claims of ownership is entitled to current possession of a house, smoke house, and garage ("the property") situated on a 188-acre tract of land in Bosque County, Texas. In two issues, appellant, Steven Dahl ("Steven"), challenges the judgment of the trial court, which grants ownership in fee simple to appellees, Warren Dahl and Terri R. Dahl ("Warren" and "Terri"). Specifically, Steven alleges that: (1) the trial court's judgment does not comport with Warren and Terri's pleadings; and (2) Warren and Terri are not entitled to the property in fee simple based on Steven's breach of an alleged condition precedent to securing his interest. We affirm.
Factual & Procedural Background
Warren and Terri drafted and entered into a sales agreement with Steven's parents, B.I. and Vivian Dahl, who owned the property in question. The agreement memorialized the price that Warren and Terri agreed to pay for the property and noted the following:
Warren and Terri R. Dahl agree to B.I. or Vivian Dahl maintaining possession of the house, smoke house and garage as longs [sic] as they want to live there. Warren and Terri R. Dahl also agree to allow Steven Dahl possession of the house, smoke house and garage as long as he wants to live there. However, the decision for Steven Dahl to maintain possession of the house, smoke house and garage will be made at the time B.I. or Vivian Dahl no longer need possession of the house, smoke house and garage.
While the house, smoke house and garage are in the possession of B.I. or Vivian Dahl and/or Steven Dahl, Warren or Terri R. Dahl are not responsible for the payment of insurance, utilities and property tax for the house, smoke house and garage.
The parties signed the agreement on September 21, 2014, but Steven was never informed of its existence. B.I. and Vivian then conveyed the property to Warren and Terri by warranty deed with no reservations on October 16, 2014. Cen-Tex Title, who had no knowledge of the aforementioned sales agreement, recorded the deed with the County Clerk of Bosque County.
Terri's testimony at trial indicated that Steven moved in with his parents from out of state sometime in October of 2015. Terri testified that Steven was serving as a caregiver to his parents, who maintained full possession of the property under Warren and Terri's management. B.I. passed away in 2017, and Vivian passed away shortly thereafter in early 2018. Steven continued to live on the property after his parents' deaths, and Warren and Terri filed suit for declaratory relief to regain possession of the property.
In their live pleading, Warren and Terri asked the trial court to declare the following:
1. Defendant's interest has lapsed by virtue of his failure to perform upkeep on the property and to pay taxes and insurance;
2. Plaintiffs are the sole owners of the property;
3. Plaintiff be awarded costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees; and
4. Any other relief that is just.
Warren and Terri also incorporated the warranty deed into the pleading and attached it as an exhibit.
After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the agreement did not create a life estate in Steven. In the alternative, the trial court concluded that even if the agreement created a life estate in Steven, the warranty deed superseded the agreement such that Warren and Terri are 100% owners in fee simple of the property. This appeal followed.
Issue One
In his first issue, Steven contends that the trial court's judgment is not supported by Warren and Terri's pleadings.
Applicable Law
A court's jurisdiction to render judgment is invoked by the pleadings, and a judgment unsupported by the pleadings is void. See Holden v. Holden, 456 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2015, no pet.) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, a trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings. See id.; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. In determining whether the judgment conforms to the pleadings, reviewing courts must view the pleadings as a whole. See Moran v. Williamson, 498 S.W.3d 85, 93 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) ("A general prayer for relief will support any relief raised by the evidence that is consistent with the allegations and causes of action stated in the petition."). In the absence of special exceptions, petitions will be liberally construed in the pleader's favor and in support of the judgment. See Moore v. Douglas, 589 S.W.2d 862, 862 (Tex. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (internal citations omitted).
An exception to the general pleading requirement arises when unpleaded issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 67; see also Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ) (observing that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by consent, they must be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in pleadings). But the "trial by consent" doctrine is to be applied only in "those exceptional cases" where it clearly appears from the record as a whole that the parties tried an unpleaded issue by consent. See Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Thus, reviewing courts must examine the record not for evidence of the issue, but for evidence of trial of the issue. See id.; see also Libhart, 949 S.W.2d at 797 (internal citation omitted).
An issue is tried by consent whenever evidence on the issue is developed during trial without objection under circumstances indicating that both parties understood that the issue was being contested. See Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. 2009). An issue is not tried by consent when the evidence relevant to the unpleaded issue is also relevant to a pleaded issue because admitting that evidence would not be calculated to elicit an objection from counsel. See Adeleye v. Driscal, 544 S.W.3d 467, 484 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether an unpleaded issue was tried by consent. See Hampden Corp. v. Remark, Inc., 331 S.W.3d 489, 495 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted).
Analysis
The record as a whole shows that the parties understood that the issue of whether the agreement created a life estate in Steven was being tried. From the outset, Warren and Terri's trial counsel characterized Steven as a "squatter" and established through Terri's testimony that Warren and Terri never intended to grant Steven a life estate in the property. On the other hand, Steven's trial counsel insisted that the agreement provided
Steven something in the nature of a life estate and asked the court to recognize as much. Importantly, Steven's trial counsel never objected to the introduction of evidence which contradicted the creation of a life estate in Steven. See Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 893 ("When both parties present evidence on an issue and the issue is developed during trial without objection, any defects in the pleadings are cured at trial, and the defects are waived.") (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial disputing Steven's life estate interest was not relevant to the pleaded issue of nonperformance of a condition precedent. Indeed, Warren and Terri's petition included a prayer for the trial court to declare them "sole owners of the property," but we agree with Steven's argument on appeal that this request for relief is contingent upon Warren and Terri's first request (i.e., that the trial court declare that Steven's interest has lapsed by virtue of his failure to perform upkeep on the property and to pay taxes and insurance). To hold otherwise would be to render the prayer for general relief inconsistent with the substance of the allegations made in Warren and Terri's petition. See Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (explaining that appellate courts should view pleadings as a whole).
Therefore, although not pleaded by either party, we conclude that the issue of the life estate was tried by consent without objection. Trial by consent cures the lack of pleadings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 67; see also Libhart, 949 S.W.2d at 901. Accordingly, we overrule Steven's first issue.
Issue Two
In his second issue, Steven contends that Warren and Terri are not entitled to the property in fee simple following Steven's alleged breach of a condition precedent contained in the sales agreement. In fact, Steven argues that the agreement did not create a condition precedent at all. Without reaching the merits, we observe that Steven's issue is premised on a finding that he had a life estate in the property. The trial court determined that Steven did not have a life estate in the property, and other than the challenge raised in his first issue, Steven does not attack the trial court's life estate finding. Therefore, whether Steven's interest in the property lapsed due to nonperformance of a condition precedent is immaterial. See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 506 (Tex. 2018) (noting that a finding is immaterial when, among other things, it has been rendered immaterial by other findings). As such, we overrule Steven's second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed
Chief Justice Gray dissenting
DISSENTING OPINION
With all due respect to the trial court, the parties, and their attorneys, the issue in this proceeding about the limited nature of Warren and Terri's interest was as critical as the nature of Steven's interest. To their credit, Warren and Terri admitted in their pleadings that they had a fee simple interest only if they could successfully extinguish Steven's interest. Warren and Terri never disavowed their agreement and never pleaded or suggested that they purchased a fee simple interest in the property, at least not until after the trial court announced its judgment. By their pleadings and evidence, Warren and Terri sought to prove they now owned the property in fee simple by establishing that Steven had failed to fulfill a condition precedent to maintaining his interest in the property, a condition that he did not even know about and for which performance was never demanded. I can agree that Warren and Terri proved it was not a traditional life estate; but as the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, they have failed to prove Steven had no interest in the property. I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
This is a sad case. A nephew (Warren and Terri) buys his aunt and uncle's property with an agreement to let them, and their son, the buyer's cousin, live on and use a portion of the property for as long as the aunt, uncle, and cousin want. Fulfilling the sales agreement, Aunt and Uncle convey to Nephew and his wife title to the property but the deed does not include the description of Aunt/Uncle/Cousin's interest. Aunt and Uncle die. Cousin, who by this time had moved in to take care of his parents, continues to live there, unaware of the agreement his parents had negotiated with Nephew that Cousin could live there as long as he wants. Then Nephew demands rent from Cousin without informing Cousin of the agreement.
Nephew never denies that part of the consideration for the purchase of the property was the agreement that Aunt, Uncle, and Cousin could live on a designated portion of the property as long as they wanted. No doubt Aunt and Uncle died believing they had provided a place for their son to live for as long as he needed/wanted it. And blood being thicker than water, one would expect that Nephew would honor the agreement, which allowed him to acquire the property in the first instance. Aunt and
Uncle fully complied with the agreement by executing the deed. Unfortunately, they are both dead and cannot help Cousin, their son, obtain the benefit they negotiated for him and the agreement that Nephew agrees he made.
In this regard, it is the inverse of the classic Hooks v. Bridgewater fact pattern. Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
As I view the evidence, there was nothing tried in this proceeding outside the pleadings. Cousin certainly did not have any reason to believe, based on the pleadings or the evidence being admitted, that anything was at issue other than that Nephew was trying to terminate Cousin's interest, whatever it was, because Cousin had not paid for insurance and taxes (Cousin had paid for his own utilities). The effort to evict was not based on the argument or evidence that Nephew owned fee simple title from the time he acquired the property from Aunt and Uncle. Rather, it was that Cousin's interest had been extinguished or somehow never sprung forth, because, Nephew argued, Cousin had breached the agreement, of which Cousin was unaware, to also pay insurance and taxes, so that, due to Cousin's default, Nephew became the owner of the property in fee simple.
The effect of the agreement as argued by Nephew is problematic. Nephew argues it created an obligation to pay for insurance and taxes and to maintain the property. If that is what the agreement said, this is, at best, a breach of contract suit or a suit for specific performance. But, that is not what the agreement says. The agreement merely says that as long as Aunt, Uncle, or Cousin are in possession of the designated portion of the premises, Nephew is "…not responsible for the payment of insurance, utilities and property tax for the house, smoke house and garage." It does not establish an express obligation for Aunt, Uncle, or Cousin to pay those expenses, or to maintain the property in its current condition.
Maintenance of the property became part of the issue about the nature of Cousin's interest if he had a life estate. Clearly, it was not a life estate because it existed only if Cousin was in possession of the applicable portion of the property. If it was a life estate, Cousin would not have been obligated to remain in possession for its continued existence. Rather, he could have conveyed or sold a life estate in the property. From the express terms of the agreement, Cousin had to live on the property to retain the contracted rights.
This agreement was problematic from the beginning for other reasons as well. Was it only the property tax on "the house, smoke house and garage" that were not Nephew's responsibility or was it on the entire tract? And did Aunt and Uncle have to maintain a property owner's liability insurance policy and keep up the fences on the entire tract or just the small portion of which they had possession? What happened in the event there was no insurance and there was a catastrophic loss? Did Nephew have to rebuild so that Aunt and Uncle could continue to live there?
Moreover, Nephew's pleadings make it clear that he recognized under the agreement he made with Aunt and Uncle that Cousin had some interest in the use of the house, smoke house, and garage after Aunt and Uncle passed away. Whether that interest rose to the level of a life estate or was merely a license or a lease are nuances in determining the nature of an interest in real estate which cannot be resolved today. Also, whether the agreement created an obligation for Aunt, Uncle, or Cousin to obtain and maintain insurance and pay the property tax on some portion of the property during the possession of Aunt, Uncle, or Cousin or whether it was a condition precedent to entry or continued possession cannot be decided in this appeal. Likewise, whether the payment of insurance and taxes by Nephew during the remaining life of Aunt and Uncle waived the alleged condition precedent cannot be resolved in this appeal. The issue that was pled and tried is not, as the trial court determined, the nature of Nephew's title at the time of the agreement as limited by the deed executed by the parties. There was more to the deal than the deed; and the parties litigated the deal, not the deed.
The trial court rendered judgment on the record at the conclusion of the trial as follows:
Having heard all your evidence, reviewed the contents of the file, I will find that a life estate in Exhibit No. 2 was not created. And even if it had, it was superceded (sic) by the deed. There were no reservations of the life estate in that deed. So the parties, Mr. Warren and Mrs. Terri Dahl, are 100% owners in fee simple of the estate - or the property that we're discussing.
I have no quarrel with the law set out in the opinion of the Court. Rather, I view the pleadings and nature of the evidence somewhat differently than the Court, in that the extent of the interest conveyed by the deed was never the issue in the case, and stray remarks about that issue in the evidence or argument, if any, is not the type of event that raises a tried-by-consent argument that Nephew owned a present fee simple interest based solely on the deed which was not subject to Aunt's, Uncle's, or Cousin's interest as agreed upon.
The only statement about the law with which I disagree is the statement, in dicta, that a judgment not supported by the pleadings is void. If that was ever an accurate statement of the law, it is now an overstatement of the legal effect of deficient pleadings. If it was truly void, a judgment could be attacked years after it was signed and otherwise became final, on the theory that it was unsupported by the pleadings. Dubai has foreclosed such an argument. See Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000). A judgment may be erroneous and subject to attack by direct appeal because it is not supported by pleadings, as in this case, but if not set aside on direct appeal and it becomes final, it cannot be later attacked for a pleading deficiency.
The opening line of the Court's opinion frames my disagreement with it. This was a suit for declaratory judgment brought by Nephew about the rights of the parties. It was not brought as a trespass to try title case, as it possibly should have been, to determine ownership and quiet title to the property. But Cousin never contended he "owned" an interest, as such, in the title to the property. At most, Cousin's lawyer characterized it as being "in the nature of a life estate." While that could be a general description, it is not a legally accurate one. Moreover, this case presents the problem of what is a trial court supposed to do when the party that sought a declaratory judgment simply fails to produce adequate evidence for the trial court to properly determine the relative rights of possession between the parties? Should this be like we have held in family law where the standard of review for a division of community property is an abuse of discretion, and when the parties have failed to present adequate evidence the trial court abuses its discretion when it nevertheless attempts to divide the property? See Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610-611 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). I think it could be. See Skeels v. Suder, No. 02-18-00112-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 8377, at *18-19 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 14, 2021, no pet.h.) (mem. op on reh'g); Waldrop v. Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (en banc op. on reconsideration). But that is not the issue that has been presented to us, and therefore, I have limited my discussion and analysis to the pleading issue presented.
Accordingly, because I would hold that the judgment is not supported by the pleadings and would reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings rather than affirm the trial court's judgment, I respectfully dissent.