Opinion
No. 3D10-2704 Lower Tribunal No. 09-40869 Lower Tribunal No. 09-46161
01-23-2013
Freddy D'Agastino, et al., Appellants, v. The City of Miami, et al., Appellees.
Ronald J. Cohen and Jon M. Kreger, for appellants. Julie O. Bru, City Attorney, Warren Bittner, Deputy City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Assistant City Attorney, for appellees.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Amy Steele Donner, Judge.
Ronald J. Cohen and Jon M. Kreger, for appellants.
Julie O. Bru, City Attorney, Warren Bittner, Deputy City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Assistant City Attorney, for appellees. Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
SHEPHERD, J.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on cross motions for summary judgment. Appellants contend, as they argued below, that section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides the exclusive means to investigate allegations of police misconduct, and the City of Miami Ordinance creating a Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP) to oversee the sworn police department directly conflicts with the statute and therefore must fall. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a civilian complaint lodged with the CIP that alleged professional misconduct during a traffic stop conducted by City of Miami Police Lieutenant Freddy D'Agastino. After the City of Miami Police Department concluded its investigation, the CIP subpoenaed Lt. D'Agastino to testify before its Complaint Committee regarding the allegations. In response, Lieutenant D'Agastino filed a petition in the trial court seeking to quash the subpoena and obtain a protective order against his having to testify. He alleged that section 112.533(1) granted the police department exclusive authority to investigate allegations of police misconduct. Section 112.533(1)(a) provides:
The Internal Affairs department ultimately determined the allegations in the complaint were "inconclusive."
Every law enforcement agency . . . shall establish and put into operation a system for the . . . investigation . . . of complaints received by such agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for(emphasis added).
investigating a complaint against a law enforcement . . . officer . . . notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary.
The City of Miami intervened, and was served separately with a declaratory action by the Fraternal Order of Police seeking to declare unconstitutional those ordinances empowering the CIP to investigate the City's law enforcement officers. The CIP, in turn, joined that action. The two cases ultimately were consolidated and each party moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions filed by the City and the CIP, relying upon Timoney v. City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel, 990 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Appellants contend Timoney is distinguishable and that Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review Board, 15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), controls.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
The Florida Constitution grants municipalities broad "governmental, corporate and propriety powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services." Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (1968). It further permits municipalities to "exercise any powers for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." Id. (emphasis added). In furtherance of this constitutional guarantee of local self-government, the state legislature adopted the Florida Municipal Home Rule Act in 1973. Section 166.021 of the Act provides:
Prior to the adoption of section 2(b), municipalities had only those powers granted by law. See Art. V, § 8, Fla. Const. (1885); Asbell v. Green, 32 So. 2d 593, 598 (Fla. 1947) (holding that ability to amend charter did not entitle city to issue ordinance extending its power to include activities not authorized in the charter or by general law).
(1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.§ 166.021, Fla. Stat. (1973) (emphasis added).
. . . .
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution. It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited.
Thus, "[e]xcept for those acts expressly prohibited by . . . statute or by the Constitution . . . municipalities have the same legislative powers for municipal purposes . . . as are possessed by the state legislature." Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 73-267, 275 (1973). Florida courts interpreting the Act have identified two settings where local government action is "expressly prohibited": (1) where state law expressly preempts the action, or (2) where there exists a literal incompatibility or direct conflict between the local ordinance and a state statute. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We accordingly restrict our review to a determination of whether CIP investigation is expressly prohibited under either of the above scenarios.
ANALYSIS
I.
In 2001, the City of Miami Charter was amended to include a mandate that the city commission create a civilian investigative panel to oversee the sworn police department. City of Miami Charter, § 51. The following year, the commission approved an ordinance creating the CIP in accordance with the Charter's mandate. Its express purpose is to "[a]ct as independent civilian oversight of the sworn police department." Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-27(1) (2002). In furtherance of this purpose, the CIP is authorized to "conduct investigations, inquiries and public hearings to make factual determinations, [and] facilitate resolution and recommendations to the city manager and police chief regarding allegations of misconduct by any sworn police officer." Id. Particularly at issue is the CIP's subpoena power, through which it can compel a sworn police officer or other witness to testify before it. Id. at § 11.5-32. D'Agastino contends the Police Officers' Bill of Rights (PBR), set forth under sections 112.532-533 of the Florida Statutes, provides the sole procedure for investigating police misconduct. To the extent the City charged the CIP with investigatory power, he argues it directly conflicts with the statute and is therefore expressly prohibited.
A side by side comparison of the two laws reveals the pertinent provisions to be as follows:
§ 112.533, Fla. Stat. (2007)
Receipt and processing of complaints.—
(1)(a) Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, investigation, and determination of complaints received by such agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary.
. . . .
(b)1. Any political subdivision that initiates or receives a complaint against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer must within 5 business days forward the complaint to the employing agency of the officer who is the subject of the complaint for review or investigation.
2. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "political subdivision" means a separate agency or unit of local government created or established by law or ordinance and the officers thereof and includes, but is not limited to, an authority, board, branch, bureau, city, commission, consolidated government, county, department, district, institution, metropolitan government, municipality, office, officer, public corporation, town, or village.
Art. II, § 11.5-27
Purposes, powers and duties.
The purpose, powers and duties of the CIP are to:
(1) Act as independent civilian oversight of the sworn police department;
. . . .
(5) Conduct investigations, inquiries and public hearings to make factual determinations, facilitate resolution and propose recommendations to the city manager and police chief regarding allegations of misconduct by any sworn officer of the city police department;
. . . .
(9) Make recommendations as to the disposition of alleged incidents of police misconduct, to which the police chief is required to respond within 30 days[.]
A brief perusal of these provisions makes clear the PBR does not purport to expressly preempt other investigative bodies or means of oversight. D'Agastino concedes as much. Thus, we proceed to our next task, a determination whether there exists literal incompatibility—direct conflict—between the CIP and the PBR. See Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d at 831. Given our narrow scope of review, we must carefully analyze the provisions of the two laws to answer this question.
The City Charter and the CIP's enabling ordinance clearly establish the CIP acts independently of the police department and other city officials. City of Miami Charter § 51(E)(1); Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-27. Indeed, the CIP's independence is central to its purpose, as expressed by its mandate: to provide "independent citizens' oversight of the sworn police department." City of Miami Charter § 51 (emphasis added).
The CIP is granted limited power to act in response to its investigations, and may only propose recommendations to the City Manager or Police Chief. City of Miami Charter § 51(E)(1)-(3); Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-27. The CIP has no management authority over City police officers. It cannot discipline, suspend, demote, discharge, or transfer city police officers. Management decisions as a result of police misconduct are reserved to city police administrators, in keeping with the structure of the PBR. Indeed, the CIP ordinance provides that "[p]olicies and procedures shall be established to ensure compliance with Chapters 112 and 119 of the Florida Statutes and any other applicable laws." Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-33(e) (2002).
Additionally, the City Charter provides the CIP "shall not interfere with any pending or potential criminal investigation or prosecution." City of Miami Charter § 51(D). The CIP ordinance further dictates the CIP shall "[e]xercise its powers so as to not interfere with any ongoing investigations and conduct its activities consistent with applicable law . . . and labor contracts." Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-27(2). To that end, the CIP is restricted from investigating a complaint until "after determination by its independent counsel, who shall be required to consult with the appropriate prosecutorial agencies, [so] that an investigation will not interfere with any pending criminal investigation." Miami, Fla., Code art. II, § 11.5-31(2)(a). Finally, the Ordinance provides that "[a] decision of the CIP to proceed with an investigation may be challenged by any agency engaged in such investigation or prosecution by seeking judicial order in law or equity in a court of competent jurisdiction," and that "[w]ritten notification of such challenge to the CIP shall stay the investigation for 48 hours permitting the agency to obtain such a judicial order[.]" Id.
In contrast, the PBR creates a process for internal investigations by the police department to determine whether to proceed with disciplinary charges. To this end, section 112.532(1) of the Florida Statutes (2007), provides:
(1) RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION.—Whenever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, suspension, demotion, or dismissal, the interrogation must be conducted under the following conditions. . . .(emphasis added). The rights provided under this provision are limited to instances of investigation and interrogation by members of the officer's employing law enforcement agency. This provision makes no reference to external citizen investigations, and therefore does not apply in that context.
Section 112.533(1)(a) provides:
Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, investigation, and determination of complaints received by such agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary.(emphasis added). The Appellants urge a reading of section 112.533(1)(a) that would vest law enforcement agencies with the exclusive authority to investigate any complaint against their sworn officers. The City, in turn, reads section 112.533(1) as providing the exclusive procedure for the receipt and processing of complaints for purposes of employee discipline. However, it argues that this section does not preclude the formation of an independent and external citizens review panel, such as the CIP, to investigate alleged police misconduct and make proposed recommendations. Bearing in mind our narrow scope of review, we now proceed to determine whether direct conflict exists between section 112.532 and the CIP.
A.
Florida's Municipal Home Rule law is animated by the preference, found in both the Florida Constitution and state statutes, that local officials should be charged with addressing problems relating to the health and welfare of their citizens. The legislature has recognized limited exceptions where it is preferable to impose a statewide scheme. In such cases, the legislature expressly preempted local action by stating a clear intent to occupy that field. However, but for few exceptions, preemption of local rule may not be implied or inferred. As the appellants concede, preemption is not at issue here. We therefore turn to the question of conflict.
See, e.g., Fla. Power Corp. v. Seminole Cnty., 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the statutory jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission to regulate rates and services of public utilities preempts the authority of a city and county to require a power company to place its lines underground).
In contrast to the 1885 constitution, under which municipalities acted only as authorized by the legislature, the 1968 amendment empowered municipalities to independently exercise any power for municipal purposes not otherwise prohibited by law. However, the Florida Supreme Court limited the amendment's application by narrowly interpreting "municipal powers" as those expressly granted in the municipal charter or immediately directed toward the achievement of such powers. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972). The enactment of the Municipal Home Rule Act clarified the legislature's intent that the constitution grant municipalities "broad exercise of home rule powers . . . for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited." Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (1968); §§ 166.021(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1973). Florida courts since have acknowledged that "[e]xpress pre-emption requires a specific statement [and] cannot be made by implication nor by inference." City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 3d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 2006) (citing Fla. League of Cities, Inc. v. Dep't of Ins. & Treasurer, 540 So. 2d 850, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). Implied preemption only exists "when the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted." Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So. 3d 880, 886 (Fla. 2010) (citing Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 894 So. 2d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).
The absence of any authority granted to the CIP to make the sort of police management decisions addressed in Chapter 112, or to affect the obligations that chapter imposes on the Miami Police Department and its investigators, makes manifest the absence of a conflict between the CIP ordinance and Chapter 112. Conflict exists when two regulations cannot stand together. Phantom of Brevard Cnty., Inc. v. Brevard Cnty., 3 So. 3d 309, 315 (Fla. 2008). The PBR and CIP are entirely reconcilable. See City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1244-45 (Fla. 2006) ("When possible, 'we must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.'") (quoting Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 557 (Fla. 2005)).
B.
Appellants, Freddy D'Agastino and the Fraternal Order of Police, disagree. They urge us to follow the rationale outlined in Demings. There, the Orange County Sheriff and one of his deputies challenged the authority of Orange County's CIP equivalent, the Citizen's Review Board ("CRB"), to subpoena deputies or otherwise investigate civilian complaints of excessive use of force by the department's sworn deputies. Noting the Orange County Sheriff is a constitutionally elected officer possessed of a portion of the sovereign power of the state, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, in the decisive holding in the case, determined the Sheriff could not be required to account for his activities to a locally-created board. The court explained:
As an independent constitutional officer, the Sheriff does not derive his authority from the County's charter or the board of county commissioners, and is neither generally accountable to the Board for his conduct in office nor subject to the board's direction in the fulfillment of his duties. Art. VIII, § 1(d), Fla. Const. In the event of misconduct or misfeasance by the Sheriff, it is Florida's governor who is authorized to suspend the Sheriff from office—and not the County's governing board. Art. IV, § 7(a), Fla. Const. And, ultimately, the Sheriff is independently accountable to the electorate of Orange County. Art. VIII, § 1(d), Fla. Const.; State v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 83 So. 508 (1919) (explaining that the term "office" as used in the Florida Constitution "implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to, and the possession of it by, the person filling the office" or "independent authority of a governmental nature"). Given this constitutional framework, we [] find that the County cannot interfere with the Sheriff's independent exercise of his duty to investigate misconduct by his deputies either by forcing him to appoint members to the CRB or by mandating his participation inDemings, 15 So. 3d at 610-11. Although the Fifth District Court of Appeal seemed to recognize this was the dispositive issue in the case, see id. at 609 ("[T]he question presented is whether the County charter and ordinance creating and authorizing an independent board to review citizen complaints against Sheriff's deputies, without first abolishing the constitutional office of sheriff, is 'inconsistent' with general law."), the court also addressed whether the conduct of the board was "inconsistent" with section 112.533. Id. Setting aside the serious question whether the standard applicable to a compatibility inquiry concerning a state statute and an ordinance of a charter county, such as Orange County, is at all instructive in a compatibility inquiry between a state statute and a municipal ordinance, we simply disagree with the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeal on this point. Rather, we prefer and remain quite comfortable with the observation made not so long ago by another panel of this court in Timoney, relating to the issue before us today, namely that Chapter 112 "concerns internal investigations conducted by a police department of its own officers" and the PBR "sets forth the procedures to be followed by the police department for interrogation of a law enforcement officer under investigation by the police department[,]" Timoney, 990 So. 2d at 618 (first emphasis added), while the CIP's authority "extends to independent, external investigations." Id. at 619 (emphasis added). Hence, following Timoney, we conclude the CIP provides a distinct function that is not prohibited by the rights and restrictions set forth under Chapter 112. To the extent this observation was non-dispositive in Timoney, we adopt it here in support of the rationale already provided for affirmance.
CRB proceedings, either in person or through his deputies or employees.
Because Orange County is a charter county, it is authorized by Article VIII section 1(d) of the Florida Constitution to abolish the constitutionally elected office of sheriff by charter amendment or special law approved by a vote of the electors so long as all of the duties of the office are transferred to another office.
Article VIII, section 1(g) of the Florida Constitution states: "Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law . . . . The governing body of a county operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law." Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution provides that "[m]unicipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." Id. (emphasis added). Section 166.021(1), Florida Statutes, provides: "As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities . . . may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law." Id. (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
In affirming the order below, we reaffirm the principles codified in the Florida Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Act. As demonstrated by our analysis above, the City of Miami acted within its home rule authority in creating the CIP. Our decision today accords with Timoney and reconciles Chapter 112 and the CIP. WELLS, C.J., concurs.
ROTHENBERG, J. (dissenting).
The Florida Constitution grants municipalities broad powers to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, "except as otherwise provided by law." Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Recognizing the powers granted, along with the limitations placed on local governments, Florida's Legislature adopted the Florida Municipal Home Rule Act in 1973, which provides:
(1) As provided in § 2(b), Art. VIII of the state constitution, municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.§ 166.021, Fla. Stat. (1973) (emphasis added).
. . . .
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution. It is the further intent of the legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. . . .
The language found in Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, "except as otherwise provided by law," has been interpreted as limiting municipal power where: (1) state law expressly preempts the action, or (2) there exists a literal incompatibility or direct conflict between the local ordinance and a state statute. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Because the City of Miami's ordinance is expressly preempted by Florida law, and it is in direct conflict with Florida statutes, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
ANALYSIS
A. The City of Miami's Ordinance
In 2002, the City of Miami, by ordinance, created a civilian investigative panel ("the CIP") to "[c]onduct investigations, inquiries and public hearings to make factual determinations, facilitate resolution and propose recommendations to the city manager and police chief regarding allegations of misconduct by any sworn officer of the city police department[.]" Miami, Fla., Code Art. II, § 11.5-27(5).
Specifically, article II, section 11.5-27 provides:
The purpose, powers and duties of the CIP are to:
(1) Act as independent civilian oversight of the sworn police department;
(2) Exercise its powers so as to not interfere with any ongoing investigations and conduct its activities consistent with applicable law . . . ;
. . . .
(5) Conduct investigations, inquiries and public hearings to make
factual determinations, facilitate resolution and propose recommendations to the city manager and police chief regarding allegations of misconduct by any sworn officer of the city police; (6) Request issuance of subpoenas, after consultation with the state attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, (Miami-Dade County) and approval of CIP independent counsel, for the purpose of obtaining evidence from witnesses and production of books, papers, and other evidence, which subpoenas shall be signed, served and enforced pursuant to applicable law, provided that no immunity be conferred by the CIP;
. . . .
(8) Issue reports to the mayor, city commission, city attorney, city manager, chief of police and the public;
(9) Make recommendations as to the disposition of alleged incidents of police misconduct, to which the police chief is required to respond within 30 days[.]
. . . .
The ordinance further provides that "[p]olicies and procedures shall be established to ensure compliance with Chapters 112 and 119 of the Florida Statutes. . . ." Miami, Fla., Code Art. II, § 11.5-33(e). As will be discussed in detail below, the City of Miami's ordinance is expressly preempted by, and is in direct conflict with, Chapter 112. B. Chapter 112, Florida Statutes
Chapter 112 governs the rights of law enforcement officers while under investigation. Section 112.531(1) defines "law enforcement officers" as:
[A]ny person, other than a chief of police, who is employed full time by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state; and includes any person who is appointed by the sheriff as a deputy sheriff pursuant to s. 30.07
Lt. D'Agastino, the appellant, who was subpoenaed to appear before the CIP to answer questions and provide testimony to the CIP Committee regarding a civilian complaint alleging he committed misconduct during a traffic stop, is, without dispute, a law enforcement officer under Chapter 112. Lt. D'Agastino therefore entitled to all of the safeguards and protections set forth in Chapter 112, and specifically sections 112.532 and 112.533, commonly referred to as the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights.
Section 112.532 identifies the rights granted to law enforcement officers and correctional officers while under investigation, and begins with the following preamble. "All law enforcement officers and correctional officers employed by or appointed to a law enforcement agency or a correctional agency shall have the following rights and privileges[.]" (emphasis added). Subsection (1) identifies those rights; subsection (2) addresses who shall serve on complaint boards; subsection (3) provides a remedy for law enforcement and correctional officers who are knowingly falsely accused; subsection (4) specifies the notice requirements; subsection (5) protects law enforcement and correctional officers from retaliation for exercising their rights; and subsection (6) provides a 180-day time limitation to complete an investigation.
The rights specifically provided in section 112.532(1) are as follows:
(1) Rights of law enforcement officers and correctional officers while under investigation.—Whenever a law enforcement
officer or correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, suspension, demotion, or dismissal, the interrogation must be conducted under the following conditions:
(a) The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at a time when the law enforcement officer or correctional officer is on duty, unless the seriousness of the investigation is of such a degree that immediate action is required.
(b) The interrogation shall take place either at the office of the command of the investigating officer or at the office of the local precinct, police unit, or correctional unit in which the incident allegedly occurred, as designated by the investigating officer or agency.
(c) The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under investigation shall be informed of the rank, name, and command of the officer in charge of the investigation, the interrogating officer, and all persons present during the interrogation. All questions directed to the officer under interrogation shall be asked by or through one interrogator during any one investigative interrogation, unless specifically waived by the officer under investigation.
(d) The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under investigation must be informed of the nature of the investigation before any interrogation begins, and he or she must be informed of the names of all complainants. All identifiable witnesses shall be interviewed, whenever possible, prior to the beginning of the investigative interview of the accused officer. The complaint, all witness statements, including all other existing subject officer statements, and all other existing evidence, including, but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information, and audio or video recordings relating to the incident under investigation, must be provided to each officer who is the subject of the complaint before the beginning of any investigative interview of that officer. An officer, after being informed of the right to review witness statements, may voluntarily waive the provisions of this paragraph and provide a voluntary statement at any time.
(e) Interrogating sessions shall be for reasonable periods and shall be timed to allow for such personal necessities and rest periods as are reasonably necessary.
(f) The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under interrogation may not be subjected to offensive language or be
threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action. A promise or reward may not be made as an inducement to answer any questions.
(g) The formal interrogation of a law enforcement officer or correctional officer, including all recess periods, must be recorded on audio tape, or otherwise preserved in such a manner as to allow a transcript to be prepared, and there shall be no unrecorded questions or statements. Upon the request of the interrogated officer, a copy of any recording of the interrogation session must be made available to the interrogated officer no later than 72 hours, excluding holidays and weekends, following said interrogation.
(h) If the law enforcement officer or correctional officer under interrogation is under arrest, or is likely to be placed under arrest as a result of the interrogation, he or she shall be completely informed of all his or her rights before commencing the interrogation.
(i) At the request of any law enforcement officer or correctional officer under investigation, he or she has the right to be represented by counsel or any other representative of his or her choice, who shall be present at all times during the interrogation whenever the interrogation relates to the officer's continued fitness for law enforcement or correctional service.
(j) Notwithstanding the rights and privileges provided by this part, this part does not limit the right of an agency to discipline or to pursue criminal charges against an officer.
Both sides agree that the rights granted to law enforcement and correctional officers under section 112.532 only apply to police departments while conducting an investigation. Thus, the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights and the protections it provides to law enforcement and correctional officers do not protect them when they are being investigated and questioned by the CIP. C. The City of Miami's ordinance is expressly preempted by Florida Statute
Section 112.533, enacted in 1974, was amended in 2003 to add the following language identified in bold:
(1)(a) Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, investigation, and determination of complaints received by such agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary.Ch. 2003-149, § 2, at 906, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Notably, the 2003 amendment provided an express exception authorizing investigation by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. § 112.533(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).
In 2007, section 112.533 was further amended to require that:
(1)(b)1. Any political subdivision that initiates or receives a complaint against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer must within 5 business days forward the complaint to the employing agency of the officer who is the subject of the complaint for review or investigation.Ch. 2007-110, §2, at 1258, Laws of Fla.; § 112.533(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).
2. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "political subdivision" means a separate agency or unit of local government created or established by law or ordinance and the officers thereof and includes, but is not limited to, an authority, board, branch, bureau, city, commission, consolidated government, county, department, district, institution, metropolitan government, municipality, office, officer, public corporation, town, or village.
There is nothing ambiguous about these amendments. As the Fifth District Court of Appeal found in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review Board, 15 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), the statute as amended:
conveys a clear and definite directive that when a complaint is registered against a law enforcement officer, the employing agency is the only local governmental entity authorized to investigate that complaint. This is clear from: (1) the title language of chapter 2003-149, designating the investigation required by chapter 112 as the "exclusive procedure" for investigation; (2) the language added to section 112.533 in 2003, mandating that the investigation authorized by chapter 112 "shall be the procedure" for investigating complaints against local law enforcement "notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary;" and (3) the language added to section 112.533 in 2007, directing any local governmental entity that receives or initiates a complaint against a law enforcement officer to forward it to the employing agency for investigation in accordance with chapter 112.
Thus, the language in Chapter 112, as amended, clearly and unambiguously mandates the procedure that must be followed when investigating a complaint against a law enforcement or correctional officer. Because review by citizen review panels is not one of the specified exceptions, the City of Miami's ordinance is preempted by Florida law and is therefore unconstitutional. D. The City of Miami's ordinance is in conflict with Florida law
The statute, as previously noted, provides an exception for the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. It also authorizes investigations by the state attorney's office, state and federal grand juries, state and federal criminal courts, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Department of Justice.
As previously addressed, section 112.533, as amended in 2003 and 2007, clarifies that a law enforcement agency's internal investigation shall be the procedure for investigating law enforcement and correctional officers notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to the contrary. § 112.533(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). In 2007, the statute was also amended to direct all local governmental entities that receive or initiate a complaint against a law enforcement or correctional officer to forward the complaint to the employing agency for investigation in accordance with Chapter 112. Ch. 2007-110, § 2, at 1258, Laws of Fla.; § 112.533(1)(b).
Section 112.533 also adds various other duties by the investigating agency and protections for the law enforcement or correctional officer being investigated. For example, section 112.533(1)(a) dictates that agency personnel assigned to the investigation must: prepare a report; verify that the contents are true and accurate based on personal knowledge, information, and belief; and include a sworn statement attesting that rights of the subject of the investigation contained in sections 112.532 and 112.533 have been honored. Section 112.533(2)(a) provides that the complaint and investigation must be kept confidential until the investigation is closed or the agency head provides written notice to the subject officer informing the officer that the investigation has concluded and whether disciplinary charges will be filed. Section 112.533 additionally grants the subject officer and/or his attorney broad discovery rights and access, and section 112.533(2)(c) establishes penalties for premature willful disclosure or failure to provide the subject officer with access to the identified discoverable items.
These statutorily mandated obligations of the investigating agency and the rights granted to law enforcement and correctional officers are not similarly required or granted under the City of Miami's ordinance, nor are the rights set forth in section 112.532. Specifically, section 112.532(1) requires that: (1) the interrogation take place at the precinct or correctional unit where the incident allegedly occurred, at a reasonable time and preferably while the officer is on duty, § 112.532(1)(a),(b); (2) all questions directed to the officer be asked by or through one interrogator during any one investigative interrogation, § 112.532(1)(c); (3) the officer under investigation must be informed of the nature of the investigation, the name of the complainant(s) and witnesses, all witness statements, and other evidence obtained, prior to the interrogation of the subject officer, § 112.532(1)(d); (4) the interrogation must be recorded and be made available upon request by the subject officer within 72 hours of the interrogation, § 112.532(1)(g); (5) if the subject officer is under arrest or is likely to be placed under arrest as a result of the interrogation, he or she must be informed of his or her rights prior to commencement of the interrogation, §112.532(1)(h); and (6) the subject officer has the right to be represented by counsel and have counsel present during the interrogation, § 112.532(1)(g).
The following protections which are also provided by Chapter 112 to law enforcement and correctional officers under investigation are likewise not required by the City of Miami's ordinance. Section 112.532(3) grants law enforcement and correctional officers the right to bring a civil suit against any person, group, organization or corporation, or the head of such organization or corporation, for abridgment of the officer's rights or for filing a complaint which the person or entity knew was false when it was filed. Section 112.532(6) additionally restricts the investigation to a 180-day limitation period.
Because the City of Miami's ordinance does not include these substantial, material requirements and rights, it is in direct conflict with sections 112.532 and 112.533. Therefore, the ordinance is unconstitutional. To hold otherwise would render these statutes meaningless and provide law enforcement and correctional agencies with a mechanism to obtain statements and other evidence from its officers by non-statutorily created boards that are not required to comply with the statutory mandates contained in Chapter 112. In other words, it would permit law enforcement to use evidence the CIP obtained without affording the subject officer the protection of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority relies on this Court's opinion in Timoney v. City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel, 990 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), while noting that the majority opinion conflicts with the Fifth District's opinion in Demings. Timoney, however, did not address the constitutionality of the City of Miami's ordinance or analyze whether the ordinance conflicts with or is preempted by state statute. This Court in Timoney merely determined that because Chapter 112 only governs the rights of law enforcement officers under investigation and the definition of "law enforcement officer" in section 112.531(2) specifically exempts the chief of police from its definition, Chapter 112 did not apply to Chief Timoney and he was therefore subject to the CIP's investigative subpoena. Timoney is therefore not controlling. Indeed, the majority, does not contend that it is. Conversely, the Fifth District in Demings did address the constitutionality of a similar county ordinance in Orange County and found that it was in direct conflict with Chapter 112. I wholeheartedly agree with the Fifth District's opinion in Demings, and because the majority's opinion in the instant case is in direct conflict with Demings, direct conflict must be certified.
In Demings, Orange County's Sheriff, Jerry Demings, and his deputy, Steven Jenny, appealed the trial court's order upholding the sections of Orange County's charter and ordinances establishing the Orange County Citizen's Review Board ("the CRB"), which is similar to the board created by the City of Miami, the CIP, and was created to investigate citizen complaints of excessive force and abuse of power. Demings, 15 So. 3d at 605. After analyzing section 112.533, as amended in 2003 and 2007, the Fifth District concluded it was unambiguous and "[i]t conveys a clear and definite directive that when a complaint is registered against a law enforcement officer, the employing agency is the only local governmental agency authorized to investigate the complaint." Id. at 608. The Fifth District thus concluded that "[b]ecause section 112.533 limits the investigation of complaints against law enforcement officers by local government to the employing agency's investigation, the charter provisions and ordinance that establish an additional procedure for investigating these complaints necessarily and directly conflict with the statute." Id. at 609.
Because the City of Miami's ordinance is preempted by state law and it is in direct conflict with sections 112.532 and 112.533, it is unconstitutional. I, therefore, respectfully disagree with the majority opinion upholding the ordinance. Additionally, because the majority opinion is in direct conflict with Demings, the conflict should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court.