D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co.

22 Citing cases

  1. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.

    231 Cal.App.4th 1131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)

    These provisions are apparently common in property damage insurance policies. They were explained succinctly in D & S Realty v. Markel Ins. Co. (2012) 284 Neb. 1, 816 N.W.2d 1 ( D & S Realty ), and we quote at length from that decision. "Standard casualty protection for residential and commercial property insures the property only to the extent of its actual cash value.

  2. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.

    231 Cal.App.4th 1131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)

    These provisions are apparently common in property-damage insurance policies. They were explained succinctly in D & S Realty v. Markel Ins. Co. (2012) 284 Neb. 1, 816 N.W.2d 1 (D & S Realty ), and we quote at length from that decision. “Standard casualty protection for residential and commercial property insures the property only to the extent of its actual cash value.

  3. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.

    A135938 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014)

    These provisions are apparently common in property-damage insurance policies. They were explained succinctly in D&S Realty v. Market Ins. Co. (2012) 284 Neb. 1 (D&S Realty), and we quote at length from that decision. "Standard casualty protection for residential and commercial property insures the property only to the extent of its actual cash value.

  4. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.

    A135938 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014)

    These provisions are apparently common in property-damage insurance policies. They were explained succinctly in D&S Realty v. Market Ins. Co. (2012) 284 Neb. 1 (D&S Realty), and we quote at length from that decision. "Standard casualty protection for residential and commercial property insures the property only to the extent of its actual cash value.

  5. Corrales Ventures, LLC v. Union Ins. Co.

    1:20-cv-00872-LF-SCY (D.N.M. Jan. 25, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    The most comprehensive opinion the Court has found on this subject is the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2012). The question in D & S Realty was “whether the insurer's general denial of liability excused the insured from complying with a policy condition requiring that the insured actually repair or replace the damaged property before replacement costs will be paid

  6. Henn v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.

    295 Neb. 859 (Neb. 2017)   Cited 22 times   6 Legal Analyses
    In Henn v. American Family Insurance Co., 894 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Neb. 2017), the plaintiff suffered hail damage to her home's roof vent caps, gutters, siding, fascia, screens, deck, and air-conditioning unit.

    "D & S Realty v. Markel Ins. Co., 284 Neb. 1, 14, 816 N.W.2d 1, 11 (2012).This court then stated that under a replacement cost policy, "where the cost to repair or replace is greater than the actual cash value, the insured, not the insurer, is responsible for the cash difference necessary to replace the old property with new property.

  7. SCF, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.

    1:20-cv-01173-JDB-jay (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Id. (quoting D&S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 284 Neb. 1, 816 N.W.2d 1, 13 and n.31 (Neb. 2012) (collecting cases)).

  8. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. White Stone Props., Ltd.

    Case No. A-12-CA-275-SS (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    This language is clear and unambiguous, and courts have routinely enforced replacement cost coverage provisions. See Ghoman v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Rolls v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 378 F. Supp. 392, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd, 503 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1974); D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (Neb. 2012). In Ghoman, the court, in describing contract language identical to the language above, noted "[i]t allows the insured to either make a claim for replacement costs, up to policy limits, or actual cash value supplemented by additional replacement cost coverage."

  9. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Qureshi

    No. 4D2023-1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jul. 24, 2024)

    Moreover, we reject the dissent's reliance upon Tio and the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion in D &S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Co., 816 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2012), for the circular argument that Universal's failure to tender payment for the estimated damages prevented the insureds from performing the repair work, thereby rendering the policy provision requiring the insureds to perform or incur the expense of the repairs as a condition precedent to payment unenforceable on the equitable theories of waiver or estoppel.

  10. Robertson P'ship v. Erie Ins. Exch.

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150517 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Id. Erie argues that similarly, here the Endorsement did not contain the condition of repair or replacement of the building, but it also did not have language providing for unlimited coverage, so the only reasonable interpretation was to construe the Endorsement with the policy as a whole and apply the coverage limitations contained in the Extension. ¶ 47 Erie further argues that, like most replacement cost policies, the Extension requires repair or replacement of the damaged property as a condition precedent to recovery because there is a moral hazard that the insured could otherwise intentionally destroy the property in order to gain from the loss. See D&S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Insurance Co., 816 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Neb. 2012). ¶ 48 Erie additionally argues that Mishne's deposition testimony that functional replacement cost endorsements were typically added to policies to reduce premiums supported the trial court's conclusion that the intent in adding the Endorsement was not to expand the amount potentially payable to an insured, nor eliminate the requirement to repair or replace the building, but rather to provide a more reasonable and less costly alternative to replacement cost coverage. Erie argues that the only reasonable interpretation is that section B of the Endorsement was added to ensure that functional replacement cost would be allowed for buildings, while traditional replacement cost would continue to be allowed at the election of the insured for personal property, so long as in all cases the property was actually repaired or replaced.