Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-05282-RMG-KFM
02-21-2024
Lamont Cutner, Plaintiff; v. Warden Wallace, Major Ocean, Sgt. Myers, Cpl. Brandon Williams, Capt. Spikes, Marcus Thomas, Demau Spurlock, Joyalyn Eskew, Esther Labrador, Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 23, 2023 (doc. 1). By orders filed November 21, 2023, December 11, 2023, and January 11, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 6; 10; 16). The plaintiff complied with the court's orders, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. During this same time, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (doc. 24) and a motion to amend his amended complaint (doc. 31). On February 20, 2024, the undersigned granted the plaintiff's motion (doc. 33), and the plaintiff's second amended complaint (doc. 35) was entered on the docket. Having reviewed the plaintiff's second amended complaint, the undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff's excessive force claim against defendants Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers is sufficient to survive screening, and service will be recommended as to those defendants on that claim. However, the remainder of the plaintiff's claims in the second amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; thus, they are subject to summary dismissal as outlined below.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), regarding an incident that occurred at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) (doc. 35). The plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment Rights were violated by the defendants on May 20, 2021 (id. at 6, 7). He contends that the incident happened after he “had words” with Sgt. Myers, who then asked Cpl. Williams for help, and then came into his cell and punched, kicked, and stomped on him (id. at 7, 8-9). During this same time, he contends that another inmate came into his cell and attacked him (id. at 7, 9). Maj. Ocean approached and told them to stop and had the plaintiff transferred to a control cell (id. at 9-10). The plaintiff contends that he was held in the control cell for five days instead of three and that he did not have a blanket or boxers during that time (id. at 10). The plaintiff screamed and yelled from the cell and Ofc. Spurlock and Ofc. Thomas came to his cell and saw the plaintiff's busted lip and head, and the plaintiff requested medical care, but was not provided medical care (id. at 10-11). The plaintiff contends that he was then transferred to Broad River by Ms. Labrador and Warden Wallace despite his protective custody status (id. at 11). Lt. Spikes was also aware that the plaintiff was assaulted, but did not complete an incident report (id.). Nurse Eskew denied the plaintiff medical care (id. at 12). The plaintiff also alleges that he requested medical treatment and although Ofc. Thomas and other unnamed individuals indicated that they were requesting medical treatment for the plaintiff, he did not receive medical treatment (id. at 13). The plaintiff's injuries include a swollen head/face, busted lip, and an injury to his right shoulder (id. at 13). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id. at 13).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. Additionally, as indicated, the plaintiff's excessive force claim against defendants Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers is sufficient to survive screening, and service will be recommended as to those defendants on that claim. The remainder of the plaintiff's claims, as outlined below, are subject to summary dismissal.
Supervisory Liability
The plaintiff's second amended complaint makes supervisory liability claims against Warden Wallace, Maj. Ocean, Dir. Labrador, and Lt. Spikes (see doc. 35). First, although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff). Additionally, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that any of these defendants were aware of conduct posing a risk to the plaintiff (before the incident in question), nor alleged a causal link between any knowledge these defendants may have of the complained-of matters and the plaintiff's alleged injuries - which he asserts were from the excessive force incident. For example, the plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to Broad River by Warden Wallace and Dir. Labrador despite his protective custody status, but his second amended complaint contains no allegations regarding how his protective custody status affected the transfer - and prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's custody status only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). Here, the plaintiff's second amended complaint contains no allegations regarding atypical or significant hardships caused by the transfer to Broad River. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no atypical or significant hardship despite claims of vermin-infested cells, human waste in cells, leaking toilets, unbearable heat, less food, reduced access to clean clothes and linens, reduced out-of-cell time, no outdoor recreation time, and no educational or religious services).
Similarly, the plaintiff has not stated a claim against Maj. Ocean, because he alleges that Maj. Ocean had Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers stop assaulting the plaintiff when he approached and had the plaintiff transferred to a control cell, meaning that the plaintiff has not alleged that Maj. Ocean allowed the incident to continue or had any knowledge that Cpl. Williams or Sgt. Myers were entering the plaintiff's cell to use excessive force. Similarly, the plaintiff's claims that his rights were violated when incident reports were not completed likewise fail to state a claim because private citizens (such as the plaintiff) do not have a “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another,” See Linda R.S. v. RichardD., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), and violations of SCDC policy - absent more - does not constitute a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992). As such, the plaintiff's supervisory liability claims against these defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Failure to Protect Claim
Liberally construed, the plaintiff alleges that Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers failed to protect him from being hit by another inmate during the alleged excessive force incident (doc. 35 at 7, 9). To plausibly state a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient factual allegations to show that a prison official had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregarded that substantial risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating the standard of deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury). Here, the plaintiff's second amended complaint contains no allegations that Cpl. Williams or Sgt. Myers were aware that the unspecified inmate posed a threat to the plaintiff or ignored such a threat during the incident in question. As such, the plaintiff's failure to protect claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Here, the plaintiff's complained-of conditions include being in a control cell for five days without boxers to wear or a blanket, as well as that he requested clothes from Ofc. Thomas, but his request was denied (doc. 35 at 9-10). The alleged conditions, however, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Thus, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are also subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
The plaintiff also contends that Ofc. Spurlock, Ofc. Thomas, and Nurse Eskew denied him access to medical care (doc. 35 at 10, 11, 12, 13). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481,486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. First, the plaintiff's alleged injuries, a split lip/swollen face/injured shoulder do not appear to rise to the level of a serious medical need (see doc. 35). Moreover, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations of denied medical care fall short of the plausibility standard. Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (finding that the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Indeed, the entirety of the plaintiff's allegations against Nurse Eskew and Ofc. Spurlock are that Nurse Eskew was aware of his assault and denied him medical care (doc. 35 at 12) and that he asked Ofc. Spurlock for unspecified medical care and was denied (id. at 10). Further, the plaintiff's second amended complaint provides contradictory allegations with respect to Ofc. Thomas, alleging that Ofc. Thomas denied his request for medical care, and also that Ofc. Thomas acknowledged the plaintiff's request for medical treatment and indicated that he was working on getting the plaintiff seen by medical, although the plaintiff contends that he was not immediately seen (compare doc. 35 at 10 with doc. 35 at 13). However, because the plaintiff concedes that Ofc. Thomas took steps to obtain medical treatment for the plaintiff, his claim fails because he cannot show that Ofc. Thomas was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's need for medical care. Indeed, at best, these defendants may have been negligent in not ensuring that medical showed up to treat the plaintiff for his busted lip or swollen face, however, mere negligence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim also fails to state a claim for relief and should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
As noted above, this case will go forward with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim against defendants Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers. However, with respect to the plaintiff's remaining claims, the undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the second amended complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss the remaining claims and defendants with prejudice (other than the excessive force claim against defendants Cpl. Williams and Sgt. Myers), without leave for further amendment, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court 3
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).