Opinion
C. A. 6:24-cv-01584-RMG-KFM
06-05-2024
Lamont Cutner, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant Nike Dasant, Esther Labrador, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed this action seeking injunctive relief from the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. 1). In signing the complaint, the plaintiff acknowledged that he was responsible for notifying the clerk in writing of any change of address and that failure to keep his address updated with the court may lead to dismissal of the case (id. at 16). On April 23, 2024, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his case was not in proper form for service and instructing him to provide certain documents to bring his case into proper form (doc. 8). The order reminded the plaintiff to notify the clerk in writing of any change of address and warned that failure to keep his address updated with the Court may lead to dismissal of the case (id. at 2-3). The order also warned the plaintiff that his failure to comply with the order and submit the necessary proper form documents in the time provided in the order may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with an order of this court (id. at 2). The plaintiff responded to the order, but did not sign the Forms USM 285 where indicated, so on May 10, 2024, an order was issued giving the plaintiff a second opportunity to bring his case into proper form (doc. 13). The order reminded the plaintiff a second time to notify the clerk in writing of any change of address and warned that failure to keep his address updated with the court may lead to dismissal of the case (id. at 2). The order also warned the plaintiff that his failure to comply with the order and submit the appropriately completed proper form documents within the time permitted in the order may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with an order of this court (id. at 1). To date, the plaintiff has not responded to the court's May 10, 2024, order, and the time to do so has lapsed.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) regarding events that occurred while he was located at Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”) (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated on March 14, 2023, when Lt. Dasant authorized the plaintiff and other inmates to be transferred to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”) based on an incident report that there was a fight in the unit where the plaintiff was located (id. at 5, 6). He contends his rights were violated because he was not given an RHU notification form within 24 hours of being placed on RHU, which is a violation of SCDC policy (id. at 6, 9). When he received the form, it was not completed correctly (id. at 6-7).
The plaintiff also alleges that he is not being provided enough “structured” or “programming” time per SCDC policy, but also alleges that when he complained about the lack of mental health treatment, Dir. Labrador put him on a list for a mental health unit when available (id. at 7-9). The plaintiff contends that other SCDC employees indicate that he is not on a list for the unit, so Dir. Labrador lied to him (id. at 8). The plaintiff's only injury is emotional distress (id. at 10). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to be transferred to a high level mental health program (id. at 9, 10).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking injunctive relief from the defendants. However, as set forth in more detail below, the instant action should be dismissed.
Rule 41
As an initial matter, because the plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form, the instant matter should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well established that a court has the authority to dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with orders of the court. Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir.1989). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (emphasis added). In addition to its inherent authority, this court may also sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Id. at 630. In considering whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b), the court is required to consider four factors:
(1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff;
(2) the amount of prejudice to the defendants caused by the delay;
(3) the history of the plaintiff in proceeding in a dilatory manner; and,
(4) the existence of less drastic sanctions other than dismissal.Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir.1978).
Here, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal. With respect to factors (1) and (3), as noted, despite multiple opportunities, the plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form. In doing so, he has failed to comply with the court's orders of April 23, 2024, and May 10, 2024, which instructed the plaintiff to provide specific documentation to the court to bring his case into proper form (docs. 8; 13). Each order warned the plaintiff of the consequences of failing to comply with the orders' instructions, including the dismissal of his case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (docs. 8 at 2; 13 at 1). Despite these warnings, the plaintiff has not provided the court with the required documentation. Accordingly, as the plaintiff has failed to comply with the court's orders and has been previously warned that such failures could result in dismissal, it appears that less drastic sanctions would not be appropriate. As such, the undersigned recommends that the instant action be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure to comply with orders of the court.
Failure to State a Claim
Even had the plaintiff brought this case into proper form, it would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief, as set forth in more detail below.
Due Process Claim
The plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was transferred to the RHU without the proper notice (doc. 1 at 5, 6-7, 9). To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). First, to the extent the plaintiff asserts violations of his rights because he has been kept in the RHU (based upon his custody classification), the claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The plaintiff's assertion that this transfer violated SCDC policy likewise fails to rise to the level of a plausible claim because violation of an SCDC policy or rule, on its own, does not constitute a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Keelerv. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992); Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 3:06-cv-02062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (The plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not “follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). Here, the only hardship alleged by the plaintiff is that he has been denied the ability to have certain therapy sessions and to engage in “structured” and “programming” time (doc. 1 at 8). However, the law is well settled that “inmates have no constitutional right to rehabilitation or educational programs.” Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F.Supp. 933, 942 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (noting that deprivation of rehabilitation and educational programs does not violate Eighth Amendment)). Further, the plaintiff's contention that he has been denied “structured” or “programming” time fails to rise to the level of an atypical or significant hardship. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no atypical or significant hardship despite claims of reduced out-of-cell time, no outdoor recreation time, and no educational or religious services).
Further, the plaintiff's alleged injury - emotional distress - is not constitutionally cognizable. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (finding that there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). Moreover, the plaintiff's only requested relief in this action - transfer to a mental health program - is relief this court cannot grant because the decision about where to house inmates is generally committed to the discretion of state officials. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (noting that “federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons”). Thus, the plaintiff's due process claims is subject to dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
Liberally construed, the plaintiff may assert a denial of access to medical care because he has not been placed in a mental health program as requested and has not received enough mental health treatment (doc. 1 at 7-9). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. First, the only defendant named with respect to this claim is Dir. Labrador, and it is unclear how Dir. Labrador was involved in the plaintiff's mental health treatment - except for in a supervisory capacity (see doc. 1). Nevertheless, even construing the plaintiff's claims as asserting a failure by Dir. Labrador to personally treat him, the plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied all mental health treatment, only the specific mental health treatment of unspecified “structured” time (doc. 1 at 7-9) - meaning that his claim is based on his preference for different treatment than was provided - to which he is not constitutionally entitled. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). Additionally, the plaintiff concedes that in response to his grievance about mental health treatment, Dir. Labrador indicated that he was on a wait list for the secured mental health unit (doc. 1-1 at 2). The plaintiff contends that another SCDC employee later indicated that he was no longer on the wait list and would have to address the matter with an institutional board, presumably based on the four additional disciplinary infractions with which he was charged after Dir. Labrador placed him on the list for transfer (see doc. 1-1 at 3). See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state. sc.us/scdc-public/ (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited June 4, 2024).
Further, even presuming Dir. Labrador had not placed him on the list for transfer to a secured mental health unit, as noted above, the plaintiff's only alleged injury - emotional distress - is not constitutionally cognizable. See Williams, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2. Similarly, as noted above, the plaintiff's requested relief - transfer to a mental health program is relief this court cannot grant because the decision about where to house inmates is generally committed to the discretion of state officials. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228-29. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).