Opinion
C. A. 20-4497-SAL-PJG
03-16-2022
Russell Antonio Cunningham, Plaintiff, v. Mike Hunt, Aiken County Sheriff; Nick Gallam, Captain; Bill Wheats, The Honorable Bill Wheats, Solicitor, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Russell Antonio Cunningham, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that Defendant Bill Weeks (incorrectly identified in the caption as “Bill Wheats”) should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
In a contemporaneous order the court authorized the issuance and service of process on Defendants Mike Hunt and Nick Gallam.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is currently detained in the Aiken County Detention Center on state criminal charges. Plaintiff claims that Aiken County Solicitor Bill Weeks is violating his rights under the Fifth Amendment because Plaintiff has been detained for more than six months without Weeks having prepared an indictment to present to a grand jury. Plaintiff also claims that despite making a motion for a speedy trial, Plaintiff has not received an answer to that motion, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Plaintiff further claims that he was denied bond on a non-capital charge, which violates the Eighth Amendment because in jail, he lacks the ability to defend himself against the charges. Plaintiff brings this action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also seeks to have his charges dismissed.
Plaintiff also claims the other defendants-two jail officers-denied him access to law books and other legal materials necessary to defend himself.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Amended Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
However, solicitors are immune from suit where a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 for the solicitor's prosecution of the plaintiff. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (“Solicitors are immune from §1983 claims where their challenged actions are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' ”); see also Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that to determine whether a particular act is “intimately associated with the judicial phase, ” the court employs an functional approach, distinguishing between advocative functions and investigative or administrative functions) (quoting Imbler at 430). Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Weeks has not prepared an indictment, has not answered Plaintiff's motion for a speedy trial, and advocated that Plaintiff be denied bond. These allegations all concern advocative functions of Weeks's role in deciding whether to or how to prosecute Plaintiff. See Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining “the Imbler Court specified that absolute immunity protects prosecutors' decisions whether and when to prosecute”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nero, 890 F.3d at 118 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a prosecutor acts as an advocate when he “prepares and files charging documents” or participates in a pretrial hearing). Accordingly, Weeks is entitled to prosecutorial immunity from Plaintiffs claims in this case.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to have his charges dismissed, such relief is not available in a § 1983 action, see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity or duration of confinement); nor would that relief be available if the court construed this matter as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that federal habeas corpus cannot be used to dismiss an indictment or prevent a prosecution); and regardless, the court generally may not equitably interfere with a state criminal proceeding, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendant Weeks be dismissed from this case with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).