II. Intentional Contract Interference We discussed the legal requirements for a claim of tortious interference with a prospective contract in Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 364 N.W.2d 158 (Ct.App. 1985). An individual improperly interferes with a prospective contract by "(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue [a] prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing [a] prospective relation."
Speculation is not a proper basis for a jury decision. SeeFoseid v. State Bank of Cross Plains, 197 Wis.2d 772, 791, 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct.App. 1995) (verdict cannot be based on "conjecture and speculation"); Cudd v.Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 662, 364 N.W.2d 158 (Ct.App. 1985) (verdict cannot be based on "mere speculation"). 4.
To that end, Wisconsin "recognizes as a cause of action the tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relations." Duct-O-Wire Co. v. U.S. Crane, Inc., 31 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wisconsin law); see also Cudd v. Crownhart, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Wis.Ct.App. 1985) (noting that a plaintiff has a cause of action under Wisconsin law to protect against "interference with existing contractual relations and for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations"). To prevail on a tortious interference claim under Wisconsin law, a plaintiff must satisfy five elements: (1) an actual or prospective contract existed between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant interfered with that contract or prospective contract; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) the interference caused the plaintiff to sustain damages; and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged to interfere.
(4) that the [plaintiffs'] conduct was a substantial factor in producing the damages claimed by the [defendants]. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Sheri Tanner's Sexual Discrimination Action at 10-11 (citing Federal Pants, Inc. v. Stocking, 762 F.2d 561, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1985), and Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Ct.App. 1985)). Although the Federal Pants and Cudd courts characterized the elements of this tort somewhat differently, defendants "agree with the four elements of a prima facie claim for tortious interference."
¶ 9 There is no dispute that Garrow intentionally interfered with Midwest's current and prospective business arrangements.See Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 659–60, 364 N.W.2d 158 (Ct.App.1985). However, Garrow is liable only for the harm caused by the interference.
Wisconsin first adopted the cause of action for intentional interference with an existing contractual relationship in Mendelson v. BlatzBrewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 491, 101 N.W.2d 805 (1960). SeeCudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis. 2d 656, 659, 364 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1985). In Mendelson, our supreme court adopted the original version of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS. § 766 (1939), which incorporated causes of action for existing and prospective contracts.
[T]his intent requirement also applies to interference with prospective contracts." Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Wis.App. 1985). Misany claims that the Army negligently lost his records and caused him to lose a prospective job.
ECF No. 30 at 6. Serio cites Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League, 249 N.W.2d 547, 533 (Wis. 1977) and Cudd v. Crownhart, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) to support the proposition that “[n]o allegation in the Complaint provides any factual basis on which the Court could conclude (or even draw a reasonable inference) that Serio acted with a purpose” when he allegedly interfered with Gilsinger's professional relationships. Id.
B. Tortious interference with prospective contractsUnder Wisconsin law, a claim for tortious interference with prospective contracts has five elements: (1) the plaintiff had a prospective contractual relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant interfered with the relationship; (3) the interference was intentional; (4) there was a causal connection between the interference and the plaintiff's damages; and (5) the interference was not justified or privileged. Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 456, 597 N.W.2d 462, 478 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 659-60, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 1985)). Wood River challenges Sando's allegations relating to the fifth element.
Pure Milk Products Cooperative v. National Farmers Organization, 90 Wis.2d 781, 796, 280 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. 1979). See also Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 659, 364 N.W.2d 158 (Wis.App. 1985) ("A Wisconsin plaintiff therefore has a remedy in a common law action for interference with existing contractual relations and for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.") (citation omitted), review denied, 122 Wis.2d 783, 367 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. 1985). A Wisconsin tortious interference cause of action has five elements: (1) the plaintiff must have had a contract or a prospective contractual relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant must have interfered with that relationship; (3) the interference by the defendant must have been intentional; (4) there must be a causal connection between the interference and damages; and (5) the defendant must not have been justified or privileged to interfere.