Opinion
2014-12-11
Kimberly CRUZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Evan LISE, Defendant–Respondent.
The Sullivan Law Firm, New York (James A. Domini of counsel), for appellant. Russo, Apoznanski & Tambasco, Melville (Susan J. Mitola of counsel), for respondent.
The Sullivan Law Firm, New York (James A. Domini of counsel), for appellant. Russo, Apoznanski & Tambasco, Melville (Susan J. Mitola of counsel), for respondent.
SWEENY, J.P., RENWICK, DeGRASSE, CLARK, KAPNICK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lizbeth Gonzalez, J.), entered on or about March 3, 2014, which denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
In support of her motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit averring that she had stopped at an intersection when her car was hit in the rear by defendant's vehicle. Since a “rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle,” this was sufficient to shift the burden to defendant “to come forward with an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident” (Cabrera v. Rodriguez, 72 A.D.3d 553, 553, 900 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept.2010]; see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 [2008]; Joplin v. City of New York, 116 A.D.3d 443, 982 N.Y.S.2d 762 [1st Dept.2014] ). Defendant's affidavit asserting that plaintiff suddenly stopped in front of him, standing alone, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (Corrigan v. Porter Cab Corp., 101 A.D.3d 471, 472, 955 N.Y.S.2d 336 [1st Dept.2012]; see also Gutierrez v. Trillium USA, LLC, 111 A.D.3d 669, 670–671, 974 N.Y.S.2d 563 [2d Dept.2013]; Renteria v. Simakov, 109 A.D.3d 749, 972 N.Y.S.2d 15 [1st Dept.2013] ).