Opinion
Civil Action No. 21 - 388
06-04-2021
ABRAHAM (JUNIOR) CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL, JUDGE MARIA N. METZEL, JUDGE DAVID R. CASHMAN, WARDEN, ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL, C.O. MONDONE, C.O. EDWARDS, MRS. ROBERTS, MR. WILLIAM N. SANDSTONE, JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES, Defendants.
District Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Abraham Cruz, Jr. ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and currently confined at SCI-Dallas. He initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and it was transferred to this Court by Order dated March 22, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1-7.) Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis by Order dated March 26, 2021, and his Complaint was docketed that same day. (ECF Nos. 9-10.) On March 30, 2021, Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint, which he later filed on April 13, 2021. (ECF Nos. 13, 17.) Upon review of the Amended Complaint, the undersigned now recommends that it be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking redress from governmental officers or employees.
B. Standard of Review
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2002).
In reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Id. at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a civil rights claim "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a section 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Discussion
Even after ordering Plaintiff to amend his complaint so that he could set forth his claims more clearly and concisely, Plaintiff's allegations are still difficult to comprehend. However, what is clear is that Plaintiff is complaining about events that occurred anywhere from as late as 2001 to as recently as 2012. As such, it is clear that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
As an initial matter, while ordinarily an affirmative defense, statute of limitations considerations may be raised in a screening review, as explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Delaware County Court, 260 F. App'x 454 (3d Cir. 2008).
Civil rights complaints are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256 F. App'x 563, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2007). Although we have not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (finding that a district court's screening authority under § 1915(e) "differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not be raised and considered sua sponte.").260 F. App'x at 455. In Smith, the Third Circuit agreed that the limitations defense was evident from the face of the complaint and thus found that the plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed as untimely.
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in district courts within Pennsylvania are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania, and the applicable statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania is two years. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524; Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon the continuing violation doctrine, an equitable exception to the timely filing requirement, "the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff 'is aware of the injury at the time it occurred.'" Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 773 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003)). For example, the "continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock begun when plaintiff obtained requisite information [to statue a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy." Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In "civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, federal courts must ascertain the underlying cause of action under state law and apply the limitation period which the state would apply if the action had been brought in state court" and the "controlling statute of limitations in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most analogous one provided by state law." Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1974)); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Under the continuing violation doctrine, "when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period." Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has stated that
[i]n order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts." West [v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,] 45 F.3d [744,] 755 [(3d Cir. 1995)] quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter - whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency - whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence - whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n.9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)). The consideration of "degree of permanence" is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292.
Judged by these standards, Plaintiff's claims are untimely and barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The events which gave rise to this litigation occurred between 2001 and 2012, and all appear to be isolated incidents, i.e., discrete and independently actionable acts that would have triggered Plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his rights. Because the claims Plaintiff raises accrued more than two years before he initiated this action, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Simms v. Freeman, 428 F. App'x 119, 120 (3d Cir. 2011) ("If the allegations, taken as true, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.") (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
Finally, while the undersigned is cognizant that a district court must allow amendment by the plaintiff in a civil rights action brought under section 1983 before dismissing for failure to state a claim, the Court should not allow amendment in this case because it would be futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6), the district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile).
III. CONCLUSION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.
Dated: June 4, 2021.
/s/_________
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge Cc: Abraham (Junior) Cruz
NY-2555
SCI Dallas
1000 Follies Rd.
Dallas, PA 18612-0286