Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:97cv212-D-A
January 12, 1998
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court are the motions of the plaintiffs 1) to dismiss from this action all of their claims arising under federal law and 2) to remand this action to the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Mississippi. After careful consideration, the court finds that neither of these motions are well taken and the court shall deny them both.
In determining the propriety of remand, this court normally employs the "well-pleaded complaint" rule and looks to the face of the plaintiffs' complaint as of the time of removal. See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537-38, 59 S.Ct. 347, 348-49, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939); Nutro Products Corporation v. NCNB Texas National Bank. 35 F.3d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990). Consequently, as subsequent events do not affect the removability of an action, this court need not address the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss prior to their motion to remand. The well-pleaded complaint rule directs the court to examine the plaintiffs' complaint — if the face of the plaintiffs' complaint reveals no issue of federal law, there is no federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 327 (1987) ("The rule makes the plaintiff the master of his claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.").
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute . . . must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9, 77 L.Ed.2d at 430, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76, 58 L.Ed. 1218, 34 S.Ct. 724 (1914)). In this case, the plaintiffs originally filed in state court and has alleged in relevant part that:
Plaintiffs contend that . . . that the limitation[s]. . . provided by § 11-46-15 of the 1972 Mississippi Code, as amended, is unconstitutional . . .
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs bring this action for declaratory judgment and ask the Court to construe, determine, and declare the rights of the parties under all relevant statutes of the State of Mississippi, relevant constitutional provisions of the Mississippi Constitution and the United States Constitution . . .
Plaintiffs' Complaint, ¶¶ VI, X (emphasis added). Upon a reading of the complaint, it is apparent that the plaintiffs seek recovery which arises under "the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This court possesses original subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar, and has no discretion to remand these claims to state court. Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1993); Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Wilson Indus., 886 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir 1989).
The plaintiffs do seek, however, to dismiss their federal claims and leave only state law causes of action in this matter. This court could then utilize its discretion and decline to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' remaining non-federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 590 (5th Cir. 1992); Watts v. Kroger. 955 F. Supp. 674, 687 (N.D. Miss. 1997). If this court determines that such a request is merely an attempt at forum shopping, this court would not reward the plaintiffs with a remand of this cause.See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357, 108 S.Ct. 614, 622, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); Brown, 901 F.2d at 1254; Guillot v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 112, 114 (W.D. La. 1996). Such a determination by this court would only arise, however, if the court grants the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss.
The court takes note that the plaintiffs have not delineated whether they seek dismissal of their federal claims with or without prejudice. As such, this court will presume that they seek only a dismissal without prejudice. Further, the plaintiffs have failed to submit to this court a memorandum of authorities in support of their motion. Rule 8(d), Uniform Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi. Without knowing precisely what the plaintiffs seek or why they do so, this court cannot say that the plaintiffs are entitled to the dismissal of their federal law claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). The undersigned shall deny the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss.
Application of the well-pleaded complaint rule reveals that this court possesses original federal question jurisdiction over the case at bar. Further, the plaintiffs have failed to adequately demonstrate their entitlement to dismiss their claims arising under federal law. As such, both the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and motion to remand shall be denied.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND REMAND
Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:
) the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their claims arising under federal law is hereby
DENIED; and
) the plaintiffs' motion to remand this cause to the Circuit Court of Calhoun
County, Mississippi is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.