Opinion
March 8, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Mordue, J.
Present — Lawton, J.P., Fallon, Doerr, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs and judgment granted in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiff Margaret C. Crull was injured when the vehicle she was operating collided with a vehicle operated by Kimberly H. Tripoli and owned by Kimberly's husband, Scott. The vehicle owned by Scott Tripoli was insured by defendant, which offered Crull the per person limits of bodily injury coverage ($100,000) provided by the policy. Crull demanded that defendant also pay the per person limits of bodily injury coverage ($100,000) on the separate policy it had issued insuring a vehicle owned by Kimberly Tripoli. Defendant refused, contending that the policy issued to Kimberly Tripoli did not provide bodily injury coverage for accidents arising out of the use of a vehicle owned by her husband. Defendant appeals from a judgment granting plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment declaring that the policy issued to Kimberly Tripoli provides excess coverage and that, pursuant to Carlino v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. ( 74 N.Y.2d 350), defendant is obligated to pay any damages up to the limits of $200,000 that may be awarded in favor of Crull. We reverse.
The policy issued to Kimberly Tripoli provides bodily injury coverage for accidents arising out of the use of "other cars". The policy extends such coverage "to the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car." There is no suggestion that the vehicle owned by Kimberly's husband was "newly acquired" within the meaning of the policy. The policy defines a "temporary substitute car" as "a car not owned by you or your spouse" and a "non-owned car" as "a car not * * * owned by * * * you, your spouse, or any relatives." Thus, the clear language of the policy negates bodily injury coverage for accidents arising from Kimberly Tripoli's operation of a vehicle owned by Kimberly's husband ( see, Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Kligler, 42 N.Y.2d 863; Creech v Knitter, 88 A.D.2d 985, affd 57 N.Y.2d 712). Plaintiffs' reliance upon Handelsman v Sea Ins. Co. ( 85 N.Y.2d 96, rearg denied 85 N.Y.2d 924) is misplaced. The subject policy contains the "narrowing reference" to non-owned vehicles not present in Handelsman ( Handelsman v Sea Ins. Co., supra, at 102). Further, we reject plaintiffs' contentions that the policy language and declarations page are in conflict and that the insurer was required to state on the declarations page that the policy did not provide coverage if the insured used a vehicle owned by her husband. There is no requirement that an insurer list every coverage limitation or exclusion on the declarations page of the policy.
Thus, we reverse the judgment on appeal and grant judgment in favor of defendant declaring that the policy issued to Kimberly Tripoli does not provide bodily injury coverage for accidents arising out of her use of the vehicle owned by her husband and that her policy is not applicable to the claim asserted by plaintiff Crull.