"In the retaliation context, instead of requiring a significant change in employment status to constitute adversity, an action is adverse if it would have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (APM) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405). In determining whether a particular action would dissuade a reasonable worker from pursuing a charge of discrimination, courts look to the "particular circumstances" of the action so as to determine whether the adverse action resulted in an objective harm to the worker.
"In the retaliation context, instead of requiring a significant change in employment status to constitute adversity, an action is adverse if it would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ " Crowley v. Vilsack , 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington N. , 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 ). Applying that standard, the D.C. Circuit has held that "[a] reasonable employee might well be dissuaded from filing an EEOC complaint if she thought her employer would retaliate by burying her in work." Mogenhan v. Napolitano , 613 F.3d 1162, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ; seeJouanny v. Embassy of France in the U.S. , No. 16-cv-135, 2017 WL 2455023, at *6 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that allegations concerning the defendant nearly doubling the plaintiff's workload to pressure her to quit "satisifie[d] the adversity requirement for a retaliation claim" (citing Mogenhan , 613 F.3d at 1166 ) ).
However, as we have said, Ms. Bereston's well-pleaded factual allegations fail to support her conclusory assertion that the PIP in her case was issued in retaliation for her putatively protected conduct (either in refusing to violate HIPAA or for her compliance efforts in general) rather than in response to her identified management deficiencies.Crowley v. Vilsack , 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 330–31 (D.D.C. 2017).
Anderson's allegations that she was assigned a disproportionately heavy workload, placed on a PIP, and denied leave satisfy this requirement. See Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 331 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that imposition of a PIP can constitute an adverse action for retaliation claim even if it does not affect employee's salary, grade, or performance appraisal); Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“A reasonable employee might well be dissuaded from filing an EEO complaint if she thought her employer would retaliate by burying her in work.”). Of course, such actions do not always rise the level of materially adverse actions.
but see Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 331 (D.D.C. 2017) (concluding, without addressing Stewart, that “the imposition of a PIP - even one that does not result in a negative impact on salary, grade or performance appraisal - can constitute an adverse action”). Nowhere does Plaintiff attempt to show how any of these actions affected his grade or salary in any way: he does not argue, for instance, that they led to his eventual termination. Compare Holmes, 2024 WL 864217, at *9 (warnings could qualify if “later used to justify [employee's] suspension and demotion”) with Pl. Opp. at 13 (asserting, without more, that “PIP could dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of discrimination”) (emphasis added) (quoting Chowdhury v. Blair, 604 F.Supp.2d 90, 97 (D.D.C. 2009)).
. In the retaliation context, an action is adverse if it “would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'” Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 60). This standard encompasses a “broader sweep of actions” than the standard for a discrimination claim,
” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For a claim of retaliation, “an action is adverse if it would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'” Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). The action must also be materially adverse so as “to separate significant from trivial harms . . . such as the sporadic use of abusive language.”
” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n.4. For a claim of retaliation, “an action is adverse if it would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'” Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F.Supp.3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). The action must also be materially adverse so as “to separate significant from trivial harms . . . such as the sporadic use of abusive language.”
Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n.4. For a claim of retaliation, "an action is adverse if it would have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Chatman cannot clear this initial hurdle.
In the retaliation context, conversely, "an action is adverse if it would have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Crowley v. Vilsack, 236 F. Supp. 3d 326, 330 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68). Bearing this in mind, the Court looks at the three incidents separately.