Where the language of a particular statutory provision is at issue, we will focus upon the statute as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases. We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include. Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001). RSA 540-A:2 provides, "No landlord shall willfully violate a tenant's right to quiet enjoyment of his tenancy. . . .
In New Hampshire, landlords impliedly warrant that the premises they lease are habitable. See Adams v. Woodlands of Nashua, 151 N.H. 640, 642 (2005) ("[A] tenant whose premises are unsafe or unsanitary may have a remedy because such conditions could violate the implied warranty of habitability."); Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 391 (2001) ("A defect that renders premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for living therein, constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability."). This implied warranty of habitability entitles tenants to damages, such as those awarded by the District Court to Landry in this case, when that warranty is breached.
The covenant of quiet enjoyment is a common law doctrine that obligates the landlord to refrain from interferences with the tenant's possession during the tenancy. Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389, 788 A.2d 263 (2001). It is implied by law in every lease.
The starting point in any statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute. Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001). We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.
We will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001) (quotations and brackets omitted). RSA 282-A:25 provides that an individual have "annual earnings, of which in each of the 2 calendar quarters [in the base period] the individual must have earned not less than $1,400" to receive benefits.
"The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo." Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001). "[I]n construing tax statutes, we are guided by the well-settled principle . . . that a tax exemption is construed to give full effect to the legislative intent of the statute."
Lath contends that, even if he cannot bring a claim against PennyMac as a landlord under RSA 540-A:2, he can bring a claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability as a tenant at sufferance. See Crowley v. Fraizer, 147 N.H. 387, 391 (2001) ("A defect that renders premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for living therein, constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability."). Lath is not a tenant at sufferance.
NHLA has represented clients in state and federal court for many years. See, e.g., Laaman v. Warden. 238 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (giving history of class action litigation on behalf of prisoners and consent decree); Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387 (2001); Hynes v. Hale, 146 N.H. 533 (2001). B. Rule 23(b)(2)
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001). We address the ninety-day requirement first.
Because the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. See Crowley v. Frazier, 147 N.H. 387, 389 (2001). The innovative land use controls statute expressly provides that an impact fee ordinance "may provide for administration . . . by the planning board."