Opinion
No. 05-02-00069-CV.
Opinion issued February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. DV99-04311-E.
AFFIRMED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal, William H. Crowder challenges the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment in his lawsuit against American Eagle Airlines, Inc., Successor-in-Interest to Wings West Airlines, Inc. In four issues, Crowder contends his claims were not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, or limitations. In an additional point of error, Crowder asserts he presented sufficient evidence to defeat appellee's no-evidence summary judgment motion. Because we conclude Crowder did not present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements of his various claims, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
We have previously affirmed the trial court's summary judgment against Crowder in the related case of William H. Crowder v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 05-00661-CV (April 25, 2000).
In the fall of 1995, Crowder applied to be an AMR Eagle pilot. In a November 7, 1995 letter, AMR Eagle offered Crowder employment contingent on, among other things, passing a medical examination. Crowder underwent the required medical examination at American Airlines, Inc.'s medical department on November 7, 1995. The medical examination revealed elevated blood pressure and cholesterol readings. Crowder was not advised of these elevated readings at the time of his examination. However, Crowder's blood pressure readings triggered American Airlines's "more medical information needed" or "MMIN" procedure. It is undisputed that Crowder's MMIN status meant that further blood pressure readings were required before Crowder could be certified as having passed the medical examination.
At that time, AMR Eagle, Inc., was a wholly owned subsidiary of AMR Corporation and Wings West Airlines d/b/a American Eagle was a wholly owned subsidiary of AMR Eagle, Inc.
American Airlines is a wholly owned subsidiary of AMR Corporation. During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, American Airlines, AMR Eagle, and Wings West were separate and distinct corporate entities.
By letter dated November 10, 1995, AMR Eagle advised Crowder he had been selected for training as a Wings West Airlines Flight Officer. Crowder completed training and in January 1996, began flying as a Wings West First Officer. Crowder was never advised of his elevated blood pressure and cholesterol readings nor was he ever informed that additional blood pressure readings were needed. On June 9, 1996, about seven months after Crowder accepted AMR Eagle's offer of employment, he suffered a massive heart attack.
The only communication from American Airlines's medical department regarding Crowder's MMIN status were two forms directed to AMR Eagle recruitment. In the medical disposition box on one of the forms, a bubble was darkened next to the statement "pending review of information requested." In the "comments" section, it was noted "still need blood pressure readings." This form is undated and there is no evidence if or when this form was ever sent to or received by AMR Eagle. The other form was stamped "received June 3, 1996" by AMR Eagle's recruitment department. In the medical disposition box of that form, a bubble was darkened next to the statement "pending review of information requested." On the "comments" section, it was noted "still missing MMIN."
Crowder sued appellee for damages alleging it concealed from him the results of the medical examination revealing the elevated blood pressure and cholesterol readings which were cardiac risk factors. Crowder's live petition against appellee asserts causes of action for actual and constructive fraud, breach of express and implied contracts, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, "organized unlawful conduct," and conversion.
Appellee moved for summary judgment asserting, among other things, there was no evidence to support each of Crowder's causes of action. Crowder moved for partial summary judgment requesting the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that appellee violated its legal duty to disclose and not misrepresent the findings of Crowder's physical examination. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied Crowder's.
In his brief, Crowder references the denial of his motion for summary judgment and in his prayer requests we "grant Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment." Because Crowder has neither raised an issue nor presented argument on the denial of his motion for partial summary judgment, he has waived any error in connection with the trial court's ruling in this regard. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1.
We review a no-evidence summary judgment applying the same legal sufficiency standard used in reviewing a directed verdict. See Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2000, no pet.). We must therefore determine whether Crowder produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element of his asserted claims. Id.
In his fifth issue, Crowder contends he presented sufficient proof on his claims to defeat appellee's no-evidence summary judgment motion. Specifically, Crowder contends he presented evidence that appellee had knowledge of "critical health facts," intentionally failed to disclose these facts during his medical examination, misrepresented that he had passed the medical examination, and allowed him to pilot planes while he was medically disqualified.
In the trial court, appellee contended it was entitled to summary judgment on Crowder's fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and organized unlawful conduct claims because Crowder had no evidence that appellee intended to deceive, breached a fiduciary duty, or engaged in any organized unlawful conduct. Crowder alleges these claims are supported by evidence that appellee operated under a secret nondisclosure policy, knew about his elevated blood pressure and cholesterol readings, and intentionally concealed these cardiac risk factors by hiring him and allowing him to fly even though he had not passed the required medical examination.
After reviewing the summary judgment record, we have found no evidence that appellee had any knowledge of Crowder's elevated blood pressure and cholesterol readings, utilized a secret nondisclosure policy, or even knew Crowder had not received his medical clearance at the time he was hired. Crowder's physical examination was performed at a medical facility operated by American Airlines, not Wings West or AMR Eagle. To the extent Crowder attempts to attribute to appellee actions that took place during the examination by American Airlines employees, we note that American Airlines, Wings West, and AMR Eagle were distinct corporate entities. Moreover, our previous opinion upheld the trial court's rejection of Crowder's claims against American Airlines.
The only communications from American Airlines's medical department regarding Crowder's physical examination were two forms directed to AMR Eagle recruitment. Of the two forms, only one was stamped "received" by AMR Eagle's recruitment department. The stamped form revealed nothing about Crowder's physical examination results except that the MMIN was still needed. It did not mention Crowder's elevated blood pressure or cholesterol readings or indicate that additional blood pressure readings were required. There is simply no summary judgment evidence that either Wings West or AMR Eagle had knowledge of the elevated readings or intended to deceive Crowder regarding the results of his medical examination. At best, the evidence shows that AMR Eagle became aware only six days before Crowder's heart attack that additional information was needed for him to receive his medical clearance. This evidence is insufficient to raise a fact issue on whether appellee knew of the cardiac risk factors that Crowder asserts should have been disclosed.
Likewise, there is no evidence that AMR Eagle or Wings West had a policy of nondisclosure with respect to the medical examination results. Crowder's summary judgment evidence on the nondisclosure policy was elicited from American Airlines employees on American Airlines policy and did not address the policies of either AMR Eagle or Wings West. As noted above, American Airlines, Wings West, and AMR Eagle were distinct corporate entities. There is no evidence that Wings West or AMR Eagle was aware of American Airlines's policy or even received the medical records generated from the examinations performed by American Airlines. Instead, it appears the only documentation AMR Eagle received was a form containing a medical disposition. Because there is no evidence that Wings West or AMR Eagle knew of Crowder's cardiac risk factors, or had a nondisclosure policy, Crowder's causes of action based on appellee's knowing failure to disclose or conceal this information necessarily fail. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Crowder's fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and "organized unlawful conduct" claims.
Crowder relies on the November 7 conditional offer letter to support his breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The letter, from AMR Eagle Recruitment, states in relevant part, "Congratulations! You have been selected as an AMR Eagle Pilot. Please understand that this is a conditional offer of employment and is contingent upon you passing the background check, drug test, breath alcohol test, and medical examination." Crowder asserts that the letter is tantamount to a promise that he would be hired only if he passed the physical. We disagree. Instead, the letter simply made an employment offer contingent on certain requirements being met, one of which was passing a medical examination. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on these claims.
Because we have concluded Crowder has failed to meet his burden on appellee's no-evidence summary judgment motion, we need not address his remaining four issues challenging appellee's entitlement to summary judgment based on various affirmative defenses. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In his reply brief, Crowder concedes his conversion claim "does not appear viable." Consequently, we need not address this cause of action.