Opinion
No. HHD X04 CV-05-4016823 S
March 26, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter is before the court concerning the defendant David Reis' motion for summary judgment (#206). The court heard oral argument concerning the motion on March 3, 2009.
I BACKGROUND
In his motion, Reis contends that the plaintiff, Crow Sutton Associates, Inc.'s (C S or plaintiff) claims against him in its second amended complaint, which sound in negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation/fraud are time-barred by General Statutes § 52-577. See second amended complaint, ninth and tenth counts. In response, C S contends that (1) the statute of limitations was equitably tolled until C S obtained information bearing on the existence of its claims, (2) the statute of limitations was tolled by Reis' continuing course of conduct, and (3) the motion is premature because Reis has not responded to discovery requests.
Section 52-577 provides, "No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of."
The plaintiff alleges that it was a subcontractor on a construction project located in Redding, Connecticut, known as Meadow Ridge Retirement Community (the project). The owner of the project was non-party Redding Life Care, LLC (RLC), whose managing member was Reis. See second amended complaint (complaint), ninth count, ¶¶ 6, 8. In 1999, non-party Sordoni Sanska Construction Company (Sordoni) entered into a contract with RLC to perform work on the project. C S subcontracted with Sordoni to provide labor, materials, and equipment for site work and landscaping at the project. See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 9.
C S further alleges that the contract between RLC and Sordoni was terminated, and in August 2000, RLC entered into an agreement with defendant C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC (Klewin), whereby Klewin would act as construction manager on the project. See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 11. C S also alleges that, in October 2000, C S and RLC entered into an agreement whereby the subcontract between C S and Sordoni was assigned to RLC. See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 14. C S agreed to continue to provide labor, materials and equipment to the project. In November 2000, Klewin, as principal, and defendant United States Fidelity Guaranty Company (USF G), as surety, executed a labor and materials payment bond, with RLC as obligee (Bond). See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 12; C S Exhibit 13 (Bond).
C S alleges that representatives of Klewin and RLC assured C S that RLC would pay C S in accordance with the subcontract and any change orders, as secured by the Bond. C S also alleges that, based on these representations and assurances, it continued to perform. See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 16. C S contends that, despite repeated demand, RLC has only made partial payments for the labor, materials, and equipment furnished by C S. See complaint, ninth count, ¶¶ 18-19.
As to Reis, in the ninth count, concerning negligent misrepresentation, C S alleges that he made statements to C S, that he knew, or in the exercise of due care, should have known, were false, including: that RLC and Reis would pay C S in accordance with the subcontract and any change orders; that C S was liable for certain backcharges for work allegedly performed by Klewin and/or other subcontractors, when in fact C S was not liable for any such backcharges; and that C S was protected by the Bond, when in fact the Bond was intentionally drafted, and billings and payments were manipulated by Klewin and RLC, so that the bond would not be subject to good faith claims by claimants, such as C S, despite the apparent terms and conditions of the Bond. See complaint, ninth count, ¶ 20. C S also alleges that it relied on Reis' statements to its detriment, and that it has been damaged.
As to intentional misrepresentation/fraud, in the tenth count C S reiterates the same allegations, and alleges that Reis made the statements with knowledge of their falsity. See complaint, tenth count, ¶ 22. C S alleges that Reis did so with the intent that C S rely on the false statements, and thereby agree to perform work and supply materials to the project, as requested by Reis, for the benefit of Klewin, RLC, and Reis. See complaint, tenth count, ¶ 23. C S also alleges that Reis improperly instructed Klewin to assess a $116,716.64 deduct change order against C S. See complaint, tenth count, ¶ 25. Paragraph 3.2 of the construction management agreement between RLC and Klewin provides, "[o]nly David Reis, as Managing Member of Redding Life Care, LLC may direct the performance of any work, which results in the change of the Cost of the Work or the Project Schedule." See C S Exh. 9, pp. 12-13.
According to C S's response to Reis' Interrogatory No. 4, Reis allegedly made statements to C S concerning payment assurances between July and November 2000. See Reis Exhibit H, p. 2. Also, C S contends that Reis' agent assured C S in April 2001 that it was protected by the payment bond. See C S Exh. 7 (April 10, 2001 transmittal from David Latimer).
In its January 2003 affidavit of claim to St. Paul Surety (Reis Exh. G), paragraph 2, C S stated that it furnished landscaping and site improvements to the project until November 8, 2002.
C S filed a bond claim in November 2002. See deposition of James Sutton, president of C S (Reis Exh. D.), page 36.
In addition, in response to Reis' Interrogatories 12 and 25, C S asserted that Reis also authorized an improper Change Order No. 93, dated April 30, 2004. See Reis Exhibits H and I (April 30, 2004 change order).
It is undisputed that the last claimed statement made by Reis or project document issued to C S occurred no later than April 30, 2004. C S asserts that it did not obtain Change Order No. 93 (which backcharged C S) until 2007, in response to discovery requests directed to Klewin and USF G. See James Sutton affidavit (C S Exh. 1), ¶¶ 41, 42. Thereafter, C S cited Reis into this matter as a defendant. Reis was served with C S' first amended complaint on March 14, 2008. See Reis Exhibit J (marshal's return).
Additional references to the facts are set forth below.
II STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 198, 931 A.2d 916 (2007). "When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
"To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bednarz v. Eye Physicians of Central Connecticut, P.C., 287 Conn. 158, 174-75, 947 A.2d 291 (2008).
"[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J Pfund Associates, Inc., 109 Conn.App. 560, 564, 952 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 940, 959 A.2d 1007 (2008).
Although, initially, in its memorandum in opposition to the motion, the plaintiff objected to consideration of Reis' exhibits on the ground that they were unauthenticated, this objection was withdrawn at oral argument. Likewise, no objection was made to Reis' presentation of additional exhibits with his reply. Accordingly, in the absence of objections, the court has considered the exhibits presented by C S and by Reis.
III DISCUSSION A Equitable Tolling
"The purpose of [a] statute of limitation or of repose is . . . to (1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 206-07, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006).
In response to Reis' contention that the general tort statute of limitations/repose, General Statutes § 52-577, quoted above, applies here, C S asserts that there is a split in authority in the Superior Court as to whether that statute or General Statute § 52-584 applies. In contrast to § 52-577, § 52-584 specifically applies only to actions to "recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property . . ." See Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 79 Conn.App. 290, 297, 830 A.2d 346 (2003). "[W]here the plaintiff['s] claim is predicated on injury to . . . personal property caused by negligence, it is clear that [it has] brought a claim within the purview of § 52-584." Id., 299.
In relevant part, § 52-584 provides, "[n]o action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of . . ."
The language of the two statutes is similar as applied to the outside deadline for bringing an action: in § 52-577, "[n]o action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of"; in § 52-584, "no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of."
Here, in contrast, C S seeks to recover, not for injury to the person or to real or personal property, but for economic loss, for monies claimed to be due, arising from the provision of commercial services (labor, material, and equipment) on a construction project. "[T]he three-year limitation of 52-577 is applicable to all actions founded upon a tort which do not fall within those causes of action carved out of 52-577 and enumerated in 52-584 or another section." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rubin, 209 Conn. 437, 441, 551 A.2d 1220 (1988). "With respect to the plaintiff's fraud and misrepresentation claims, the applicable statute of limitations is three years." Krondes v. Norwalk Savings Society, 53 Conn.App. 102, 113, 728 A.2d 1103 (1999) (citing § 52-577). "Claims based upon fraudulent misrepresentation are governed by the three year statute of limitations of General Statutes 52-577." Day v. General Electric Credit Corp., 15 Conn.App. 677, 683, 546 A.2d 315, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 819, 551 A.2d 755 (1988).
"Section 52-577 is a statute of repose in that it sets a fixed limit after which the tortfeasor will not be held liable and in some cases will serve to bar an action before it accrues." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosenfield v. Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman, Hirtle, LLC, 69 Conn.App. 151, 159, 795 A.2d 572 (2002). See Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 794, 849 A.2d 839 (2004) ("court often has used the term `statute of limitations' to refer to other statutes that technically function more like statutes of repose," citing § 52-577.).
"`In construing our general tort statute of limitations [, General Statutes § 52-577,] . . . we have concluded that the history of that legislative choice of language precludes any construction thereof delaying the start of the limitation period until the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212, 541 A.2d 472 (1988). The date of the act or omission complained of is the date when the . . . conduct of the defendant occurs . . . [Section] 52-577 is an occurrence statute and . . . its limitation period does not begin when the plaintiff first discovers an injury[.]" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 408, 957 A.2d 836 (2008).
In considering the parties' arguments, the court is not called upon to adjudicate whether or not Reis' conduct amounted to negligent or intentional misrepresentation. See Miller v. Bourgoin, 28 Conn.App. 491, 497, 613 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 927, 614 A.2d 825 (1992) (whether evidence supports a claim of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation presents a question of fact). Rather, the court must determine whether or not there is a material factual dispute as to whether C S' claims are timely. Since Reis was served in March 2008, more than three years after the date of the last alleged conduct, April 30, 2004, unless the three-year period provided by the statute is tolled, C S' claims against him are time-barred.
C S argues that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled until such time as it obtained information bearing on the existence of its claim, which it contends was in 2007. As noted in H.J. Kelly Associates v. Meriden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 03 0285781 (January 17, 2008, Taylor, J.), cited by C S, the equitable tolling doctrine embraces "what is sometimes called the `discovery rule,' which holds that the statute begins to run only after discovery of the facts constituting the violation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
This court agrees with the analyses of Judges Sheldon and Covello, which found that the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable to a statute of repose, such as § 52-577. "A statute of limitations extinguishes the right to prosecute an accrued cause of action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after injury occurs. A statute of repose, by contrast, restricts potential liability by limiting the time during which a cause of action can arise. Statutes of repose thus cut off the right of action after a specified period of time regardless of when the action accrues or when the plaintiff receives notice that his rights have been [violated] . . . Since a plaintiff's knowledge of facts supporting his right of action is immaterial to the legislature's judgment that after a certain period of time, no right of action should arise, it is apparent that the operation of the statute should not be suspended merely because the plaintiff has no knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of his right of action . . . [A] statute of repose . . . should not be avoided by any claimed failure by the plaintiff to be aware of the claim. The legislature, by passing the statute, decreed such knowledge to be irrelevant to the enforceability of the statute; hence the Court cannot refuse to enforce this statute by invoking its equitable powers." (Citations omitted.) Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association v. Yocum, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 94 0539691 (June 6, 1996, Sheldon, J.) [17 Conn. L. Rptr. 343].
In Gibbons v. NER Holdings, Inc., 983 F.Sup. 310 (D.Conn. 1997), the plaintiff argued that the equitable principle of "inquiry notice" ought to toll the application of § 52-577's limitation period to his fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, see id., 314, 315, so that the limitations period began to run when he was placed on "inquiry notice," of his claims, when he had "knowledge of facts which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have led to actual knowledge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 315.
Judge Covello concluded in Gibbons that this argument for tolling the statute of limitations was without basis. See id., 315. "In Connecticut, the statute of limitations for tort claims will not be extended until such time as the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred. See Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212, 541 A.2d 472 (1988). The plaintiff's argument, disguised under the theory of `inquiry notice,' seeks to delay the start of the limitations period in the precise manner that the Fichera court held was unavailable under § 52-577, that is, he seeks to delay the start of the limitations period until the time at which he knew a cause of action had accrued. This argument is contrary to the holding in Fichera and subsequent related cases." Gibbons v. NER Holdings, Inc., supra, 983 F.Sup. 315.
The doctrine of equitable tolling advanced by C S here is inapplicable under Connecticut law. The statute of limitations may not be equitably tolled until such time as C S obtained information bearing on the existence of its claims.
B Continuing Course Of Conduct
"In its modern formulation, we have held that in order [t]o support a finding of a continuing course of conduct that may toll the statute of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong . . . Where we have upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the act or omission relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act . . . The continuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bednarz v. Eye Physicians of Central Connecticut, P.C., supra, 287 Conn. 170.
In his first special defense (#204), Reis asserts that C S' claims against him are time-barred by § 52-577. C S argues that the statute of limitations has been tolled by Reis' continuing course of conduct. In its reply to Reis' first special defense, dated February 5, 2009 (#215) (reply), which was filed with its objection to Reis' motion, C S pleaded a general denial but alleged no facts to support this theory. Instead of providing alleged facts, C S stated a legal conclusion only: "The Defendant is estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense by virtue of the Defendant's continuing course of conduct." See reply. C S added, "[i]n addition, the statute of limitations was tolled until such time as the Plaintiff obtained information bearing on the existence of its claims." This last sentence relates to C S' equitable tolling argument, which the court has addressed above in part A, not to C S' argument concerning continuing course of conduct.
Practice Book § 10-57 provides, "[m]atter in avoidance of affirmative allegations in an answer or counterclaim shall be specially pleaded in the reply." "The issue must be one which the party opposing the motion is entitled to litigate under his pleadings . . ." Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn.App. 449, 453, 671 A.2d 1329 (1996). By failing to plead facts supporting its contention in its reply, C S has not properly raised the issue before the court. See Grimes v. Stutman, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 04 4000108 (December 22, 2005, McWeeny, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 457); Franco v. Mediplex Construction, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 96 390458 (August 25, 2000, Owens, J.) (factual allegations not sufficient to support claim of continuing course of conduct; claim was not properly before the court).
Even if C S properly had pleaded its claim that the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the limitations period, it has not substantiated the contention. In its memorandum, page 16, C S argues that its allegations in the complaint, ninth and tenth counts, paragraph 20, if proven, establish that Reis committed an initial wrong upon C S. In order to attempt to show that a duty continued to exist, by providing evidence of a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty, C S then asserts that "[a]n ongoing relationship exists between C S and Reis by virtue of [RLC's] position as obligee on the Bond, C S' claim on the Bond, and Reis' role in procuring the bond." See C S memorandum, p. 17. C S argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by Reis' affirmative misrepresentations to C S concerning the validity of the Bond and C S' liability for bogus backcharges. See C S memorandum, p. 17. In Sutton's affidavit (C S Exh. 1), paragraph 13, he avers that, during late 2000 and early 2001, in order to address C S' concerns regarding nonpayment, "Reis assured C S that C S would be paid for its work on the Project and that a valid payment bond would be provided." Reis' alleged role in procuring the bond occurred long before April 2004, when the last alleged conduct, the issuance of Change Order No. 93, occurred. No subsequent affirmative misrepresentation is alleged.
C S has not alleged that it had even a contractual relationship with Reis, let alone a special or fiduciary relationship. See Bednarz v. Eye Physicians Of Central Connecticut, P.C., supra, 287 Conn. 170. It has alleged that it had a contractual relationship with non-party RLC, a commercial agreement concerning the construction project. It has not alleged that it had such an agreement with Reis as an individual.
Such a commercial relationship, even if it had been between C S and Reis, as contracting parties, would have been insufficient to establish that a "special relationship" existed. See id. As explained in an analogous context, in Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp, supra, 207 Conn. 210, "[t]he plaintiffs do not claim any relationship with the defendants that would create a duty continuing after the purchase of the lots other than that based upon the unfulfilled promises to construct various improvements upon the land of the defendants reserved as a recreational area. Such a contractual relationship, however, does not create a fiduciary obligation that might have imposed upon the defendants as the perpetrators of a fraud the continuing duty to disclose their prior lack of candor to the plaintiffs. Nor does the circumstance that the plaintiffs were the victims of deception . . . impose such a duty of disclosure on the defendants. We are aware of no authority holding that the perpetrator of a fraud involving merely a vendor-vendee relationship has a legal duty to disclose his deceit after its occurrence and that the breach of that duty will toll the statute of limitations. Such a relationship does not give rise to obligations equivalent to those of a fiduciary."
In addition, here neither C S nor Reis was a party to the Bond. RLC's position as obligee of the Bond does not create a fiduciary duty between Reis and C S. While C S may have had the right to make a Bond claim against USF G as surety and Klewin as principal, such a right is immaterial to a claim by C S of a continuing duty by Reis based on the "special relationship" aspect of the continuing course of conduct doctrine. C S has not established that Reis owed it a continuing duty. See Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 357, 963 A.2d 640 (2009). Thus, as a matter of law, there is no support for C S' assertion that the limitations period only began to run upon its discovery that Klewin, RLC, and Reis were aligned in a manner as to prevent C S from asserting valid claims against the Bond. See C S memorandum, pp. 17-18.
C S also argues (see C S memorandum, p. 18) that an affirmative misrepresentation is continuing wrongful conduct as a matter of law, citing Evans v. Province, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 6000855 (August 4, 2008, Zoarski, J.T.R.). In Evans, summary judgment was denied because the plaintiffs averred that affirmative misrepresentations continued to be made until December 2005, well after the initial alleged misrepresentations which led them to enter into a contract in October 2004. See id. Thus, evidence of later wrongful conduct was provided, which met the alternative requirement of the continuing course of conduct doctrine, a showing of "some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." Bednarz v. Eye Physicians Of Central Connecticut, P.C., supra, 287 Conn. 170. The Evans court concluded that the claims of the defendant's "continued misrepresentations, if true, will toll the applicable statute of limitations." Evans v. Province, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 07 6000855.
Here, in contrast, as discussed above, the last conduct alleged occurred April 30, 2004. No subsequent affirmative misrepresentation or later wrongful conduct is alleged. Accordingly, C S has not provided evidence which meets the requirements of the continuing course of conduct doctrine.
While the continuous course of conduct doctrine is "conspicuously fact-bound" (internal quotation marks omitted), Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 322 n. 11, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006), C S, as the opposing party, has not presented evidence of a continuing course of conduct which, as a matter of law, supports the tolling of the limitations period. No genuine issue of material fact is presented. See CT Page 5754 Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 11.
C Discovery Requests Served In Response To Motion
C S also argues that summary judgment is premature at this time because it has not yet received responses to its interrogatories and requests for production, dated January 8, 2009, which were directed to Reis. C S also reiterates its contention that it was only able to gather evidence of Reis' alleged wrongdoing through the discovery process, apparently again referring to Change Order No. 93, dated April 30, 2004, discussed above. In its argument, C S does not explain what information it has sought from Reis in its discovery requests.
As noted above, Reis was served with process in this matter by C S in March 2008. Reis filed his motion for summary judgment on December 15, 2008. It is evident that, although it had the opportunity to do so months before, C S did not serve Reis with discovery requests until after receiving Reis' motion for summary judgment.
Practice Book § 17-47 provides, "[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that such party cannot, for reasons stated, present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial authority may deny the motion for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." "Under [§ 17-47], the opposing party must show by affidavit precisely what facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the moving party and what steps he has taken to attempt to acquire these facts." Dorazio v. M.B. Foster Electric Co., 157 Conn. 226, 230, 253 A.2d 22 (1968). "A party opposing a summary judgment motion pursuant to § [17-47] on the ground that more time is needed to conduct discovery bears the burden of establishing a valid reason why the motion should be denied or its resolution postponed, including some indication as to what steps that party has taken to secure facts necessary to defeat the motion." Peerless Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 489, 697 A.2d 680 (1997).
Here, in Sutton's affidavit, submitted with C S' opposition to Reis' motion, C S has not complied with Practice Book § 17-47, by showing precisely what facts are within the exclusive knowledge of Reis which ought to be the subject of discovery. Sutton's affidavit does not discuss the discovery requests which were addressed to Reis.
Where a plaintiff fails to timely comply with Practice Book § 17-47, such "lack of diligence is fatal to [its] claim." Sheridan v. Board of Education, 20 Conn.App. 231, 238, 565 A.2d 882 (1989). In the absence of such compliance, the court concludes that Reis' motion is not premature.
C S has not shown that the applicable statute of limitations, § 52-577, was tolled. C S' claims against Reis are time-barred, since they were not brought "within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." See § 52-577.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Reis has shown that the material facts are not disputed and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his first special defense to C S' claims against him. Accordingly, his motion for summary judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.