Both sides in the floor debate conceded that the amendment would make the act apply not only to those lawyers who have collection practices but also to those who collect on an occasional basis and the small law firm which collects debts incidentally to the general practice of law. 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting R. Hobbs, Attorneys Must Now Comply With Fair Debt Collection Law, Pa. J.L. Rptr., Nov. 21, 1987, at 3). While the commentary cited in Crossley bolsters Plaintiffs' position, we find it unpersuasive.

Thus, we hold that an attorney performing exclusively legal tasks is not, on that basis alone, precluded from being considered a "debt collector" under the FDCPA. Cf. Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding attorney liable for violation of the FDCPA). Jones distinguishes Crossley on the grounds that, in that case, the attorney personally contacted the debtor, demanding repayment of the debt. It is unclear from the Crossley opinion whether the court relied upon this fact, or whether the attorney's purely legal activities related to debt collection would have sufficed to meet the "debt collector" definition.

The courts are split as to the correct approach. In Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.3d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit referred to the "regularly" requirement of the FDCPA. The court's decision in Crossley is discussed below.

Pertinent Third Circuit authority is scarce. In Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), the following language, which the plaintiff alleged to be violative of § 1692e, was contained in a debt collection letter sent by the defendant, an attorney: The above matter has been referred to me for collection. I am obligated to demand immediate payment of the full amount of the plaintiff's damages and costs as stated above.

In defining "debt collector," other courts have considered the number of collection activities and percentage of the individual's total workload this represents, the frequency of the collection activities, whether the defendant has personnel who work on collection activities, whether the defendant has systems to facilitate debt collection, and whether the collection activities take place as part of an on-going client relationship on whose behalf the defendant does collection work. See Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2004); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3rd Cir. 1989); Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1176 (6th Cir. 1999). Finally, the court observes that statutes are to be construed by their plain meaning.

Although the FDCPA, at one time, did not apply to attorneys acting on behalf of their clients, Congress repealed this provision when it discovered that an increasing number of attorneys were collecting debts on their clients' behalf. Dutton v. Wolpoff Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 655 (3d Cir. 1993); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, attorneys who regularly engage in debt collection practices, apart from their legal representation, are covered under the FDCPA.

Further, the case law on point shows that an attorney "who engages in collection activities more than a handful of times per year must comply with the [Act]." Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989). It is the volume of the attorney's debt collection efforts that is dispositive, not the percentage such efforts amount to in the attorney's practice. Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.Conn. 1990)

Nonetheless, the persuasive authority that is available, suggests that the plaintiffs in the present case do not need to prove the elements of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In In re Littles (Littles I), 75 B.R. 240 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1987), later proceeding, In re Littles (Littles II), 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988), modified, Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 682 (E.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), the bankruptcy court had to consider whether it had jurisdiction to make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in an action by the bankrupt estate against a debt collector for violations of the FDCPA. The central issue in this jurisdictional question was whether the estate's claims for emotional distress under § 1692k(a)(1) of the FDCPA were "personal injury torts" that had to be tried in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

Even if the Court were to ignore these remarks, it finds there is more than sufficient evidence from other sources supporting plaintiff's arguments with respect to the meaning of the term "debt collector."Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989), cited by defendants, is inapposite to the cases at bar. In Crossley, the Court found Lieberman, an attorney, to be a "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA, where Lieberman engaged in activity that was precisely of the nature Congress sought to control by enacting the FDCPA.

An attorney who regularly collects debts is a debt collector within the meaning of the "FDCPA". See Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3rd Cir. 1989); Edward J. Cacace, et al. v. Joseph B. Lukas, Civil No. N-87-430 (EEB) (D.Conn. March 6, 1989); Raymond Woolfolk v. Albert G. Rubin, Civil No. N-88-266 (EEB) (D.Conn. Nov. 9, 1989); In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988). Although undefined under the FDCPA, the term "regular" means "steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation."