(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cross v. State , 354 Ga. App. 355, 362-363 (2) (b), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020). (i) Ordinary Appellate Review.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cross v. State , 354 Ga. App. 355, 358 (1), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020) ; see also OCGA § 24-14-8. (a) Aggravated sodomy.

See Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 492 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (holding that trial counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection does not constitute deficient performance and causes no prejudice).See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 459 (3), 851 S.E.2d 580 (2020) (holding that certain evidence, including a 911 call, was "relevant to the nature and circumstances of the gunfight" and that appellant had not made "any showing that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of this evidence"); Crossv. State, 354 Ga. App. 355, 363 (2) (b), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020) ("[T]he probative value of the other acts was ‘great’ because the State had a strong need for the evidence to combat [the defendant’s] attacks on the victim’s credibility and to negate [the defendant’s] defense that the encounter was consensual."). [12, 13] 3. Finally, Anderson argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for rape.

(i) Contrary to his position, the prosecutorial need for the other acts evidence to establish Johnson's intent was strong in light of his defense theory that he had consensual sex with the victim and that her injuries were caused by her friend. See McWilliams v. State , 304 Ga. 502, 510 (3), 820 S.E.2d 33 (2018) (probative value of other acts evidence was great where "the State was left only with appellant's differing narratives" as to "direct evidence of what transpired on the night in question"); Cross v. State , 354 Ga. App. 355, 363 (2) (b), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020) (finding "the State had a strong need for the evidence to combat [defendant's] attacks on the victim's credibility and to negate [his] defense that the encounter was consensual"); compare Jackson , 306 Ga. at 78 (2) (b) (ii), 829 S.E.2d 142 ("lack of any real prosecutorial need" where "[n]either party ever contended that the shooting was unintentional"); Arrington v. State , 355 Ga. App. 361, 365 (a), 844 S.E.2d 256 (2020) (unfair prejudice of prior acts evidence outweighed its probative value where intent was not at issue). (ii) Johnson points to the dissimilarities in the crimes as a basis to find the other acts less probative.

Thus, there was sufficient evidence of force and lack of consent to support Kim's convictions for aggravated sodomy. See Cross v. State , 354 Ga. App. 355, 357-358 (1), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020) (the victim's testimony that the defendant forced her to engage in oral sex against her will and prevented her from getting away was sufficient to sustain conviction for aggravated sodomy); Brinson v. State , 208 Ga. App. 556, 558 (4), 430 S.E.2d 875 (1993) (victim's testimony that the act of sodomy was committed with force and against her will was sufficient to prove that the defendant did not consent). (c) Kim next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery convictions because the State failed to prove that Kim knew or should have known that G. M. did not consent.

And, in close cases, balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admissibility. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cross v. State , 354 Ga. App. 355, 362-363 (2) (b), 839 S.E.2d 265 (2020). Freeman argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value because his prior acts are so similar to those in the instant case.