Opinion
Civil 3:20-cv-01695
07-22-2022
DENISE ANNE CROOKER, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE J. TESSITORE, et al., Defendants.
Mannion Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN E. SCHWAB UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Denise Anne Crooker (“Crooker”), filed a complaint, claiming that the Pennsylvania State Police, without probable cause, searched her home, seized her animals, and charged her with animal neglect, animal cruelty, and aggravated animal cruelty. The case is presently before the court on a motion for summary judgment as to whether probable cause existed for the search warrant of the property and the subsequent seizure of Crooker's animals. Upon review of the motion and briefs filed in support and opposition, it is recommended the defendants' joint motion for summary judgment be granted as it relates to probable cause for the search warrant and seizure of the animals; however, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment be denied as it relates to the issue of probable cause for the arrest and be denied as it relates to Counts III, VVII.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Crooker began this action when she filed a complaint on September 18, 2020, naming Pennsylvania State Trooper George J. Tessitore (“Trooper Tessitore”), Pennsylvania State Trooper George Weitz (“Trooper Weitz”), Pennsylvania State Trooper Shaun Flynn (“Trooper Flynn”), the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), Gerri Papillon, the President of the Board of Directors and/or a director, officer or manager of Camp Papillon Animal Shelter, Inc., (“Papillon”), Camp Papillon Animal Shelter, Inc. (“Camp Papillon”), Pocono Peak Veterinary Center (“PPVC”), and Samantha Thompson, V.M.D., the owner, operator, employee, agent, and/or servant of PPVC (“Dr. Thompson”) as defendants (collectively “the defendants”). Doc. 1 at 1.
Before we begin our discussion of the relevant background and procedural history of this case, we note that in Crooker's counterstatement of material facts, she denies all factual allegations that do not relate to whether the defendants had sufficient probable cause. While we agree that the purpose of this Report and Recommendation is to recommend whether probable cause existed for the search of the property and seizure of the animals, it is still necessary to provide contextual information for the District Judge's review. Accordingly, for the sake of providing a narrative, we will only briefly discuss the relevant background information to set the stage for our probable cause discussion.
According to Crooker, she resided at 752 Toll Road, Effort, Pennsylvania, where she owned various animals. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 41, 43. Per the defendants, on September 19, 2018, a local bus driver provided a tip to Papillon regarding a dog that had been outside for three days and was seen drinking from a puddle, which resulted in Papillon traveling to the 752 Toll Road property to investigate. Doc. 101 at ¶¶ 11-13. According to the defendants, Trooper Tessitore and Trooper Weitz were then dispatched to the 752 Toll Road property, and spoke to Crooker's husband, Aaron Peters (“Peters”). Id. at ¶¶ 8, 15, 19. After Trooper Tessitore and Trooper Weitz conducted an investigation around the property, Trooper Flynn made an application for a search warrant for the property, pursuant to Title 18 § 5553. Id. at ¶ 26.
The warrant identified that “[a]ny and all animals . . . that could be victims of Title 18 Section 5532 Neglect of Animal, Section 5533 Cruelty of Animal, or Section 5534 Aggravated Cruelty to Animal” are to be seized. Id. at ¶ 27. The affidavit of probable cause also stated:
[Members of] PSP/Fern Ridge responded to the residence of 752 Toll Road for a report of multiple dog law violations. After further investigation, troopers from PSP/Fern Ridge discovered the outside of the residence in deplorable conditions. They
observed multiple dogs in a fenced in area in the rear of the residence, confined to chains in living conditions that were less than habitable, such as feces everywhere, miscellaneous household trash strewn about the property. All of the dogs that were observed were emaciated, in particular one of the dogs was severely emaciated. The dog was observed severely emaciated was urinating blood while the troopers were there .... [t]he inside of the residence was observed in deplorable conditions with more animals observed inside the residence living in conditions that were less than habitable.Id. at ¶ 28.
Magisterial District Judge Mancuso authorized the search warrant, and it was later executed by members of the PSP and Trooper Flynn. Id. at ¶ 29. As a result of the search, seven dogs and one rabbit were seized. Id. at ¶ 30. On October 19, 2018, Trooper Tessitore filed criminal complaints and affidavits of probable cause charging both Peters and Crooker with:
One count for Section 5534(a)(2), Aggravated Cruelty to Animal (F3) (Offense No. 1);
Eight counts for Section 5533(a), Cruelty to Animal (M2/S) (Offense Nos. 2, 4);
Eight counts for Section 5532(a), Neglect of Animal (M3/S) (Offense Nos. 3, 5).Id. at ¶ 48. Eventually, Judge Mancuso dismissed all charges against Crooker and found Peters guilty of § 5532(a), Neglect to Animals. Id. at ¶ 53.
After a stipulation between the parties (doc. 40) and Judge Jones' Order on the defendants' motion to dismiss Crooker's complaint (doc. 63), Crooker's remaining claims are as followed:
Count I - A state law conspiracy claim against all Defendants;
Count II - Fourteenth Amendment violations related to deprivation of property without due process, against the PSP Defendants and the Shelter Defendants;
Count III - Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations related to probable cause with the search warrant against the PSP Defendants and Shelter Defendants;
Count IV - An unidentified supervisory liability claim against John Doe defendants;
Count V - A state law malicious prosecution claim against Trooper Flynn and Trooper Tessitore;
Count VI - A state law conversion claim against Trooper Tessitore, the Shelter Defendants, and the Vet Defendants; and,
Count VII - A state law replevin claim against Trooper Tessitore, the Shelter Defendants, and the Vet Defendants.
Here, we refer to Trooper Tessitore, Trooper Weitz, and Trooper Flynn as the “PSP Defendants,” Papillon and Camp Papillon as the “Shelter Defendants,” and Dr. Thompson and PPVC as the “Vet Defendants.”
Doc. 100 at 11 (citing doc. 1 at ¶¶ 89-151, doc. 40, doc. 63). For relief, Crooker seeks “actual, consequential, treble and punitive damages as well as damages for pain and suffering, attorneys' fees .. and such additional relief as this Honorable Court may deem appropriate.” Doc. 1 at 31.
On July 9, 2021, we issued an Order directing the parties to conduct a period of discovery limited to the issue of whether probable cause existed for the seizure of the animals. Doc. 87. Additionally, we permitted the parties to file motions for summary judgment on this issue of probable cause. Id. On November 15, 2021, the defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, requesting that this court find that probable cause existed as it relates to the search of the property, seizure of certain animals, and the arrest and prosecution of Crooker. Doc. 99. Additionally, the defendants request that, if we find there existed valid probable cause, that this court dismiss all of Crooker's remaining counts. Id. That same day, the defendants filed a brief in support of their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 100) and a statement of material facts (doc. 101).
On December 28, 2021, Crooker filed a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 104) and a counterstatement of material facts on January 26, 2022 (doc. 112). The defendants then filed a reply brief to Crooker's brief in opposition (doc. 108) and a joint supplemental reply brief (doc. 113) to Crooker's counterstatement of material facts. Accordingly, the issue is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
III. Summary Judgment Standard.
The defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by “‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49.
When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
IV. Material Facts.
The following facts are the material facts for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion.
Here, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, the defendants filed a statement of material facts, and Crooker filed a response. Where the facts are undisputed, we cite to the defendants' statement of material facts (doc. 101) and Crooker's response thereto (doc. 112). In accordance with our duty to “construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party[,]” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2015)), where Crooker disputes a fact set forth in the defendants' statement of material facts, and she cites record evidence creating a genuine factual dispute, we cite to Crooker's version of the fact. When citing to page numbers of a document, we use the page numbers from the CM/ECF header on the top of the document. Additionally, in many instances, Crooker denies the defendants' factual allegations; however, she does so on procedural grounds, claiming that the defendants' facts exceed the scope of the motion for summary judgment on the limited issue of whether there was probable cause. In these instances, Crooker does not include a reference to the evidence in the record that controverts the defendants' facts. Because Local Rule 56.1 requires that “all material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party,” we will deem the defendants' statements of material facts, which relate to the issue of probable cause, admitted unless Crooker controverts it with references to record evidence.
From August 24, 2018, through September 9, 2018, Crooker resided at the 752 Toll Road property with her husband, Aaron Peters, and their animals. Doc. 101 ¶¶ 8-9; see n.2. On September 19, 2018, Papillon traveled to the 752 Toll Road property in response to a bus driver's tip regarding dogs at the property, and, after no one answered the door, she contacted the state police. Id. ¶¶ 12-14; see n.2. In response to the call, Trooper Tessitore and Trooper Weitz were dispatched to 752 Toll Road. Id. ¶ 15; see n.2. Once there, Trooper Tessitore observed dogs that appeared thin, and reported that he believed he saw a dog urinating blood. Id. ¶¶ 17-18; see n.2. Later that day, Trooper Flynn made an application for a search warrant to search the 752 Toll Road property. Id. ¶ 26; see n.2.
The search warrant identified that “[a]ny and all animals . . . that could be victims of Title 18 Section 5532 Neglect of Animal, Section 5533 Cruelty of Animal, or Section 5534 Aggravated Cruelty to Animal” were to be seized. Doc. 101 at ¶ 27. The affidavit of probable cause also stated:
[Members of] PSP/Fern Ridge responded to the residence of 752 Toll Road for a report of multiple dog law violations. After further investigation, troopers from PSP/Fern Ridge discovered the outside of the residence in deplorable conditions. They observed multiple dogs in a fenced in area in the rear of the residence, confined to chains in living conditions that were less than habitable, such as feces everywhere, miscellaneous household trash strewn about the property. All of the dogs that were observed were emaciated, in particular one of the dogs was severely emaciated. The dog was observed severely emaciated was urinating blood while the troopers were there. [. . .] The inside of the residence was observed in deplorable conditions with more animals observed inside the residence living in conditions that were less than habitable.Id. at ¶ 28.
Magisterial District Judge Mancuso authorized the search warrant, and it was later executed by the PSP. Id. at ¶ 29. The following day, during the execution of the search warrant, the troopers observed algae, mud, and feces within the fenced in areas where the dogs were located. Id. at ¶ 31; see n.2. Additionally, the dog that was believed to be urinating blood was observed as being unable to walk and its eyes appeared recessed. Id. at ¶ 32; see n.2. During the search, the following animals were seized:
1. A black male-neutered chow-chow mix named Cubby
2. A male-neutered black/tan Labrador/pit-bull/boxer mix named Junkyard/Benny
3. A male-neutered black/tan German shepherd/Labrador/pit-bull/boxer mix named Shovelhead/Gerald
4. A black male Labrador/pit-bull/boxer mix named Lugnut/Dusty
5. A tan female Boxer with brindle markings named Kelly/Elizabeth
6. A black female chow-chow/Labrador mix named Softtail/Talulah
7. A white female-spayed Pomeranian named Sassy
8. A white female rabbit named Lacy.Id. at ¶ 33; see n.2.
During the search, photographs of the animals and the property were taken and were subsequently shown to Crooker during her deposition. Id. at ¶ 34; see n.2. When Crooker was shown images that were taken during the search, she expressed concern about how thin some of the dogs appeared. Id. at ¶¶ 35-39; see n.2. Additionally, Crooker agreed that there was a large pile of feces in the corner of a dog's cage. Id. at ¶ 40; see n.2. When shown images of Sassy, Crooker expressed concern about her general appearance. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42; see n.2.
V. Discussion.
A. Probable cause existed for the search warrant.
In her brief in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Crooker argues that there was insufficient probable cause for the issued search warrant. Crooker attacks the warrant facially, contending that the search warrant is vague and lacks specificity. Doc. 104 at 22. Additionally, Crooker argues that the search warrant is invalid because “it fails to identify what crime had been committed or why there is probable cause to believe that evidence can be found at the Toll Road home.” Id. at 23. Crooker also argues that the search warrant contains false or reckless statements and material omissions which excluded exculpatory evidence and misled the Magisterial District Judge. Id. at 27. Additionally, Crooker argues that, based on the severance doctrine, invalid portions of the search warrant should be stricken. Id. at 22 (citing Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Ultimately, Crooker contends that the entire search warrant is invalid. Id. at 29.
As we will discuss later, we find that the affidavit of probable cause and subsequent search warrant to be wholly valid. Thus, we find Crooker's severability argument meritless.
Here, because Crooker argues that there was a lack of probable cause for the search warrant, the constitutional provision at issue is the Fourth Amendment, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of “reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.'” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)(footnote omitted)(quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)). “Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. at 654. Indeed, probable cause requires “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
At the outset, we note that the Supreme Court has held that, “[a] magistrate's ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'” Id. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). Indeed, for a judge to issue a search warrant, he or she must:
[M]ake a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity' and ‘basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclude[ing]' that probable cause existed.Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
1. The search warrant issued for the 752 Toll Road property was facially valid.
Our analysis begins with whether the affidavit provided the issuing magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found at the 752 Toll Road property. Crooker claims that the search warrant is vague, overbroad, lacks specificity, and is ambiguous. Crooker takes issue with the search warrant's language, specifically, terms such as “deplorable conditions,” “trash strewn about the property,” and “feces everywhere.” Doc. 104 at 22. Crooker contends that the phrase “deplorable conditions” is vague and that deplorable conditions are not a Crimes Code violation. Id. Crooker also argues that trash does not inherently connote a biohazard and that “feces everywhere” is nondescript. Id. The defendants counter this by citing to United States v. Conley, which holds that “[t]he supporting affidavit must be read in its entirety and in a commonsense and nontechnical manner.” United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1206 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the defendants argue that the phrases Crooker takes issue with have commonsense meanings which do not require a legal or investigative meaning to be properly understood. Doc. 108 at 10. Additionally, the defendants note that this language supports the notion that the animals did not have clean and sanitary shelter, as 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(2) requires.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(2) states, “[a] person commits an offense if the person fails to provide for the basic needs of each animal to which the person has a duty of care, whether belonging to himself or otherwise, including any of the following:
(1) ...
(2) Access to clean and sanitary shelter and protection from the weather. The shelter must be sufficient to permit the animal to retain body heat and keep the animal dry.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(2).
We agree with the defendants that the search warrant is not vague or nonspecific when it uses phrases such as “deplorable conditions,” “trash strewn about the property,” and “feces everywhere.” Indeed, a commonsense interpretation of “trash strewn about the property” and “feces everywhere” connotes squalor and conditions that violate an animal's access to clean and sanitary shelter. See Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 295-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding that the trial court appropriately concluded that the dogs were deprived of access to clean and sanitary shelter based, in part, on dog feces and trash being strewn about the property); see also Commonwealth v. Shickora, 116 A.3d 1150, 1151-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (finding that unsanitary conditions, such as dog feces in cages, posed a threat to the animals). Accordingly, we reject Crooker's argument that the search warrant contained vague and nonspecific language.
Crooker further argues that the search warrant is invalid because “it fails to identify what crime had been committed or why there is probable cause to believe that evidence can be found at the Toll Road home.” Doc. 104 at 23. Additionally, Crooker contends that the search warrant does not say if the Troopers went into the home and that they “magically concluded that there were more animals in the house.” Id.
Regarding Crooker's argument that the Troopers somehow magically concluded that there were more animals in the house in deplorable conditions, we find that this argument lacks merit. Indeed, the affidavit of probable cause states that “the inside of the residence was observed in deplorable conditions with more animals observed inside the residence living in conditions that were less than habitable.” Doc. 100-4 at DEF014. Because we know that the Troopers interacted with Peters during their initial investigation of the property, it follows that the Troopers were able to observe the inside of the property while conversing with Peters.
DEF014 is the affidavit of probable cause that was submitted to Magisterial District Judge Mancuso.
Crooker also attempts to rely on Commonwealth v. Bagley, where the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of a search warrant because it failed to identify any crime that had been committed, and it did not particularly describe the property. Commonwealth v. Bagley, 596 A.2d 811 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). Crooker notes that the search warrant states that “a search of the residence will be necessary for the development of further investigative evidence, regarding any and all violations of Tile 18 Sections 5532, 5533, 5534.” Doc. 104 at 24 (citing Doc. 100-4 at DEF014). Crooker argues that this statement is a request to conduct a fishing investigation and that the search warrant does not state what crimes are being investigated and why the affiant believes there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found at the property. Doc. 104 at 23-24.
The defendants argue that Bagley can be differentiated from this search warrant as the search warrant in Bagley stated that “[t]he warrant identified the criminal violation being investigated as ‘Suspicious Death' and authorized police to search the Bagley home for and seize ‘[a]ny items which may be related to the death of Yvonne Bagley.'” Bagley, 596 A.2d at 813. The defendants contend that the search warrant and affidavit of probable cause in Bagley did not state a crime or state any cause for believing that Bagley's death had been a criminal homicide. Id. at 815. The defendants note that, in the present search warrant, the crimes of Neglect of Animals, Cruelty to Animals, and Aggravated Cruelty to Animals are specifically identified. Doc. 100-4 at DEF013. Additionally, the defendants argue that the affidavit of probable cause gives reasons for why the Trooper believed that evidence of these animal crimes would be found at the property. Id. at DEF014.
DEF013 is the search warrant that was submitted to Magisterial District Judge Mancuso.
We agree with the defendants that the instant search warrant and affidavit of probable cause is differentiated from the search warrant and affidavit of probable cause in Bagley. Here, the affidavit of probable cause specifically states that the PSP responded to a report of multiple dog law violations and identifies the potential ongoing violations of Title 18 Sections 5532, 5533, 5534. See Doc. 100-4 at DEF013-14. Moreover, the search warrant identifies the residence and curtilage around the residence where any and all animals are present as the areas to be searched. Id at DEF013. Additionally, the search warrant provides a description of the property, as it describes the residence as “a tan ranch style home on a corner lot.” Id.
A valid search warrant must “‘[f]irst a warrant must identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause. Second, a warrant must describe the place to be searched. Third, the warrant must specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes.'” United States v. Rosario, No. 3:21-CR-206, 2022 WL 827806, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2022) (quoting United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2013)). Here, we find that the search warrant identifies the specific offenses, describes the property to be searched, and specifies the animals that are to be seized.
Crooker also argues that the search warrant is invalid because it fails to identify why there is probable cause to believe that evidence can be found at the Toll Road home. A brief review of the affidavit of probable cause contradicts Crooker's assertion. Indeed, the affidavit of probable cause sufficiently describes the Troopers' observations of deplorable conditions both outside and inside the Toll Road home, including a description of a severely emaciated dog that was outside during the initial investigation but was presumed to be inside when the Troopers returned the following day. Doc. 100-4 at DEF014. Accordingly, we find that the search warrant and affidavit of probable cause sufficiently identified the probable cause and what crime had been committed at the Toll Road property.
2. The affidavit of probable cause and search warrant did not include false or reckless statements and material omissions of fact.
In her brief in opposition, Crooker argues that the affidavit of probable cause contained false or reckless statements and material omissions of fact. In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may challenge the truthfulness of the factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a search warrant, and it set forth a two-part test for evaluating such a challenge:
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). The analysis set forth in Franks also applies in the civil-rights context, and “[a] section 1983 plaintiff who challenges the validity of a search warrant by asserting that law enforcement agents submitted a false affidavit to the issuing judicial officer must satisfy the two-part test developed by the Supreme Court in Franks ....” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Under that test, “the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Id.
Whether an affiant makes a false statement knowingly and deliberately is a “straightforward question of fact.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2010). Whether an affiant makes a statement with reckless disregard for the truth is not always as straightforward; an affiant makes a statement with reckless disregard for the truth “when ‘viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.'” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)(quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Regarding omissions, the Third Circuit has recognized that “a police officer cannot make unilateral decisions about the materiality of information, or, after satisfying him- or herself that probable cause exists, merely inform the magistrate or judge of inculpatory evidence.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787. But an omission is only made with reckless disregard if “an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘any reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.'” Id. at 788 (quoting United States v. Jacbobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)).
At the second step of the Franks analysis, the court must determine whether the false statement was “material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789. To do so, the court excises the false statement from the affidavit and then determines whether that “corrected” affidavit establishes probable cause. Id. “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). An officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available would lead a reasonable person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013). An “officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996). Although in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case the existence of probable cause is generally a question of fact, the court may conclude as a matter of law that there was probable cause if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably support a contrary factual finding. Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401.
Crooker argues that “the search warrant affidavit states that all dogs that were observed were emaciated but doesn't say how many[,] yet it speaks in the plural.” Doc. 104 at 26. Crooker contends that the only dog that would “come close to being emaciated” was Kelly/Elizabeth. Id. at 27. Crooker argues that “it was reckless of Trooper Flynn to file such an affidavit that was later debunked by the Pocono Peak veterinary records.” Id. Additionally, Crooker notes that “at least two of [the dogs] were in ideal body condition.” Id. Crooker contends that the search warrant excluded this exculpatory evidence of good body condition, and it misled the Magisterial District Judge, who was told that multiple dogs were emaciated. Id. Crooker also takes issue with the statement regarding the dog who was observed urinating blood. Id. at 28. Crooker argues that Trooper Tessitore's testimony at the preliminary hearing, in which he testified that he believed the observed dog was urinating blood from her vagina, is not anatomically possible. Doc. 104 at 28.
The defendants argue that Crooker is again attempting to apply a technical reading to the affidavit of probable cause as opposed to a commonsense interpretation. Doc. 108 at 10. Defendants note that it was not misleading to reference the animals in the plural as the affidavit of probable cause states that multiple dogs were observed. Id. Also, regarding the description of the dogs as emaciated, the defendants contend that a police officer drafted this affidavit, not a veterinarian, and that the affidavit is to be read in a nontechnical manner. Id. Additionally, the defendants note that Crooker herself testified that some of the dogs appeared underweight and that a veterinarian did label Kelly/Elizabeth as “severely emaciated.” Id. at 11 (citing Doc. 101 ¶¶ 34-39, 66). The defendants argue that even if the affidavit were to read that one dog appeared emaciated and all the other dogs appeared underweight, the search warrant would not be invalidated. Doc. 108 at 11.
Regarding Crooker's exculpatory evidence of good body condition argument, the defendants contend that Sassy was not in ideal body condition, noting that she “had fleas and such matted hair and skin irritation that she, postseizure, was required to be shaved from the base of her neck to her tail.” Id. (citing Doc. 101 at ¶ 67). The defendants also argue that it is possible that Sassy was not observed during the initial investigation, and that since the affidavit only included the observations prior to the search, it may have been impossible to include the observations of Sassy into the affidavit. Id. at 11-12. Additionally, the defendants contend that Trooper Tessitore's observation of a dog urinating blood, even if anatomically incorrect, is consistent. Id. at 12.
We agree with the defendants that the affidavit of probable cause and search warrant did not include false or reckless statements and material omissions of fact which invalidate the search warrant. We note from the outset that Crooker fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant. Despite Crooker's failure to prove this necessary knowledge element, we will analyze each contested statement under both elements of the Franks test.
Throughout her brief in opposition, Crooker points to information that was only established after the search warrant was issued, such as how many of the dogs were clinically emaciated. See doc. 104 at 27. But “‘We do not reevaluate probable cause after the search-once the warrant issues, recanted information is about as relevant as added information. The reasons to accept the veracity of the information are no more expanded by the successful search here than they are undone by the informant's mea culpa. Adding or subtracting information post-
As previously discussed, the affidavit and search warrant must be read in a commonsense and nontechnical manner. Conley, 4 F.3d at 1206. As such, a commonsense reading of the affidavit describes multiple dogs, which appear thin, living in deplorable conditions outside of the residence. Thus, the only dispute is whether the affidavit and search warrant included false or reckless statements and material omissions of fact.
Crooker first argues that the statement “all of the dogs that were observed were emaciated, in particular[,] one of the dogs was severely emaciated” is a reckless statement that invalidates the search warrant. We disagree. Because Crooker claims this statement is a false or reckless statement, we must first determine if the Trooper knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for a warrant. Here, Crooker merely argues that the veterinary records issuance has nothing at all to do with the validity of a warrant, absent material misrepresentations to the magistrate. Evidence learned after the issuance can neither add nor subtract to the affidavit or its sufficiency. That the information reasonably believed to be correct was exaggerated or a blatant fabrication invalidates neither the process nor the warrant. That the information reasonably believed is later recanted simply is not grounds to invalidate the process.”' Lasko v. Leechburg Police Dep't., 63 F.Supp.3d 522, 530 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 38 A.3d 816, 819 (Pa. 2012) (Easkin, J., dissenting)). indicate only one dog was clinically emaciated. Doc. 104 at 28-29. She fails to provide evidence, i.e., documents or deposition testimony, that the Trooper knew the other dogs were not emaciated and submitted the affidavit to the judge anyway or that he made the statement with a reckless disregard for the truth. Indeed, is undisputed that one dog was deemed emaciated by a veterinarian and several other dogs were considered underweight by both Crooker and the veterinarian. Doc. 101 ¶¶ 34-39, 66. And the defendants correctly note that this observation was made by a law enforcement officer, not a veterinarian. Thus, Crooker has failed to meet her burden and nothing in this record suggests that we should conclude that a law enforcement officer's use of the term emaciated, when only one of the dogs may have been emaciated and the other dogs may have been merely underweight, equates to a deliberate disregard for the truth.
Even if we were to conclude that the statement, “all of the dogs that were observed were emaciated,” was made with a deliberate disregard for the truth, it is not necessary to establish a finding of probable cause. Had the affidavit of probable cause been worded as Crooker suggests that there was only one emaciated dog and several underweight dogs, the search warrant would remain valid because 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(1) requires that each animal have access to necessary sustenance, and here, at least one dog was arguably not receiving adequate sustenance. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(1). Accordingly, we do not find the statement “all of the dogs that were observed were emaciated, in particular[,] one of the dogs was severely emaciated” to be a reckless statement which invalidates the search warrant.
Similarly, we do not find that the Troooper excluded exculpatory evidence of good body condition such to invalidate the search warrant. Crooker seemingly argues that the affidavit of probable cause omitted information regarding the “good body condition” dogs. Doc. 104 at 27. Once again, Crooker has not demonstrated that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made omissions regarding the dogs that were deemed to be in “good body condition.” Crooker has provided no evidence that the Trooper observed or was aware of other dogs in “good body condition” and that he intentionally or recklessly omitted that information from his affidavit of probable cause.
But even if we accept Crooker's argument that the Trooper knowingly omitted information regarding “good body condition” dogs, it is undisputed that other dogs were observed in an emaciated or underweight state. Logically, evidence of underweight dogs and otherwise deplorable outside conditions indicate evidence of further animal abuse inside the property. See Schulz v. Gendregske, 544 Fed.Appx. 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Indeed, common sense suggests that where there is evidence that an animal owner mistreats a substantial number of her animals, it is likely that she mistreats all of the animals in her care.”). Thus, viewing the record in Crooker's favor, we find no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the affidavit contained material omissions of fact.
Additionally, we reject Crooker's argument that the statement about the dog urinating blood is somehow misleading or invalidates the search warrant. It appears Crooker is arguing that this was a false or reckless statement; however, she fails to demonstrate that the Trooper knew this was a false or reckless statement. Instead, Crooker argues that the Trooper's observation cannot be anatomically correct. Doc. 104 at 28. Even if the Trooper's observation was not anatomically correct, Crooker provides no evidence that the Trooper deliberately disregarded the truth in making this statement. Moreover, omitting the entire statement would not undo a finding of probable cause for the search warrant. Indeed, the affidavit of probable cause still describes underweight dogs living in squalor.
Accordingly, we find that the affidavit of probable cause, when read in a commonsense manner, established that the Magisterial District Judge had a substantial basis for finding that evidence related to animal cruelty and neglect would be found at the Toll Road property. See United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In this regard we point out that the issue is not whether we or any other magistrate judge would have found probable cause predicated on Rivotti's affidavit. We consider only whether the magistrate judge who did make the decision had a substantial basis from which to reach his conclusion.”). We, therefore, recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted as it relates to probable cause for the search warrant.
B. Probable cause existed for the seizure.
The search warrant was executed and resulted in the seizure of seven dogs and one rabbit. Doc. 101 at ¶ 30. During the execution of the search warrant, the defendants note that algae, mud, and feces were observed in areas where the dogs were located. Doc. 101 at ¶ 31. Additionally, the dog that was observed urinating blood was observed as having sunken in eyes and being unable to walk on its own. Id. at ¶ 32. When images of the search were shown to Crooker, she admitted that several of the dogs appeared thin and that a large amount of feces was present in one of the dog's cages. Id. at ¶¶ 35-40.
The defendants argue that, based on the affidavit of probable cause, and the evidence of animal cruelty discovered during the search, that there was sufficient probable cause for the seizure of the animals. In her brief in opposition, Crooker only argues that there was a lack of probable cause for the search warrant and subsequent arrest warrant. Doc. 104 at 29, 32-33.
Regarding the seizure of the animals, Crooker only argues that the entire search warrant was invalid, thereby rendering the seizure of the animals a constitutional violation. Id. at 29. Because we have already concluded that probable cause existed for the search warrant, there is no need to discuss Crooker's argument further regarding the seizure of the animals. Thus, based on the condition of the animals and the squalor discovered during the execution of the search warrant, we find that the defendants have shown undisputed facts that probable cause existed to seize the animals. See Tomey, 884 A.2d at 295-96 (upholding the trial court's conclusion that appellant had deprived his dogs access to a clean and sanitary shelter and seizure of the animals was appropriate).
Accordingly, we recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted as it relates to probable cause for the seizure of the animals.
C. This Report and Recommendation is limited to whether probable cause existed for the search warrant and seizure of the animals.
In their various briefs, both Crooker and the defendants argue whether probable cause existed for the subsequent arrest of Crooker. We will, however, adhere to our previous Order and limit this Report and Recommendation to whether probable cause existed for the search warrant and seizure of the animals. Should this Report and Recommendation be adopted, we recommend that the parties meet and confer to discuss how a finding of probable cause for the search and seizure affects any remaining claims. Additionally, at this time, we will decline to recommend any sua sponte dismissal of any of Crooker's claims. Accordingly, we recommend denying the motion for summary judgment as it relates to the probable cause for Crooker's arrest and dismissing Counts III, V-VII.
VI. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend granting the motion (doc. 99) for summary judgment as it relates to whether probable cause existed for the search warrant and seizure of the animals. Additionally, we recommend denying the motion for summary judgment as it relates to whether probable cause existed for Crooker's arrest and dismissing Counts III, V-VII.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 33