Therefore, even a sting operation that involves “government creation of the opportunity to commit an offense, even to the point of supplying defendants with materials essential to commit crimes, does not exceed due process limits.” United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 219 (2d Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 53, 190 L.Ed.2d 55 (2014).
“ ‘It does not suffice to show that the government created the opportunity for the offense, even if the government's ploy is elaborate and the engagement with the defendant is extensive.... Likewise, feigned friendship, cash inducement, and coaching in how to commit the crime do not constitute outrageous conduct.’ ” Bout, 731 F.3d at 238 (quoting Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 121 ); United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 219 (2d Cir.2013) (same), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 53, 190 L.Ed.2d 55 (2014). By the same token, the government's use of a “sting” operation—deceptive and controversial as such operations might sometimes be—is not per se outrageous.
Therefore, even a sting operation that involves “government creation of the opportunity to commit an offense, even to the point of supplying defendants with materials essential to commit crimes, does not exceed due process limits.” United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 219 (2d Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 53, 190 L.Ed.2d 55 (2014). Moreover, “[t]he Second Circuit has ‘yet to identify a particular set of circumstances in which government investigative conduct was so egregious that it shocked the conscience and violated fundamental guarantees of due process.’ ”