Opinion
Case No. 2:06-cv-135.
June 16, 2006
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) (" PLRA"), the court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). Applying these standards, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual AllegationsPlaintiff James Craig Cristini, an inmate at the St. Louis Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Doctor Unknown McConnell. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on May 16, 2004, while playing volleyball in the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) yard, he broke his "fibula bone in right ankle." Plaintiff was sent to an outside hospital for evaluation. Plaintiff claims that he was told to return to the hospital to be casted in a few days, but that Defendant refused to authorize the trip or to place a cast on Plaintiff's ankle. Defendant refused to give Plaintiff a medical lay-in and told him that he would use crutches and go to chow like every other inmate. At some point, Plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs coming out of chow and landed on his ankle. As a result, he reinjured his ankle. In addition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's refusal to give him a medical lay-in from his job added stress to his ankle. Plaintiff states that, as a result of Defendant's deliberate indifference, he is permanently injured. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177, 114 S. Ct. 1218 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's conduct constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied "[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need for medical care is obvious even to a lay person." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 2004 WL 2792016, at *7 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves "minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care," Blackmore, 2004 WL 2792016, at *6, the inmate must "place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment." Napier v. Madison County, Kentucky, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have "a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference "entails something more than mere negligence," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be "satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Id. Under Farmer, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer, 62 F.3d at 154-55; Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. April 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes "between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). Where, as here, "a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976); see also, Brock v. Crall, No. 00-5914, 2001 WL 468169, at *2 (6th Cir. April 27, 2001); Jones v. Martin, 5 Fed. Appx. 434, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 833 (2001); Williams v. Mattson, No. 99-1796, 2000 WL 924145, at *1 (6th Cir. June 28, 2000); Davis v. Ulep, No. 97-2124, 1999 WL 98390, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1999); Cain v. Huff, No. 96-1613, 1997 WL 377029, at * 4 (6th Cir. July 2, 1997); Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at * 2 (6th Cir. April 4, 1997).
Plaintiff in this case claims that Defendant deliberately denied him needed medical attention for his broken fibula. However, it is apparent from the responses to Plaintiff's grievance and appeals that he did receive medical attention and that his complaint is with regard to the adequacy of the care received. According to the step I response:
Dr. McConnell saw grievant on 5/17/04. He advised crutches and no weight bearing. He re-evaluated again on 5/24/04 with the foot splint being in good, solid position. 6/1/04 note shows Dr. McConnell noted the splint to still be in good condition. 6/10/04 Dr. McConnell took of the splint, noting the follow-up x-ray showed good position and early healing of the fracture. Grievant was to continue crutches but when Dr. McConnell saw him on 6/29/04 it was noted that, on his own initiative, grievant began to bear full weight on 6/25/064. While at MBP, only one kite was received from grievant dated 7/28/04 about his ankle issues and there was no plan to see a "foot specialist." Care administered has been appropriate per PD 03.04.100. Step I response by John Kimsel to MBP 04 100 2451 12D3, dated November 8, 2004. Therefore, it is clear that Plaintiff's complaint is as to the adequacy of the treatment. As noted above, such a claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court determines that Plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.