., 135 Ga. App. 845 848 219 S.E.2d 458 See generallyCorbin onContracts,Batson-Cook Co. v. Georgia Marble Setting Co., 112 Ga. App. 226 229-30 144 S.E.2d 547 E. g., Southern Railway Co. v.Insurance Company of North America, 228 Ga. 23 183 S.E.2d 912 Blitch v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 122 Ga. 711 50 S.E. 945 Binswanger Glass Co. v. Beers ConstructionCo., 141 Ga. App. 715 234 S.E.2d 363 Georgia PortsAuthority v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 135 Ga. App. 859 219 S.E.2d 467 Benson Paint Co. v. Williams ConstructionCo., 128 Ga. App. 47 195 S.E.2d 671 Hearn v. Central ofGeorgia Railway Co., 22 Ga. App. 1 95 S.E. 368 See Brown v. SeaboardCoast Line Railroad Co., 554 F.2d 1299 cert.denied, 434 U.S. 975 98 S.Ct. 533 54 L.Ed.2d 467 Manchester Marble Co. v. Rutland Railroad Co., 100 Vt. 232 136 A. 394 SeeSeaboard Coast Line RailroadCo. v. Dockerty, 135 Ga. App. 540 218 S.E.2d 263 Blitchv. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 122 Ga. 711 714 50 S.E. 945 See Hannah v. Belger, 436 F.2d 96 98-99 Cristal v. Harmon, 137 Ga. App. 153 155-56 223 S.E.2d 210 Ansley v. Forest Services, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 745 747-48 218 S.E.2d 914Lie-Nielsen v. TuxedoPlumbing Heating Co., 149 Ga. App. 502 254 S.E.2d 729 See also Central of Georgia Railroad Co. v. SchnadigCorp., 139 Ga. App. 193 228 S.E.2d 165 The Natureof the Judicial ProcessSeegenerally Cash v. Street Trail, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 462 221 S.E.2d 640 Camp Concrete Products v. Central ofGeorgia Railway Co., 134 Ga. App. 537 539 215 S.E.2d 299 M. D. SMITH d/b/a M. D. : SMITH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY : : vs. : CIVIL NO. C79-11G : SEABOARD COAST LINE : RAILROAD COMPANY : O'KELLEY, District Judge. The plaintiff M. D. Smith commenced this action in the Superior Court for Barrow County, Georgia, alleging that a shop building and some equipment were destroyed by a fire started through the negligence of the defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
" Holbrook v. Capital Auto. Co., 111 Ga. App. 601, 604 ( 142 S.E.2d 288) (1965). See also Cristal v. Harmon, 137 Ga. App. 153 ( 223 S.E.2d 210) (1976). Likewise, to the extent that appellants rely upon the appellees' "concealment" of both the existence of the neighboring elevator control room and the resultant noise in the leased premises, it was not error to grant appellees a directed verdict.
Tenants who sign a lease containing a stipulation regarding the "entire agreement," when sued for the rent thereunder, cannot defend on the grounds of fraudulent representations as to the condition of the premises. Cristal v. Harmon, 137 Ga. App. 153, 155 ( 223 S.E.2d 210) (1976). Thus, Snipes is precluded by the lease from claiming that she was constructively evicted by a condition that existed at the time she signed the lease.
Since this evidence raised an issue as to whether appellants had prevented appellee from exercising its own judgment and had concealed and misrepresented a material defect relating to the panel processing operation, the merger clause did not necessarily as a matter of law vitiate appellee's fraud claim. Even though a party electing to affirm a contract is ordinarily bound by a merger clause contained therein (see, e.g., Cristal v. Harmon, 137 Ga. App. 153 ( 223 S.E.2d 210); Kot v. Richard P. Rita Personnel c., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 438 ( 214 S.E.2d 690)), a merger clause is without application where the fraud allegedly perpetrated concerned intrinsic defects in the article forming the subject matter of the contract and was such as to prevent the defrauded party from exercising its own judgment. Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga. App. 602 ( 80 S.E.2d 490); Batey v. Stone, 127 Ga. App. 81 ( 192 S.E.2d 528); Hester v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 435 (2) ( 160 S.E.2d 859). Cf. Tinsley v. Gullett Gin Co., 21 Ga. App. 512 (2, 4) ( 94 S.E. 892).
Code Ann. § 20-704 (1). See Code Ann. § 38-501; Cristal v. Harmon, 137 Ga. App. 153 ( 223 S.E.2d 210). Of similar effect is a "merger" clause contained in the contract. Cristal v. Harmon, supra.