Opinion
Record No. 1950-92-3
March 8, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG ERNEST W. BALLOU, JUDGE DESIGNATE.
William Parker Walker, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Koontz and Willis.
Argued at Salem, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
James Lorenzo Crews was tried and convicted at a bench trial for possession of cocaine. The sole question on this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in holding that a police officer's seizure of Crews was reasonable. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence proved that at 10:00 p.m. police officers were watching activity in the 800 block of Florida Avenue, in the City of Lynchburg. The police knew the area to be an "open air drug market." An officer who was hidden from view during the surveillance testified that he observed Crews for an hour near the BB Grill, a business establishment on Florida Avenue. After the officer first saw Crews standing near the Grill, an automobile stopped in front of the Grill. Crews approached a woman, who exited the automobile. Crews and the woman then walked to the side of the Grill and entered an alley. They remained in the alley, out of the sight of the officer, for thirty to forty seconds. After they came out of the alley, the woman entered the automobile and drove away.
On five separate occasions, the officer saw Crews approach five different individuals. Crews walked into the alley with each person and then returned to the area in front of the Grill. The officer testified that the conduct that he observed caused him to suspect that Crews was distributing narcotics. After observing Crews for over an hour, the officer contacted other officers, who stopped Crews, questioned him, and searched him for weapons. The police removed from Crews' pockets a knife and a razor blade containing cocaine residue. After hearing this evidence, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress the cocaine in Crews' possession.
The rule is well established that a police officer may make an investigative stop when the officer has "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 496, 412 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1992). "[T]he officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1989).
The evidence established that the officer who observed Crews' activity was experienced in conducting surveillance and knowledgeable in narcotics activity. The officer based his suspicion of narcotics dealing upon Crews' unusual conduct late at night in an area where narcotics activity frequently occurred. The officer described Crews' approach to individuals on the street between ten and eleven o'clock at night. The officer further described Crews' furtive conduct in entering an alley with each of the persons he approached. After each trip into the alley, Crews returned to the place in front of the Grill, where he waited to approach other individuals. The officer described unusual conduct that provided an objective basis from which he drew on his experience to reasonably conclude that Crews was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's refusal to suppress the evidence.
Affirmed.