Crestwood Park, Inc. v. Apostal

4 Citing cases

  1. Crescent Corp. v. Proctor Gamble Co.

    898 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    Ruling that a party was not required to file a demand in the city specified by the forum

    Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.15 at 607 (1982) (emphasis in original). See also Crestwood Park, Inc. v. Apostal, 431 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 1982) (breach went to de minimus aspect of the contract and so forfeiture was unwarranted). If a remedy other than dismissal was available to the district court, this would be the favored response. Cf. Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield, 155 Ind. App. 422, 293 N.E.2d 210, 218 (1973) ("Forfeiture is a harsh remedy, not favored in equity, and must yield to the principle of compensation where fair dealing and good conscience seem to demand.").

  2. Lutheran Homes, Inc. v. Lock Realty Corp. IX

    177 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (N.D. Ind. 2016)

    And because the legislature has since banned the transfer of certification rights, the certification rights have no present sale value, either. Though the legislature could conceivably permit transfers of the certification rights in the future, that possibility would be purely speculative and cannot justify reducing Lutheran Homes' damages. Crestwood Park, Inc. v. Apostal , 431 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.1982) (holding that damages could not be affected by possible future action by a municipality, as that would be the “product of conjecture” and “unadulterated speculation”). Lock Realty does claim that Lutheran Homes should have sold the certifications but unreasonably failed to do so, but that is part of its affirmative defense and does not affect the amount of damages that Lutheran Homes actually sustained.

  3. Eden United, Inc. v. Short

    573 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that a failure to perform could satisfy the breach of contract element

    dismissed; Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey (1972), 154 Ind. App. 632, 652, 291 N.E.2d 92, 106. Likewise, as Short contends and Eden apparently concedes, a plaintiff need not be able to prove all of his lost profits to be able to recover some of them. See Crestwood Park, Inc. v. Apostal (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 789. Thus, the question is simply whether the evidence offered by Short was so deficient as to preclude any fact finder from making a fair and reasonable finding with regard thereto, id., for, given the inherently problematic and uncertain nature of prospective profits, it is only essential that Short present such evidence as might reasonably be expected to be available under the circumstances.

  4. Ethyl Corp. v. Forcum-Lannom Associates

    433 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 50 times
    In Ethyl Corp., the court held: "While an ambiguous adhesion contract is construed in the non-draughting party's favor, an unambiguous contract must be enforced according to its terms."

    Given our holding, we remand the case for a new trial on damages only at which the owner will be restricted to damages upon his theory presented at the original trial and on appeal — that is, the compliance costs allocable to the addition only. Boss v. Deak, (1936) 210 Ind. 449, 4 N.E.2d 180. For purposes on remand, we also note that, generally, the measure of damages in a breach of contract case is the loss actually suffered as a result of the breach; consequently a plaintiff is not entitled to be placed in a better position than he would have been had the breach not occurred. Crestwood Park, Inc. v. Apostal, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 789; Downing v. Dial, (1981) Ind. App., 426 N.E.2d 416. Specifically in cases where a builder has breached a construction contract, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of completion, or alternatively, the actual cost of completion. Blade Corp. v. American Drywall, Inc., (1980) Ind. App., 400 N.E.2d 1183. Also, a party who suffers damage due to the refusal of the other party to perform under a contract has a right to recover his expenses if he completes the work at his own expense. Ogle v. Wright, (1977) 172 Ind. App. 309, 360 N.E.2d 240, (cost of completing installation of a septic tank).