Opinion
No. C 98-4386 CRB (PR); (Docket nos. 67, 69, 73, 76)
September 17, 2002
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Timothy Crayton, a prisoner of the State of California, filed this pro se civil rights action alleging the violation of his federal constitutional rights and his rights under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). At issue are Crayton's claims that defendant Terhune violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the RA, and the ADA, by denying him access to his orthomodified typewriter and to the prison law library, and that defendant Reese inflicted physical injury upon him on October 25, 1999, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and state tort law. No pending before the court are: (1) defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket #73), (2) Crayton's motion for summary judgment (docket #69), (3) Crayton's motion to compel (docket #67), (4) Crayton's motion for preliminary injunction (docket#76), and (5) the Court's Order to Show Cause re:entry of default judgment (docket #68).
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I Standard of Review
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.
The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court must consider all of the evidence submitted in support of both motions to evaluate whether a genuine issue of material fact exists precluding summary judgment for either party. The Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001).
II Terhune's Motion for Summary Judgment
Crayton alleges that defendant Terhune, Director of the California Department of Corrections, has violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the RA, and the ADA, by denying him access to his orthomodified typewriter ("OMT") and to the prison law library. He seeks injunctive relief and damages.
A. Injunctive relief
It is undisputed that Crayton was denied his OMT for almost four years. It is also undisputed that as of May 20, 2002, Crayton was provided with his OMT, and that his request for injunctive relief with respect to this issue has been rendered moot. Accordingly, this claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED. Crayton's injunctive relief claim for access to the law library remains pending, as do his damages claims.
B. Fourteenth Amendment claim
Crayton claims the sole basis for denying him access to his OMT and the law library is his disability, in violation of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Thus, in order to establish an equal protection claim, Crayton must first show that defendant Terhune did not treat him in the same manner as other similarly situated prisoners. The court finds that Crayton fails as a matter of law in this endeavor.
Crayton argues that nondisabled inmates are regularly provided access to their own typewriters, which he analogizes to his OMT, and to the law library. In this instance, however, Crayton is not similarly situated to nondisabled prisoners. See Hansen v. Rimel, 104 F.3d 189 (8th Cir. 1997). In Hansen, a hearing-impaired inmate brought an equal protection claim alleging that prison officials' failure to provide him with a special telephone denied him telephone access enjoy. by inmates without hearing impairments. In determining whether a disabled inmate is similarly situated to nondisabled inmates, the court asked "whether the disabled plaintiff is equally capable for the purpose at issue." Id. at 190. For example, an inmate in a wheelchair would be equally capable, and thus similarly situated, to a nondisabled inmate for the purpose of watching television Id. (citing More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993)). The Hansen court found that the plaintiff, who could not use a standard telephone due to his hearing impairment, was not "equally capable" of accessing a standard telephone, and therefore not similar situated to hearing inmates for the purpose of using a telephone. Id.; see also Spurlock v. Simmon 88 F. Supp.2d 1189, 1194 (D. Kan. 2000) (for purpose of telephone access, hearing impaired inmate required to use special telephone not similarly situated to hearing inmates who use regular phones); Clark v. State of California, No. C 96-1486 FMS, 1998 WL 242688, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (where developmentally disabled prisoners lacked skills to fill out forms, thereby limiting their access to medical care and educational programming, for purposes of equal protection analysis they were not similarly situated to non-developmentally disabled prisoners).
Under this analysis, a paraplegic wheelchair bound inmate like Crayton is not as equally capable as a nondisabled inmate for the purpose of using a standard typewriter or accessing the prison library and therefore is not "similarly situated" for equal protection purposes. Moreover, Crayton fails to show that defendant Terhune treated him any differently than other disabled inmates. Accordingly, on these facts, no reasonably jury could conclude that defendant Terhune treated Crayton differently than "similarly situated" inmates.
Even if the record was sufficient to establish differential treatment, Crayton has not alleged facts which show Terhune acted with the requisite intent to discriminate. "To state a claim under 4 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). A discriminatory purpose or intent means that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action because of, rather than in spite of, its adverse effect upon an identifiable group. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 ((9th Cir. 2001) (citing Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Although Crayton alleges that Terhune discriminated against him because of his disabilities, he has not presented evidence which shows that Terhune acted with discriminatory intent. Crayton allege that he has a disability, he repeatedly sought access to his OMT and the law library, including directly from defendant Terhune, and Terhune denied his requests. Based on this, Crayton asserts that Terhune's denials were because he is disabled. Aside from Crayton's unsubstantiated allegations, there is nothing in the record to indicate this is the case. These conclusory allegations are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.
C. ADA/RA claims
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101et seq., provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Both Acts apply to state correctional facilities see Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 210 (1998); Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997), and the procedures and rights applicable to a claim under each Act are the same, see Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 2182 (1999); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996). The elements for such a claim are: (1) that the plaintiff is a handicapped person; (2) that he is otherwise qualified; and (3) that the defendants' actions either (a) excluded his participation in or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or activity; or (b) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical or mental handicap. See id. Assuming that Crayton has satisfied all of the requisite elements of a claim under the ADA and RA, this court nonetheless finds that his injunctive relief claim is barred by theArmstrong consent decree, and that defendant Terhune is entitled to qualified immunity.
1. Armstrong consent decree
In 1994, an ADA/RA suit on behalf of all present and future California State prisoners and parolees with mobility, sight, hearing, learning, and kidney disabilities was brought in federal court. See Armstrong v. Davis, et al., No. C 94-2307 CW (N.D. Cal.). In the present action, filed in 1998 defendant Terhune moved to dismiss Crayton's ADA/RA claims on the ground that they were precluded by Armstrong. At that time, this court made the preliminary determination that Terhune had not sufficiently shown that Crayton's claims fell under Armstrong, and denied the motion to dismiss on this ground. In the current motion for summary judgment, in order to establish that the Armstrong decree applies to Crayton, Terhune provides a copy of the consent decree and of forms documenting Crayton's disabled status. See Defendants' Exh. B, C. Crayton has not provided evidence to the contrary, and has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of Armstrong to him. Because Crayton is a member of the class to which Armstrong applies and his pending request for injunctive relief under the ADA/RA falls squarely under Armstrong, he must pursue his request via the consent decree or through class counsel. Accordingly, the request for injunctive relief is DENIED, and is DISMISSED without prejudice to Crayton pursuing proper procedures.
2. Qualified immunity
With respect to Crayton's ADA/RA damages claims, Terhune raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-9 (1991). "Therefore, regardless of whether [a] violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not `clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). In determining whether qualified immunity applies, the threshold question must be: taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a federal right?Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). If so, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. If the law is determine to be clearly established, the next question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993).
Assuming Crayton has met the elements for a claim under the ADA/RA, the rights he seeks to enforce were not clearly established at the time. For a right to be clearly established, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would know that his conduct violates that right." Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 1995). Terhune does not dispute that he had an obligation under the ADA/RA to provide "reasonable accommodations" to disabled inmates, but Crayton cites no binding precedent which defined the contours of the accommodations required. The United States Supreme Court did not hold the ADA applicable to state prisons until 1998, see Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998 and the current parameters of the Armstrong decree, which include defining "reasonable accommodations," were not finalized until January 3, 2001. This court finds that Crayton's rights under the ADA/RA were not sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official in Terhune's position would know that his actions violated those rights. Accordingly, Terhune is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is GRANTED as to Crayton's damages claims.
III Reese's Motion for Summary Judgment
Crayton alleges that on October 25, 1999, correctional officer Reese approached him while he was in his wheelchair and demanded a "chrono," or memorandum, authorizing the use of his wheelchair. Under what Crayton alleges was the pretense of a routine search, Reese "seized plaintiff's injured, dysfunctional, paralytic, right arm and raised it above his head, then released her grip causing plaintiff's arm to free fall and bang against the metal of the wheelchair; which caused plaintiff sharp pains in his neck and head area and intense mental traumas (sic)." (Amended Complaint at 16:12-18). Crayton seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Reese.
A. Physical injury requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
"No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Failure to allege and establish an appropriate physical injury is ground for dismissal of a claim for mental or emotional injury. See Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1321-35 (S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.)
Crayton alleges that he suffered "mental trauma" as a result of Reese's actions. However, he has not established that he suffered "physical injury" within the meaning of § 1997e(e). While the qualifying physical injury under § 1997e(e) need not be significant, it must be more than de minimis. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627-29 (9th Cir. 2002). Crayton's allegation of "sharp pain" in his neck and head does not meet the de minimis standard. See id. (back and leg pain from sitting on cement floor and painful canker sore do not qualify as more than de minimis); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (bruised ear that lasted for three days was de minimis). Accordingly, Crayton's claim for damages based on mental or emotional injury is DISMISSED.
B. Use of excessive force
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 824, 834 (1994). Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).
Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action; the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 9-10; see Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (no lasting injury required for sexual assault because sexual assault was deeply offensive to human dignity). While there is no consensus as to what manner of injury a prisoner must prove in order to prevail on an excessive force claim, the extent of injury can shed light upon the degree of force used. See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (blows directed at inmate which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth and cracked dental plate were not de minimis); see also Warren v. Westchester County Jail, 106 F. Supp.2d 559, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that a de minimis injury weighs heavily towards conclusion that degree of force used was de minimis and thus not actionable under Hudson).
Compare Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A]bsence of objective proof of non-de minimis injury does not alone warrant dismissal.") and Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993) ("No actual injury needs to be proven to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim.") with Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis injury.") and Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plaintiff must show more than de minimis injury), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114 (1995). The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.
This court finds that when Crayton's allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to him, no reasonable jury could find that Reese violated the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Even if Reese did exactly as Crayton maintains, the evidence cannot support a finding that her use of force — raising his arm for inspection and allowing it to fall — was more than de minimis. This conclusion is bolstered by the de minimis nature of Crayton's alleged injury — a sharp pain in his neck and head — and the lack of any medical record. Moreover, Reese's actions were not of the type which are repugnant to the conscience of mankind. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1991) (it is not degree of injury which makes out violation of Eighth Amendment but use of official force or authority that is intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to human dignity), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). Crayton has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements of his claim. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED.
IV Crayton's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
Crayton has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the court to rely upon his statement of undisputed facts to find in his favor as to all claims. Crayton's motion presents no additional evidence which affirmatively demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Considering all of the evidence submitted in support of both parties' motions for summary judgment, this court finds Crayton has not carried his burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his federal constitutional and statutory rights were violated by defendants. Id. Accordingly, Crayton's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
V Supplemental State Law Claims
Crayton filed supplemental state law claims. Because no federal claims remain pending, the court will exercise its discretion to DISMISS the state law claims without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996).
MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS
I Court Order to Show Cause Re: Entry of Default Judgment
Per order dated June 7, 2002, this court directed defendants to show cause why a default judgment should not be entered against them for failure to comply with the court's prior briefing schedule. Defendants responded to the court's order and Crayton filed objections to the response. Having reviewed all papers, the court is satisfied that defendants did not willfully fail to comply with the briefing schedule, and concludes that entry of a default judgment is not warranted. The order to show cause is hereby DISCHARGED.
II Preliminary Injunction
Crayton moves for a preliminary injunction to compel prison authorities to provide him with ink cartridges for his OMT. As discussed above in detail, Crayton is a member of the class to which the Armstrong consent decree applies, and thus his requests for injunctive relief on matters pertaining to his disability must be addressed via the consent decree or through class counsel. Moreover, any such claims must be administratively exhausted before they are brought to federal court. Accordingly, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
III Motion to Compel
Crayton moves to compel answers to interrogatories and requests for admission which he maintains defendants failed to answer. The evidence sought by Crayton would not preclude the court's findings on the merits of Crayton's claims. Accordingly, the motion to compel is DENIED. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of discovery motion proper where party failed to show requested documents were relevant and could have affected the outcome of the summary judgment motion).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court orders as follows:
1. Crayton's injunctive relief claims are DISMISSED.
2. Defendant Terhune's and Reese's motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. (Docket no. 73.)
3. Crayton's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. (Docket no. 69.)
4. Crayton's supplemental state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
5. Crayton's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. (Docket no. 76.)
6. Crayton's motion to compel is DENIED. (Docket no. 67.)
7. The court's order to show cause is DISCHARGED. (Docket no. 68.)
Any and all other pending motions are DISMISSED as moot. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.