Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11180, Superior Court No. 4FA-02-1334 Civil.
April 25, 2004.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Donald D. Hopwood, Judge.
Keane-Alexander Crawford, pro se, Fairbanks. Gene L. Gustafson, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
At issue in this appeal is whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the individual appellees. The court concluded that the challenged searches they conducted were lawful and, alternatively, that appellees were entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed that the searches were lawful in light of the law and the facts.
We conclude that the superior court was correct on the alternative qualified immunity ground for the reasons stated in the appended order granting summary judgment. Since this conclusion is dispositive of this case, we need not reach the question of whether the searches were lawful.
The appended Order Granting Summary Judgment has been edited to conform to our technical rules.
AFFIRMED.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION
Alaska State Troopers Joseph Hazelaar and David Drvenkar searched Plaintiff Keane-Alexander Crawford ("Crawford") and the cab of his truck for weapons during a traffic stop after they discovered that Crawford was the subject of a safety alert for law enforcement officers. Crawford objected to the searches and sued Drvenkar, Hazelaar, and the State of Alaska ("Defendants"), claiming damages for violation of his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches.
Defendants now move for summary judgment and dismissal of all claims. The court concludes that there are no issues of fact to preclude summary judgment, and the brief protective search of Crawford and his vehicle for weapons did not violate his constitutional rights.
FACTS
On May 31, 2002, Alaska State Trooper Joseph Hazelaar stopped Keane-Alexander Crawford for driving with a defective taillight. When Trooper Hazelaar asked Crawford for his driver's license, Crawford informed him that he was not carrying it and did not have any other form of identification. When Hazelaar radioed Crawford's name to the Alaska State Trooper (AST) dispatch, he discovered that the AST computer showed a safety alert. Crawford was described as hostile to law enforcement and known to carry firearms, including an AK-47. Trooper Hazelaar asked Crawford to get out of his truck and walk to the back of the truck. Hazelaar then did a pat-down search to make sure Crawford was not carrying any weapons on his person. After the brief pat-down, Crawford expressed his objection to the search. Hazelaar informed him of the safety alert and refused to allow Crawford to get back in his truck until he had finished writing a citation.
Crawford Depo. at 16 (Nov. 14, 2002).
Meanwhile, Crawford used his cell phone to call the AST business office and request that more troopers be sent out. He explained during his deposition that he first requested more troopers because Hazelaar seemed nervous. Crawford thought he would feel safer if more troopers were present to make Hazelaar feel more comfortable. Hazelaar also requested assistance apparently because of the safety alert and Crawford's demeanor, which Hazelaar viewed as hostile and aggressive. Alaska State Trooper Sergeant David Drvenkar was notified of Crawrd's call and Hazelaar's request. Drvenkar recognized Crawford's name from AST safety alerts in the computer and AST briefing board notices about Crawford's hostility to law enforcement, his inclination to carry firearms (including a loaded AK-47), and mental instability. Among other things, Crawford had been arrested for disorderly conduct when he refused to obey police officers' orders to get out of his vehicle, and on another occasion he had been involuntarily committed for a mental health evaluation because of bizarre behavior toward police. Drvenkar explained during his deposition that the officer safety alerts about Crawford indicated to him a potential for Crawford to escalate a situation to a dangerous level, which could place Crawford himself in a dangerous position.
Crawford Aff. ¶ 9 (March 22, 2003).
Crawford Depo. at 30.
Crawford Depo. at 30.
Plaintiff Exh. 9 (email from Drvenkar to Tanner and Farmer, dated June 10, 2002); Exh. 2 (Hazelaar Depo. at 4-6, 11-13, 16-17, 23-24 (Jan. 23, 2003)).
Drvenkar Depo. at 7-8 (Jan. 22, 2003).
Crawford Depo. at 19-27; Drvenkar Depo. at 4-5, 7-8, 10-11.
See Drvenkar Depo. at 30.
When Sergeant Drvenkar arrived, he asked Crawford for his vehicle registration. Crawford opened the glove compartment to get his registration, and Drvenkar noticed a metal object about the size of a small handgun among the papers in the glove compartment. Drvenkar then searched the glove compartment and cab of the truck from the passenger side. The metal object turned out to be vice grips. Drvenkar then searched the cab of the truck from the driver's side, including behind and under the seat. He found no weapons. Crawford later estimated that the search of the passenger side took "a little bit over a minute." The search from the driver's side took longer.
Crawford Depo. at 32 (Nov. 14, 2002).
Crawford Depo. at 33.
Crawford Depo. at 37-38; Drvenkar Depo. at 14.
Crawford Depo. at 34.
Crawford Depo. at 38.
While Drvenkar was searching the truck, Crawford called 911 to report that a trooper was committing a crime. Drvenkar viewed Crawford's calls to the AST business line and 911 as "abnormal" and consistent with Crawford's reputation for hostility and potential mental instability. Drvenkar eventually told Crawford that if he called 911 again on a non-emergency basis, he would arrest him.
Crawford Depo. at 38-39.
See Drvenkar Depo. at 25.
Crawford Depo. at 43; Crawford Aff. ¶ 26 (March 22, 2003).
Trooper Hazelaar issued a citation for the broken taillight and failure to carry a driver's license while driving. Crawford estimated that the entire contact with the troopers lasted approximately thirty or thirty-five minutes.
Crawford Depo. at 46.
Crawford admits his taillight was defective and does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop. He also admits in his opposition brief that the information about him on the AST computer was correct. He objects to the searches of his person and his vehicle, claiming that the searches were illegal. He also alleges in his complaint that Hazelaar unlawfully threatened to arrest him for driving without possession of his driver's license. Crawford claims he is entitled to monetary relief for violations of his right to be free of unreasonable searches under the federal and state constitutions and possibly for unspecified common law torts. He also claims that "Drvenkar's and Hazelaar's unlawful actions if done without knowledge or malice were due to a lack of training by the State of Alaska."
Opp. at 8 (March 24, 2003).
Second Amended Complaint, at 2 ¶ 4 (lodged Dec. 19, 2002, filed Jan. 8, 2003).
Crawford refers to the superior court having jurisdiction over the "common law and common law of torts." Second Amended Complaint, at 1.
Second Amended Complaint, at 2 ¶ 6.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Because summary judgment forecloses further litigation on one or more issues, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of relevant factual disputes and the moving party's entitlement to judgment. If the moving party establishes a prima facie case, the nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact by showing admissible evidence of specific facts reasonably tending to dispute the moving party's evidence. When determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. A material issue of fact exists where reasonable jurors could disagree in the resolution of relevant factuaissues. The court does not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. "[T]he evidentiary threshold necessary to preclude the entry of summary judgment is low." Crawford is the nonmoving party; most of the facts recited in this memorandum are based upon Crawford's own descriptions during his deposition.
Shade v. Co Anglo Alaska Serv. Corp., 901 P.2d 434, 437 (Alaska 1995).
Preblich v. Zorea, 996 P.2d 730, 733 (Alaska 2000); Walton v. Ramos Aasand Co., 963 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Alaska 1998).
Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 630 (Alaska 2001).
Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 936 (Alaska 1986).
Moore, 36 P.3d at 630.
John's Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1032 (Alaska 2002).
Crawford is representing himself. Courts in Alaska afford pro se litigants leniency with respect to court rules and procedures. Although pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard with respect to procedural defect, the substance of the law applied to the issues remains the same.
Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 480 (Alaska 1993).
See Dougan v. Aurora Elec., Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 795-96 (Alaska 2002); Wilkerson v. State, 993 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Alaska 1999).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the scope of the pat-down search and the vehicle search did not exceed a constitutionally permissible search for the protection of officers and others in the area. Defendants also argue that both officers would be entitled to immunity in any event, because reasonable officers in their position could have believed that the searches did not violate Crawford's constitutional rights. Defendants further contend that the State and the officers are immune to any common-law claim Crawford might be making, because the officers' decisions to search for weapons was discretionary.
A. Section 1983 Claims
Crawford claims damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims the state troopers, Drvenkar and Hazelaar, violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
States are not "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the State of Alaska cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. Crawford states that he does not object to dismissal of the claims against the State of Alaska.
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Opp. at 8 (March 24, 2003).
Section 1983 suits for monetary damages against state officials acting in their official capacities are viewed the same as suits against states. Thus, monetary damages actions may be maintained against state officials only in their individual capacities. It is not clear from the pleadings whether Crawford is suing Drvenkar and Hazelaar in their individual capacities. Because Crawford is pro se, his claims are construed to be against Drvenkar and Hazelaar in their individual capacities.
Prentzel v. State, 53 P.3d 587, 593 n. 30 (Alaska 2002).
See id. at 593-9
In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Clearly, the two state troopers were acting under color of law. The second question here is whether the searches deprived Crawford of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. In order to obtain summary judgment, defendants must show that a reasonable jury could not find the searches to be unreasonable and unlawful.
E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
1. Were the searches reasonable and lawful?
Two searches are challenged. First, the pat-down search of Crawford's person for weapons by Trooper Hazelaar. Second, the search of the interior of Crawford's vehicle for weapons by Sergeant Drvenkar.
In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a pat-down search for weapons was justified in certain circumstances by the police officers' need to protect themselves and nearby bystanders. Such a search is limited in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments, which could be used for the assault of a police officer. Usually, this is merely a matter of the police officer patting down a person's outer clothing. A protective search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is reasonable when done under the same principles articulated in Terry for a pat-down search. Furthermore, a search is not rendered invalid simply because possession of a weapon is legal. A legal weapon can be just as lethal to a law enforcement officer as an illegal weapon.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 29.
See id.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035, 1051 (1983).
Id. at 1052 n. 16.
The United States Supreme Court has observed that "roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous." A protective search is justified where a police officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with a person who may be armed and dangerous, regardless of whether the police officer has probable cause to arrest the person. "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." The officer's reasonable belief may be based on his own personal observations or those of a reliable third party. The AST computer system certainly qualifies as a reliable third party on which a state trooper may rely during a traffic stop. Drvenkar and Hazelaar were justified in relying on the AST warning to form their belief that Crawford posed a safety risk. No reasonable jury could find otherwise. Crawford himself expressly admitted that Hazelaar's reliance on the warning was reasonable.
Id. at 1047, 1048 n. 13.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Free v. State, 614 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Alaska 1980).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Free, 614 P.2d at 1378.
Free, 614 P.2d at 1378.
Crawford Depo. at 17.
a. Pat-down search by Trooper Hazelaar
The United States Supreme Court has held that police may order a person out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic violation, and may frisk that person for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that the person may be armed and dangerous. After Trooper Hazelaar received the warning about Crawford, he had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself. He had Crawford get out of the vehicle and did a brief pat-down search of Crawford to check for weapons. Crawford's own description of the pat-down search shows that the search did not exceed the permissible scope of a Terry weapons search. During his deposition, Crawford stated that Hazelaar took him behind the truck and patted him down:
Long, 463 U.S. at 1047-48 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
Crawford Depo. at 15-16 (Nov. 14, 2002).
Crawford: Well, he held — used one of his hands, I can't remember which, to hold my hands behind my back, and then he used the other hand to go up and down my body, leg, just around the belt area. Probably just making sure there were no knives or pistols on my person.
Question: Are you claiming that search was illegal?
Crawford: At this point in time, I — I can't say. I — I remember telling him at the end of the traffic stop that I didn't think he had broken any laws. And I — I don't think he has. I think that everything he did was — was pretty reasonable.
Crawford Depo. at 16.
Crawford insists that the search was unnecessary. Yet, Crawford admitted during his deposition that it was reasonable for Hazelaar to believe he should be cautious:
Crawford Depo. at 17.
Crawford: . . . I think that he [Hazelaar] probably believed that what he was reading in the computer was honest and true and correct, and so I think he had — you know, he had a reasonable — I think in his position, I — I probably would have done the same thing. I would have been a little bit cautious. You know, the computer says he carries guns. I'm going to just assume he does, and ask him to stand outside his truck, so I — I don't think what he did was unreasonable, no.
Question: It would be reasonable for him to rely on that information that was in the computer?
Crawford: I think so, yeah. Even though the information was incorrect, I think that his relying upon it — I wouldn't rely upon it because I know it to be incorrect. But he had no knowledge of the incorrectness of the iormation.
Crawford Depo. at 23-24.
Crawford admits that Hazelaar's pat-down search for weapons was reasonable, considering the safety advisory about Crawford on the AST computer. Crawford also admits that Hazelaar believed the warning was true and correct. There are no issues of fact from which a reasonable jury could infer that the brief protective pat-down search was unreasonable and illegal.
See also Crawford Depo. at 15-16.
See Crawford Depo. at 23-24.
See Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 936 (Alaska 1986).
b. Search of the vehicle by Sergeant Drvenkar
The United States Supreme Court has applied the Terry principles to a search of the area potentially within immediate reach of the detained person:
the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
A weapons search of the passenger compartment is justified because not only could the detained person break away from the police and retrieve a weapon from his vehicle, but also would have access to weapons when permitted to reenter the vehicle.
Id. at 1051-52.
The AST safety alert and briefing board notices about Crawford's possession of an AK-47 and his hostile attitude toward police provided "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts," such as the risk that Crawford was mentally unstable and had firearms concealed in his vehicle, "reasonably warrant[ed]" Sergeant Drvenkar's belief that Crawford could be dangerous when contacted by police and could gain immediate control of weapons if allowed to return to his vehicle before it was searched. Furthermore, even if a weapon was legally possessed by Crawford in his vehicle, the protective search would still be justified by the AST safety warning about Crawford. Legal weapons may pose just as much danger to police officers as illegal weapons. Clearly, Drvenkar's decision to search the passenger compartment of Crawford's truck to uncover any weapons was justified.
See id. at 1049 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
See id. at 1052.
Crawford believes the vehicle search consisted of two searches, one from the passenger side and a separate search from the driver's side. After Sergeant Drvenkar searched the passenger side, Crawford asked if he could get back inside his truck. Drvenkar told him he had to wait until the entire cab of the truck was searched for weapons. Sergeant Drvenkar believed he conducted only one search, which for practical reasons, involved walking around the vehicle to search from the driver's side after searching the passenger side. Since Crawford would have access to the entire inside of the truck cab after he was allowed to enter his vehicle again, Sergeant Drvenkar's search from both sides of the cab constituted only one protective search.
Drvenkar Depo. at 14.
Even Crawford does not allege that the search was excessively long. From the passenger side, Drvenkar searched the glove compartment and that side of the floor inside the cab of the truck. Crawford estimated this "first" search took only a minute. When Drvenkar searched the cab of the truck from the driver's side, he searched all areas where a handgun could have been concealed, including behind and under the truck's bench seat. Crawford estimated that this "second" search took longer, but it certainly took no more than a few minutes.
Crawford Depo. at 38.
Crawford Depo. at 38, 42.
Crawford argues the vehicle search was not necessary, because he did not have any weapons in the truck and had told the troopers this. Yet, the troopers had no way of knowing whether he was tling the truth until they performed a search. Given the safety warning in the AST computer system, an area search of the truck cab to ensure the safety of the troopers and Crawford was justified. No reasonable jury could find that the search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle was unreasonable. Regardless of how Crawford views his own behavior during the contact with Hazelaar and Drvenkar, his previous behavior with police and with respect to firearms had resulted in the AST safety warning. It actually would be unreasonable to expect law enforcement officers to ignore the warning.
Therefore, search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, from both sides of the vehicle, was reasonable and lawful. No reasonable jury could find otherwise.
The court concludes that the pat-down search and the vehicle search did not exceed the scope that was constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. No reasonable jury could reach a finding other than that each officer had a reasonable basis for conducting his respective search based on reports from a reliable source about Crawford's past possession of firearms in his vehicle and his hostility to police.
2. Would Drvenkar and Hazelaar be entitled to immunity against the § 1983 claims even if the searches were unlawful?
Because the searches were lawful, there normally would be no need to address the defendants' assertion of immunity. Crawford's pro se status, however, requires that the court address immunity.
Ordinarily, immunity should be decided long before trial, at the earliest possible stage in litigation, and summary judgment may be proper if a defendant is obviously immune. Qualified immunity shields Drvenkar and Hazelaar from § 1983 claims if a reasonable officer could have believed the searches of Crawford and his vehicle were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the two troopers possessed. Although the constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches is well-established, the parameters of a reasonable search depend upon the circumstances. Under clearly established law, a protective search of Crawford and the passenger compartment of his vehicle was lawful if Hazelaar and Drvenkar had a specific articulable reason to believe that Crawford might be armed and dangerous. The warnings on the AST computer provided such a reason. In other words, a reasonable officer would have believed the searches were lawful in light of the clearly established law permitting protective searches for weapons and in view of the warning about Crawford on the AST computer.
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1991); Van Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 451 n. 4 (Alaska 1997). But see Prentzel v. State, 53 P.3d 587 (Alaska 2002) (dismissal on pleadings based on immunity was inappropriate where plaintiff was pro se).
See Estate of Arrowwood v. State, 894 P.2d 642, 646 (Alaska 1995).
Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227.
Therefore, Drvenkar and Hazelaar would be entitled to immunity from Crawford's § 1983 claims even if the searches were not lawful.
B. Do Drvenkar and Hazelaar have official immunity from state common-law claims?
Crawford has not specified a particular common-law claim in his complaint, but he refers to the court's common-law tort jurisdiction. Because Crawford is pro se, his complaint will be treated as including a tort claim.
The depositions clearly show that Drvenkar and Hazelaar were acting within the scope of their duties and authority as law enforcement officers. Under qualified immunity, "a public official is shielded from liability only when discretionary acts within the scope of the official's authority are done in good faith and are not malicious or corrupt." Discretionary acts are "those requiring `personal deliberation, decision and judgment.'" The troopers' decision regarding whether to search Crawford and his vehicle for weapons was discretionary; the decision required rapid deliberation and judgment by the troopers regarding the safety of the situation. An officer performing a discretionary act is protected by qualified iunity if a reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the facts of the case. In order for an officer to obtain official immunity, the officer's conduct must be objectively reasonable. Hazelaar and Drvenkar would be protected by qualified immunity if a reasonable state trooper could have believed the searches were lawful in light of clearly established law on protective searches and the fact that Crawford was the subject of AST safety alerts.
Prentzel, 53 P.3d at 591 (quoting Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 157-59 (Alaska 1987)); Pauley v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 31 P.3d 1284, 1286 (Alaska 2001); Bauman v. State, 768 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Aspen Exploration, 739 P.2d at 157-59).
Aspen Exploration, 739 P.2d at 155 (quoting Haley v. State, 687 P.2d 305, 316 (Alaska 1984) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOKOF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 at 988-89 (4th ed. 1971))).
Cf. Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, 2 P.3d 78, 83 (Alaska 2000).
Pauley, 31 P.3d at 1286 n. 4, (quoting Samaniego, 2 P.3d at 84 (quoting Mathis v. Sauser, 942 P.2d 1117, 1125 (Alaska 1997))).
Samaniego, 2 P.3d at 84.
The AST computer had safety alerts about Crawford that even Crawford admits the troopers could reasonably believe. Although Crawford told the troopers that he did not have any weapons with him, the troopers would have had no way to know whether he was being truthful until they searched him and his vehicle. Crawford described Hazelaar as nervous after receiving the safety warning on the AST computer. Crawford admitted in his deposition that he could understand why Hazelaar would be nervous after learning of the AST warning about Crawford.
Nothing in the police tape, transcripts, affidavits, and depositions suggests that Hazelaar frisked Crawford for any reason other than a good faith attempt to protect himself and anyone else who might arrive at the scene. A reasonable jury could reach only the conclusion that Hazelaar's pat-down search of Crawford for weapons was objectively reasonable in light of law and the facts.
Similarly, when Crawford was asked to show his vehicle registration, Sergeant Drvenkar noticed a metal object among the papers in the glove compartment. This observation combined with the warning certainly justified the protective search of the vehicle's passenger compartment. Even after Drvenkar ascertained that the metal object he had seen in the glove compartment was only vice grips instead of a weapon, his search from the other side of the truck was reasonable in view of the warning on the AST computer. Crawford admitted during his deposition that a handgun could have been hidden in any of the places Drvenkar searched. Additionally, Crawford estimated that the entire stop lasted only about 35 minutes, from when he was first stopped by Hazelaar to when the two troopers drove away. Based on Crawford's description of the entire contact with the troopers, the search by Drvenkar would have been only a tiny fraction of that period. Crawford admitted that Drvenkar did not remove anything from the vehicle and did not damage anything in or on the vehicle. Toward the end of his deposition, Crawford speculated that Drvenkar may have searched the cab of his truck because Crawford had filed a lawsuit against Sergeant Kemp of the state troopers. Yet, nothing Crawford described could be construed by a reasonable jury as conduct going beyond a legal protective search for weapons that was justified by the safety alert about Crawford on the AST computer.
Crawford Depo. at 38.
Crawford Depo. at 46.
Crawford Depo. at 49.
Furthermore, a law enforcement officer should not be required to choose between ensuring the safety of himself or others and the risk of incurring a lawsuit if he overestimates the danger. Particularly when the AST computer contains a warning about the person with whom the officer is currently dealing, he or she should not be asked to weigh safety against potential liability.
Therefore, the court concludes that Drvenkar and Hazelaar are immune from common-law claims challenging their decisions to conduct protective searches for weapons during their contact with Crawford.
C. Claims against the State of Alaska
Crawford expressly stated that he had no objection to dismissing the State of Alaska from this case. Nonetheless, because he is pro se, the court must examine whether the State is entitled to summary judgment. A court must advise a pro se litigant of the properrocedure for attempting to achieve what the pro se litigant is obviously trying to accomplish. If the State is not entitled to summary judgment, the court would be required to advise Crawford accordingly, despite his statement about having no objection to dismissal of the State.
Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass'n, 64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003).
First, as stated above, the State is not a person with respect to § 1983 claims. The State cannot be sued under § 1983, either directly or under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Second, Crawford suffered no damages from any negligence in training Hazelaar and Drvenkar. The brief protective searches of Crawford and the cab of his truck were legal and did not violate Crawford's constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches. During Hazelaar's deposition, Crawford asked several questions about training on constitutional requirements and pat-down searches. Crawford's claim against the State with respect to lack of proper training is based upon his claim that the troopers violated his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches. As discussed above, the searches were constitutional and did not violate Crawford's constitutional rights. Because he has no damages, Crawford cannot prevail on a claim that the State failed to properly train the two troopers.
Hazelaar Depo. at 20-22 (Jan. 23, 2003).
Third, under AS 09.50.250, the State may not be sued in tort when the claim is based on the alleged negligence of a state employee in performing a discretionary function, even if the discretion is abused. A state official's good faith determination of his authority is a discretionary decision. The troopers' evaluation of the situation and decision to conduct the protective searches were discretionary functions. Further, in a 1996 case, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the State was immune to suits arising out of mistakes made by law enforcement officers in pursuit of their official duties, at least when no emergency exists. Because a law enforcement officer owed a person in a non-emergency situation no duty of care to act without error, no duty could be breached, and no negligence claim could be brought against the State. Therefore, the State may not be sued in tort based on Drvenkar and Hazelaar's discretionary decisions to conduct protective searches for weapons.
Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, 691 P.2d 281, 284 (Alaska 1984).
See Waskey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 909 P.2d 342, 344 (Alaska 1996).
Id. at 344.
The court concludes that the State should be dismissed from this case.
D. Other claims
Crawford has no cause of action for monetary damages under the state constitution. He claims that Drvenkar and Hazelaar violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches under Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. Alaska has not recognized direct constitutional tort claims based on violation of the state constitution. Therefore, Crawford's claim for damages under the Alaska Constitution must be dismissed.
Thoma v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 n. 5 (Alaska 1997); see also Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000).
Crawford cannot maintain an action against Hazelaar for allegedly "threatening" to arrest him for failing to have a driver's license in his possession while driving. Crawford himself admitted he was not carrying his driver's license when he was stopped by Hazelaar. Failure to have a driver's license in immediate possession when driving a motor vehicle and failing to produce the license for inspection upon demand of a peace officer is a misdemeanor. When a person commits an offense in a police officer's presence, the officer may arrest that person without a warrant. Furthermore, Crawford lacked evidence of his identity. Hazelaar lawfully could have arrested Crawford for failing to have his driver's license in immediate possession while driving a motor vehicle.
AS 28.15.131; AS 28.40.050.
AS 12.25.030(a)(1); AS 18.65.080.
See AS 12.25.180(a).
In his deposition, Drvenkar stated he told Crawford that if Crawford called "911" again during the traffic stop, Drvenkar would arrest him. It is a sdemeanor for a person to knowingly make a false report for an emergency response. Crawford's repeated calls to "911" to request more police and to report a crime being committed at that moment could constitute knowingly making a false report. During Crawford's deposition he stated that he called "911" because he wanted to have his report recorded. This suggests he knew an emergency did not exist. Since Crawford made the "911" calls in the troopers' presence, Drvenkar could have arrested Crawford lawfully without a warrant for making a false report of an emergency. There was nothing illegal in Drvenkar's threat to arrest Crawford if he called "911" again during the traffic stop.
AS 11.56.800.
Crawford Depo. at 40-41.
Crawford's claim of wrongful threats of arrest has no basis.
CONCLUSION
First, the State of Alaska should be dismissed from the case. Second, Crawford has not raised any genuine issues of material fact. Based on undisputed facts, the searches were lawful under the constitution. Third, the undisputed facts support the conclusion that even if the searches were not lawful, Drvenkar and Hazelaar are entitled to immunity with respect to Crawford's constitutional and common-law claims for damages. Fourth, there is no basis for the remaining claims.
All defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The claims in the complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.