Opinion
21-35734
10-26-2022
GABRIELLE R. CRANOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 4, 2022 [**] Seattle, Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05441-MLP
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Gabrielle Cranor appeals the district court's order affirming an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. "We review the district court's order affirming the ALJ's denial of social security benefits de novo and reverse only if the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard." Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). "Even when an ALJ commits an error of law, we must affirm if the error is harmless." Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2015). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Cranor argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence, which included new evidence from Dr. Wingate submitted to the Appeals Council. But substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinions.
The ALJ found that Cranor's depression and anxiety appeared to be largely due to situational stressors related to her children. And the ALJ explained why he found unpersuasive Dr. Wingate and Dr. Sanchez's opinions that Cranor had a range of marked and moderate limitations. The ALJ found each limitation inconsistent with Cranor's documented ability to go to the gym five days per week, take public transportation, use her computer, Skype with her children, help her neighbor with gardening, go to the casino, keep track of multiple appointments, attend college classes, and consider a career in peer counseling. Substantial evidence supports this assessment.
Dr. Wingate and Dr. Sanchez opined that Cranor had marked limitations performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances without special supervision; maintaining appropriate behavior in a work setting; and completing a normal workday and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms. Dr. Wingate and Dr. Sanchez also opined that Cranor had moderate limitations understanding, remembering, and persisting in tasks; learning new tasks; asking simple questions; communicating effectively; and setting realistic goals. Dr. Wingate and Dr. Sanchez's opinions are identical in assessing Cranor's moderate limitations. The ALJ did not discuss the moderate limitations portion of Dr. Wingate's opinion but rejected the entire limitations portion of Dr. Sanchez's opinion. Cranor does not argue that the two opinions are different regarding her moderate limitations. Instead, she argues that the ALJ erred by failing to state any reason for rejecting both opinions about her moderate limitations. But that is incorrect: the ALJ explained that he rejected the entire limitations portion of Dr. Sanchez's opinion-including the moderate limitations portion-because these limitations were inconsistent with Cranor's documented, wide-ranging activities. And the ALJ did not discuss the moderate limitations portion of Dr. Wingate's opinion. To the extent that the ALJ erred in failing to explicitly discuss the moderate limitations portion of Dr. Wingate's opinion, such error is harmless. See Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 845.
The ALJ found Dr. O'Neil's characterization of Cranor's symptoms as severe to be persuasive but concluded that the opinion was otherwise vague and did not address specific abilities or work limitations. Cranor argues that this is not a legitimate reason to reject Dr. O'Neil's opinion, but she does not identify any specific impairment-related work limitation assessed by Dr. O'Neil for which the ALJ did not account. In fact, Dr. O'Neil did not describe any specific work limitations (or capabilities). Cranor also claims that the ALJ failed to acknowledge that Dr. O'Neil's opinion supports the opinions of Dr. Wingate and Dr. Sanchez regarding the severity of Cranor's mental functional limitations even absent her substance use disorders. But because Dr. O'Neil's opinion did not distinguish between Cranor's symptoms with or without the substance use disorders, the ALJ appropriately noted its limited evidentiary value.
Cranor also argues that voluminous other medical evidence supports her claim. But Cranor does not argue either that the ALJ improperly evaluated this evidence or that this evidence undermines the ALJ's findings. She even acknowledges that this evidence does not include specific opinions about her functional limitations. The evidence therefore does not support Cranor's argument about specific limitations she would have absent her substance use disorders. To the extent that Cranor argues that this evidence should have been weighed differently, "[w]e may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ." Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021).
Cranor submitted Dr. Wingate's 2019 opinion to the Appeals Council. That opinion, which mirrored Dr. Wingate's earlier opinion in assessing her marked limitations, became part of the administrative record for the district court to consider. See Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). Cranor argues that Dr. Wingate's 2019 opinion bolsters her disability claim by corroborating Dr. Wingate's previous evaluation, the opinions of Dr. O'Neil and Dr. Sanchez, and Cranor's own testimony. Yet, Cranor's responsibilities and activities had increased by the time of the 2019 opinion: she had gained weekend custody of her youngest children; she shopped for groceries and tried to cook for them; she and her children worked on a container garden; she attended a class for two hours per day; she managed her finances; and she did the dishes and cleaned. Dr. Wingate's 2019 opinion thus supports the ALJ's conclusion that absent her substance use disorders, Cranor would still be able to work despite her severe limitations.
2. Cranor argues that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony. But substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Cranor's testimony and other subjective complaints were inconsistent with the medical record and her functioning.
The ALJ cited activities that he reasonably interpreted to contradict Cranor's testimony regarding the impact of her mental health symptoms-including difficulty being around people, and paranoia and hyper-alertness when in a group. The ALJ noted that Cranor regularly went to the casino, took the train to visit her children, visited her neighbor to help with laundry and gardening, attended multiple meetings per week, and went to the gym five days per week. The ALJ also noted Cranor's inconsistent statements, which reasonably support the determination that Cranor's testimony about her work capabilities was unreliable. Thus, the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for finding Cranor's testimony not to be credible. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence supports that finding.
The ALJ reasonably found Cranor inconsistent, as she testified that she worked only two or three days total since 2009, despite telling Dr. Wingate that she worked under the table to survive.
3. Cranor argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess whether her impairments are disabling in the absence of her substance use disorders. She says that the evidence shows that she is disabled under Listing 12.15 in the absence of her substance use disorders. But Cranor does not address any of the requirements to meet the statutory definition of disability, either under Listing 12.15 or otherwise. Listing 12.15 is used "to evaluate trauma- and stressor-related disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder." Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 Fed Reg. 66,138, 66,159 (Sept. 26, 2016); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(B)(11) (Listing 12.15). To satisfy Listing 12.15, a claimant must meet either medical and functional criteria or serious and persistent criteria. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A)(2). Otherwise, "[f]or a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that his unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is 'equivalent' to a listed impairment, he must present medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990). Cranor's argument fails because she does not address the applicable requirements.
4. Cranor argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her residual functional capacity and in making the corresponding step-five finding in the absence of her substance use disorders. She argues that the ALJ erred because the residual functional capacity assessment does not include all the limitations described by Dr. O'Neil, Dr. Wingate, and Dr. Sanchez, and her own testimony. And she argues that the ALJ erred by finding that she can perform full-time competitive work in the absence of her substance use disorders because she claims she would require excessive absences in part due to her need to attend many weekly counseling appointments. Cranor relatedly argues that the evidence shows that there are no full-time competitive jobs she can perform on a sustained basis. And she disputes the vocational expert testimony because she contends that the ALJ's hypothetical on which it was based did not include all her limitations.
But the ALJ found that if Cranor "stopped the substance abuse," she "would have the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with" the "nonexertional limitations" of only "occasional superficial interaction with the general public, no tandem or teamwork, and few workplace changes." And the ALJ made a step-five finding that Cranor could work as a housekeeping cleaner, production assembler, or inspector hand packager, among other jobs. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings, Cranor's arguments fail. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).