Opinion
No. CV 03 056 6806
September 12, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to a "Finding and Order" dated November 25, 2002, issued by the office of the Claims Commissioner for the State of Connecticut granting permission to the plaintiff to sue the state after the requirements of General Statutes § 4-160(b) were found to be met.
General Statutes § 4-160 provides in relevant part: "(a) When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. (b) In any claim alleging malpractice against the state, a state hospital or a sanitorium or against a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor or other licensed health care provider employed by the state, the attorney or party filing the claim may submit a certificate of good faith to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with section 52-190a. If such a certificate is submitted, the Claims Commissioner shall authorize suit against the state on such claim.
On April 22, 2004, the plaintiff, Carol Crane-Dupre, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Steven P. Crane, filed a five-count second revised complaint. In all counts, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the defendants' negligent care of the plaintiff's decedent resulted in the decedent dying from an overdose of cocaine and/or heroin. In count one, the plaintiff names the state of Connecticut (state) as a defendant. In count two, the plaintiff names the state of Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction services (department) as a defendant. In count three, the plaintiff names Thomas A. Kirk, Jr., (commissioner) in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services as a defendant. In count four, the plaintiff names the Southeastern Mental Health Authority (authority) as a defendant. In count five, the plaintiff names the Stonington Institute and Connecticut Hospital Management Corp. as defendants.
The defendants, Stonington Institute and Connecticut Hospital Management Corp., have no relevant role concerning the present motion to dismiss.
The defendants — the department, the commissioner and the authority — have filed a motion to dismiss counts two, three and four of the plaintiff's second revised complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. More specifically, the defendants move on the ground that General Statutes § 4-160(b) "only permits suit against the state and no other state entity or employee." With the motion, the defendants filed an accompanying memorandum of law.
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, together with attached exhibits of her request for permission to sue the state and the claims commissioner's response granting the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff further contends in her objection that General Statutes § 19a-24 "permits a direct action against the agencies and the [c]ommissioner, each of which was separately sued in this case.
Sovereign Immunity
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . . When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." McIntosh v. Sullivan, 274 Conn. 262, 267, 875 A.2d 459 (2005).
"It is well settled that the state is immune from suit unless it waives sovereign immunity by appropriate legislation. Without such a waiver, courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against the state." Isaacs v. Ottaviano, 65 Conn.App. 418, 421, 783 A.2d 485 (2001). "In the absence of legislative authority, monetary awards against the state or its officials are not permitted . . . A party seeking to maintain an action under a legislative exception to sovereign immunity must come clearly within the provisions of the exception provided by statute." (Citation omitted.) Josephson v. Solnit, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 330032 (June 30, 1998, Radcliffe, J.). "[S]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 232, 464 A.2d 45 (1983). "There are two ways in which the state may consent to be sued: (1) through a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity; and (2) through the claims commissioner." Whitten v. Rettig, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 0079391 (December 4, 2000, DiPentima, J.).
The plaintiff, in her objection to the motion to dismiss, contends that she sought and received permission from the claims commissioner to sue the state. In addition, she contends that General Statutes § 19a-24 allows a direct action against the commissioner and agencies, each of which was separately sued in the present case. Section 19a-24 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Any claim for damages in excess of seven thousand five hundred dollars on account of any official act or omission of the Commissioner of Public Health or the Commissioner of Mental Retardation or any member of their staffs, any member of the Council on Tuberculosis Control, Hospital Care and Rehabilitation, the Council on Mental Retardation or either of the boards of trustees of the state training schools or any member of any regional advisory and planning council or any superintendent, director, employee or staff member of any chronic disease hospital or state training school or state mental retardation region shall be brought as a civil action against the commissioners in their official capacities and said commissioners shall be represented therein by the Attorney General in the manner provided in chapter 35."
"The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z. "If the words of a statute are clear, the duty of a reviewing court is to apply the legislature's directive since where the wording is plain, courts will not speculate as to any supposed intention because the question before a court then is not what the legislature actually intended, but what intention it expressed by the words that it used . . . The Statute must be applied as its words direct." (Citations omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, supra, 191 Conn. 228.
In Duguay, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 19a-24, brought suit against the commissioner of mental retardation, the Southbury Training School and the state of Connecticut, among others, for personal injuries he sustained while under the care of the superintendent of the Southbury Training School. Our Supreme Court found that "[§]19a-24 was intended by the legislature to apply to all civil actions against the commissioner of health and the commissioner of mental retardation or any member of their staffs. By its enactment the legislature has waived sovereign immunity of the state in those cases to which the statute applies." Duguay v. Hopkins, supra, 191 Conn. 232. See also 111 Whitney Avenue, Inc. v. Commission of the Department of Mental Retardation, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 99 0587659 (March 22, 2001, Berger, J.); Pattavina v. Mills, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 96 0080257 (August 23, 2000, Higgins, J.) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 521, 525). The court further found that the "commissioner of mental retardation is the only state defendant named in 19a-24 against whom suit could be brought in his official capacity for actions performed within the purview of this case." Duguay v. Hopkins, supra, 191 Conn. 232. The court, therefore, found that the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the Southbury Training School and the state of Connecticut were not in error. See also Hunyadi v. Addiss, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 307725 (December 10, 1992, McGrath, J.) ( 8 C.S.C.R. 76, 77) (where the court found that the only state defendant named in § 19a-24 was the commissioner of health services, and therefore, the plaintiffs, in order to add any additional state agencies as defendants, must obtain consent from the claims commissioner.)
In Josephson v. Solnit, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 330032, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 19a-24, brought an action for personal injuries against the commissioner of the department of mental health and addiction service. The commissioner moved to dismiss the claims against him on the ground the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The commissioner argued that he was immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the state had not consented to be sued. The court found that "[t]he plain language of § 19a-24(a) demonstrates that certain civil actions may be maintained against the commissioners of [p]ublic [h]ealth and [m]ental [r]etardation, not the [c]ommissioner of the [d]epartment of [m]ental [h]ealth and [a]ddiction [s]ervices . . . When a statute presents no ambiguity, it is unnecessary to look any further than the words themselves which are assumed to express the intent of the legislature." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Id.
In the present case, an examination of the civil summons and the plaintiff's second revised complaint — counts two, three and four — discloses that the plaintiff has named the commissioner and the department of mental health and addiction services, as well as the southeastern mental health authority, as party defendants.
Section 19a-24(a) states in pertinent part that: " Any claim for damages . . . on account of any official act or omission of the Commissioner of Public Health or the Commissioner of Mental Retardation or any member of their staffs . . . or any superintendent, director, employee or staff member of any chronic disease hospital or state training school or state mental retardation region shall be brought as a civil action against the commissioners in their official capacities and said commissioners shall be represented therein by the Attorney General in the manner provided in chapter 35." (Emphasis added.) A review of the plain and unambiguous wording of the statute, as well as the findings of Duguay v. Hopkins, Hunyadi v. Addiss and Josephson v. Solnit, discloses that § 19a-24 allows for claims for damages to be brought against the commissioners of public health and mental retardation, and no others. Therefore, in light of the plain language of the statute and the aforementioned case law, § 19a-24 is not applicable in the present case, and the plaintiff may not circumvent obtaining a waiver of sovereign immunity by commencing a direct action against the commissioner, the department or the authority.
However, as discussed above, the plaintiff has secured permission to sue the state pursuant to a "Finding and Order" issued by the claims commissioner, wherein the commissioner found the requirements of § 4-160(b) to have been met. Section 4-160(b) provides: "In any claim alleging malpractice against the state, a state hospital or a sanitorium or against a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor or other licensed health care provider employed by the state, the attorney or party filing the claim may submit a certificate of good faith to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with section 52-190a. If such a certificate is submitted, the Claims Commissioner shall authorize suit against the state on such claim."
The defendants argue that § 4-160(b) allows the plaintiff to sue the state of Connecticut, but not any other state entity or state employee. In the state of Connecticut, however, "[w]e have . . . recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Therefore, we have dealt with such suits as if they were solely against the state and have referred to the state as the defendant." (Citations omitted.) Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 342, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981). See also State v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 138 Conn. 363, 367-68, 84 A.2d 683 (1951) ("[t]he state is a legal entity which can function only through its officers and agents or other duly constituted and qualified authorities.").
In the present case, the plaintiff was granted permission to sue the state by the claims commissioner. A review of the plaintiff's Request for Permission to Sue (plaintiff's exhibit A) seeking permission to sue the state reveals that the plaintiff set forth allegations against state agencies and employees. The claims commissioner granted permission to sue the state based on these allegations.
More importantly, because the "state is a legal entity which can function only through its officers and agents or other duly constituted and qualified authorities[,]" a suit against these officers or qualified authorities is deemed to be a suit against the state. State v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 138 Conn. 367-68; see also Sentner v. Board of Trustees, supra, 184 Conn. 342. Therefore, within the context of the facts of the present case in which permission has been granted to the plaintiff to sue the state, it cannot be found that this court lacks jurisdiction over claims containing allegations against officers or other qualified state authorities.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss counts two, three and four should be and hereby is denied.
Clarance J. Jones