Opinion
10-07-2016
In the Matter of Ronald CRAMER, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Dulsa CRAMER, Respondent–Appellant. In the Matter of Dulsa Cramer, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Ronald Cramer, Respondent–Respondent. In The Matter of Mary Humphrey, Esq., Attorney for the Children, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Ronald Cramer, Respondent–Respondent, and Dulsa Cramer, Respondent–Appellant.
Peter J. DiGiorgio, Jr., Utica, for Respondent–Appellant and Petitioner–Appellant. Calli, Calli & Cully, Utica (Herbert J. Cully Of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent Ronald Cramer and Respondent–Respondent. Mary Humphrey, Attorney for the Children, New Hartford.
Peter J. DiGiorgio, Jr., Utica, for Respondent–Appellant and Petitioner–Appellant.
Calli, Calli & Cully, Utica (Herbert J. Cully Of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent Ronald Cramer and Respondent–Respondent.
Mary Humphrey, Attorney for the Children, New Hartford.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Respondent–petitioner-respondent mother appeals from an order granting sole custody of the children to petitioner-respondent-respondent father and supervised visitation with the mother. Contrary to the mother's contention, Family Court made sufficient findings of fact, and its determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Ladd v. Krupp, 136 A.D.3d 1391, 1392–1393, 24 N.Y.S.3d 834 ). “It is well settled that a concerted effort by one parent to interfere with the other parent's contact with the child is so inimical to the best interests of the child ... as to, per se, raise a strong probability that [the interfering parent] is unfit to act as custodial parent” (id. at 1393, 24 N.Y.S.3d 834 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the evidence before the court established that the mother was alienating the children from the father. The mother made it apparent during her testimony that she did not want the children to have a relationship with the father. The mother denied or obstructed the father's visitation with the children and would not cooperate with the visitation supervisors. The totality of the circumstances supported the court's award of custody to the father (see Matter of Marino v. Marino, 90 A.D.3d 1694, 1695, 935 N.Y.S.2d 818 ).
Contrary to the mother's contention, the court's order does not require her to complete a parenting program and comply with mental health counseling as a prerequisite to filing a petition for modification of custody or visitation (see generally Matter of Avdic v. Avdic, 125 A.D.3d 1534, 1535, 4 N.Y.S.3d 792 ; Matter of Adam H., 195 A.D.2d 1074, 1075, 600 N.Y.S.2d 406 ). Rather, the court's order states that the mother's completion of such a program and substantial compliance with the mental health counseling ordered by the court would constitute a substantial change of circumstances for any future petition for modification of the order. Nothing in the order prevents the mother from supporting a modification petition with a showing of a different change of circumstances. The court also properly ordered the mother to attend mental health counseling as a component of its order granting her visitation (see generally Avdic, 125 A.D.3d at 1535, 4 N.Y.S.3d 792 ).
We have considered the mother's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.