Opinion
A-13490
06-08-2022
JEFFREY KEITH CRAIG, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, No. 1KE-18-00545 CR First Judicial District, Ketchikan, Trevor Stephens, Judge.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Jeffrey Keith Craig was convicted, following a jury trial, of attempted first-degree murder after he shot his daughter's boyfriend, Kirk Robertson, in the arm. Over Craig's objection, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence of Craig's two-year incestuous relationship with his daughter to prove that Craig had a motive for shooting Robertson (i.e., because Robertson presented a threat to Craig's relationship with his daughter). On appeal, Craig now challenges that ruling on various grounds.
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) & AS 11.31.100(a). The jury also found Craig guilty of first-degree assault, but this count merged with Craig's conviction for attempted first-degree murder. AS 11.41.200(a)(1). In addition, Craig was convicted in a bifurcated bench trial of third-degree weapons misconduct. AS 11.61.200(a)(1).
First, Craig argues that the evidence of his incestuous relationship with his daughter was only relevant to his motive to shoot Robertson if the State also demonstrated that Craig knew that his daughter and Robertson were in a sexual or romantic relationship. Craig argues that the State did not proffer any such evidence. He therefore claims that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his sexual relationship with his daughter.
Alaska Evidence Rule 104(b) governs issues of conditional relevance - i.e., situations in which the relevance of a piece of evidence depends on the truth of another fact. The rule provides that "[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." Evidence is "sufficient" for this purpose if there is enough evidence for a reasonable juror to find the preliminary fact established.
See Bennett v. Anchorage, 205 P.3d 1113, 1117 (Alaska App. 2009); see also Alaska R. Evid. 104(b) cmt.
Here, we disagree with Craig's contention that the "condition of fact" the State was required to establish was that Craig "knew" that his daughter and Robertson were in a sexual or romantic relationship. Rather, under the circumstances of this case, Craig's incestuous relationship with his daughter was relevant to establishing Craig's motive to shoot Robertson if Craig either knew or suspected that his daughter and Robertson had some sort of romantic or sexual relationship. And the evidence was clearly sufficient to establish that Craig suspected that his daughter and Robertson had such a relationship. Robertson testified that Craig dropped his daughter off at Robertson's house on the night of the shooting and then returned to Robertson's house at approximately 2:30 a.m., demanding to see his daughter. Robertson told Craig that his daughter was no longer there, at which point Craig became irate and shot Robertson. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Craig believed that his daughter and Robertson were engaged in a romantic or sexual relationship.
Craig next argues that the evidence of his incestuous relationship with his daughter was inadmissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. We review a trial court's ruling to admit evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. Here, the evidence of Craig's incestuous relationship with his daughter was certainly prejudicial, but it was also extremely probative. Without this information, it would have been difficult for the jury to understand why Craig would have shot Robertson, which in turn would have lent credence to Craig's theory that someone else was the shooter and that Robertson had framed him. We cannot say that the trial court's decision to admit this evidence was an abuse of discretion.
See Weitz v. State, 794 P.2d 952, 955 (Alaska App. 1990).
Finally, Craig argues that even if the trial court did not err in admitting some evidence of Craig's incestuous relationship with his daughter, it erred in admitting a letter Craig wrote to his daughter expressing romantic and sexual attraction. Craig argues that the admission of the letter was gratuitous and more prejudicial than probative, given that the jury was already aware of his relationship with his daughter through the daughter's testimony and Craig did not dispute the existence of the relationship at trial. While we question whether this additional evidence was necessary, we conclude that any error in admitting the letter was harmless.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.