Opinion
Civ. No. 03-1376 (DRD)
November 24, 2003
James A. Plaisted, Esq., Steven D. Grossman, Esq., WALDER, HAYDEN BROGAN, P.A., Rosemand, New Jersey, for Plaintiffs
Johnathan Auerbach, Esq., Neil Mara, Esq., BERGER MONTAGUE, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Plaintiffs
Charles F. Rysavy, Esq., J. Wylie Donald, Esq., McCARTER ENGLISH, Newark, New Jersey, for Defendant
OPINION
Plaintiffs brought suit against Lucent Technologies, Inc. ("Lucent") for injuries they sustained or might sustain, allegedly due to exposure to Lucent's product. Lucent moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas ("Texas District Court"), where an identical case is pending. In the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, and for the convenience of all involved, the court grants Lucent's motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Named plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") and proposed class members are members of the U.S. Armed Forces and the armed forces of other NATO countries who worked as radar technicians, radar operators, and radar mechanics for periods between 1958 through 1994. They claim that they suffer from or are at increased risk of developing diseases such as leukemia, lymphoma and brain cancer due to their exposure to ionizing radiation emitted by radar devices designed and/or manufactured or distributed by defendant Lucent. Plaintiffs allege that Lucent negligently designed and manufactured the radar devices, and failed to warn of the potential hazards of working with them. They seek certification of two classes, one of which requests injunctive relief and the other of which requests compensatory and punitive damages.
Specifically, Plaintiffs seek certification of (1) a "medical monitoring" class and (2) a "liability" class. The first class requests (a) the creation of a fund (to be administered by the court) to finance, inter alia, medical testing, preventive screening and independent scientific studies, and (b) an order that Lucent issue an emergency notice to potential class members informing them of the dangers and health risks posed by their work with the radar devices. The second class requests compensatory and punitive damages. Complaint at 24-25.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, in January, 2003. Lucent removed the action to this court on March 28, 2003. Plaintiffs moved to remand the action to New Jersey state court, but the court denied that motion, holding that removal was proper because the district court could legitimately exercise jurisdiction over Lucent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (federal officer jurisdiction) and Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution (federal enclave jurisdiction).Crackau, et al. v. Lucent Technologies, Civ. No. 03-1376, 2003 WL 21665135 at *5-6 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003).III. RELATED CASES
Two cases intimately related to this one were filed before this case was filed, and are currently pending in federal district courts in Texas and Massachusetts. A. The Texas Case
On October 8, 2002, several named plaintiffs ("Texas Plaintiffs") filed suit ("Texas case") in Texas state court on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Raytheon Company, General Electric Corporation, Honeywell International, Inc., ITT Industries, and ITT-Gilfillan. Inc., as well as Lucent ("Texas Defendants"). They seek certification of identical classes as seek certification in this court, and make similar claims against the named defendants as are made here against Lucent. Because the plaintiff class is the same in the Texas case and the instant case, Lucent is a defendant in both cases, and the allegations in both cases are substantively identical, the instant case is merely a "subset" of the Texas case.
The named plaintiffs in the Texas case are Bund zur Unterstuzung Radargeschadigter (a not-for-profit advocacy group that educates and advocates on behalf of radar operators, mechanics and technicians) and several individuals, none of whom is also a named plaintiff in the instant case.
Plaintiffs claim that "there is no overlap of any plaintiffs among the different actions," Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Lucent's Motion to Transfer at 4, but this is clearly incorrect. The named plaintiffs are indeed different in the Texas case and the instant case, but the classes they purport to represent are identical.Compare Complaint initiating the Texas case at 34-35 and Complaint initiating the instant case at 24-25.
The Texas Defendants removed the case to the Texas District Court. The Texas Plaintiffs moved to remand, but Magistrate Judge Garney recommended that the motion be denied on the ground that federal enclave jurisdiction was present. The District Court judge presumably took this recommendation because the Texas Defendants then moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Magistrate Judge Garney recommended that the court grant the motion, but, on September 29, 2003, District Judge Martinez nevertheless denied the motion. B. The Massachusetts Case
In his Order denying the Texas Defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Martinez indicated that an Opinion discussing the denial was forthcoming, but that Opinion has not yet been issued.
Still other named plaintiffs ("Massachusetts Plaintiffs") filed suit ("Massachusetts case") in Massachuetts state court against Raytheon Company on December 20, 2002. Like the Texas Plaintiffs, the Massachusetts Plaintiffs seek certification of the same classes as seek certification in this court, and make similar claims against Raytheon as are made against Lucent here. Raytheon removed to federal district court, and, on May 6, 2003, the Massachusetts Plaintiffs moved to remand. The court is unaware whether the Massachusetts district court has decided this motion.
IV. DISCUSSION
Lucent asks the court to transfer this case to the Texas District Court where a substantively identical case is pending, or alternately to stay the action pending resolution of the proceedings in that court. Alternately, Lucent claims, the court should dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds because though the Texas District Court would be a more convenient forum for the resolution of these claims than this court is, Germany ultimately would be the most appropriate forum. Finally, Lucent moves to dismiss the case for failure to join the government of Germany, which it claims is an indispensable party.
Because of the strong private and public interests in ensuring that identical cases are tried in the same forum, the court grants Lucent's motion to transfer this case to the Texas District Court. The court does not reach the remaining motions.
A. Sequence in which the court must consider Lucent's motions
In general, when a court is confronted with both a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and a § 1404(a) motion to transfer to another district court, it is appropriate for the court to consider the transfer motion first. Dismissal would be wrong where transfer was possible.
Under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court may in its discretion dismiss an action — even if it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, and venue is proper — when (1) an adequate alternative forum is available and (2) "trial in the chosen forum would `establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience,' or the `chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.' " Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v. American Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)). Under federal statutory law, a district court may — for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice — transfer an action to any other district or division where it might have been brought in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) was enacted to avoid "the harshness of dismissal" when an alternate federal court forum is available. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). Since the enactment of § 1404(a) in 1948, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable only in cases in which the alternate forum is abroad. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 448 n. 2 (1994); 17-111 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.71 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.).
See also Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); 111 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.71 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). Before § 1404(a), a court could dismiss any case whose resolution where filed would cause convenience or "interests of justice" problems, regardless of whether the case could have been resolved by another district court without those problems. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (upholding dismissal of action in New York district court when Virginia was more convenient forum). This was problematic not only because it "denie[d] the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of bringing an action where he [chose], but [also because it made] it possible for him to lose out completely, through the running of the statute of limitations in the forum finally deemed appropriate." All States Freight v. Modarelli1, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952).
Under typical circumstances, it is appropriate for the defendant to make only a § 1404(a) motion to transfer or a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds because the alternate forum in question is either another district court or a foreign country. In this case, it is possible at the outset that both a foreign tribunal and another U.S. district court is a more appropriate forum for this case than this court. Under these circumstances, the court should rule out the possibility that the action can be transferred before it considers whether to take the more radical action of dismissing the action for filing in a more convenient foreign forum. See, e.g.,Yerostathis v. A. Luisi, Ltd, 380 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1967) (transfer, as opposed to dismissal, is appropriate "whenever the more convenient tribunal is a United States District Court . . .[b]ut the federal courts retain the inherent power to refuse jurisdiction of cases . . . which should have been brought in a foreign jurisdiction"); Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corporation, No. 94 Civ. 4770 (SS), 1995 WL 479474 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1995) (Sotomayor, J.) ("The enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . . . has superceded the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens insofar as transfer to another federal district court is possible. A dismissal for forum non conveniens is thereby warranted only when a weighing of all factors in favor of any possible domestic fora indicates that the case should have been brought abroad") (citations and internal quotations omitted); Nun v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5434 (KMW), 1994 WL 361488 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1994) (Wood, J.) (refusing to dismiss a case though "as between Canada and New York, Canada is the preferable forum" because "[s]ince the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . . . the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable, and dismissal inappropriate, in cases in which transfer to another federal forum is proper").
As Judge Gibbons succinctly put it
The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes the existence of at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process . . . If the two or more available forums are federal, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) mitigates the possible harshness of the forum non conveniens rule by providing for transfer rather than dismissal. But where the other available forums are . . . foreign the traditional forum non conveniens remedy of dismissal is appropriate.DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1977).
This conclusion seems unavoidable given that § 1404 was intended to mitigate the harshness of the common law forum non conveniens doctrine. Nevertheless, several courts in which defendants have moved for a forum non conveniens dismissal or, alternately, a § 1404 transfer, have considered the forum non conveniens motion first. See, e.g.,victoria.com, Inc. v. Cott Beverages Canada, 239 F. Supp.2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering and granting motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and thus never addressing the motion to transfer); Alexander Proudfoot PLC v. Federal Insurance Co., Civ. A. No. 92-4384 (MLP), 1993 739660 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 1993) (considering and denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds before considering and granting a motion to transfer to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois).
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Even if it were appropriate in general for a court to consider a forum non conveniens motion before a § 1404(a) motion, however, it might not be appropriate for this court to consider Lucent's forum non conveniens motion because the Texas District Court's denial of the Texas Plaintiffs' forum non conveniens motion might preclude it from doing so. Several courts have held, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, that one federal court's resolution of a forum non conveniens motion bars a second federal court in which the same action has been brought from considering an identical motion unless the relevant factors would weigh differently in the two courts (e.g., it would be more convenient to litigate the case in the second court in which the motion is brought than it was in the first court, which dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds). In order for the Texas District Court's denial of the forum non conveniens motion not to have preclusive effect on this court's consideration of the motion, then, Plaintiffs would have to show facts demonstrating that New Jersey is a less convenient forum for this case than the Western District of Texas is. Plaintiffs might be able to do this, but the court need not decide the question, as it holds that transfer is appropriate here.
See Pastewka v. Texaco, Inc., 565 F.2d 851, 853-854 (3d Cir. 1977) (New York district court's dismissal of case because England was a more logical forum than New York precludes Delaware district court from considering the forum non conveniens motion because no facts demonstrated that Delaware would be a more convenient forum than New York); Mizokami Bros of Arizona v. Mobay Chemical Corporation, 660 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1981) (Arizona district court's dismissal did not preclude Missouri district court from considering the forum non conveniens motion because "the contacts of the parties with Missouri, the availability of witnesses in Missouri and other relevant factors make the inquiry [in Missouri] distinct"); Alexander Proudfoot v. Federal Insurance Company, 860 F. Supp. 541, 544 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (court's refusal to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds had no preclusive effect on later court's consideration because material facts underlying the judgment had changed so there was reason to grant the motion now that had not been clear earlier).
This rule appears to be potentially inconsistent with the principle — discussed above — that a court should not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds if it was possible to transfer to another district court. If, as in Mizokami, facts exist which make consideration of an action more convenient in the second court (eradicating the preclusive effect of first court's forum non conveniens dismissal), this should indicate that the first court should have transferred in the first place rather than dismissed. Nevertheless, the rule is the law of this Circuit underPastewka.
B. § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer
Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The purpose of a transfer under § 1404(a) "is to avoid waste of time, energy and money and, in addition, to safeguard litigants, witnesses and the public against avoidable inconvenienece and expense."Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Supp.2d 442, 449 (D.N.J. 1999). The burden of establishing the need for transfer rests with the movant.Jumara v. State Farm Insurance Company, 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995).
1. Jurisdiction Exists and Venue is Proper in this Court
The court may not transfer an action under § 1404(a) unless it itself has subject matter jurisdiction over — and is a proper venue for — the action. 17-111 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 111.14 (3d ed. 1997) (subject matter restriction required); Osteotech, Inc. v. GenSci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 349, 357 (D.N.J. 1998) (proper venue required). The court has already affirmed its own subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Crackau, et al. v. Lucent Technologies, Civ. No. 03-1376, 2003 WL 21665135 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003). The court need not consider whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Lucent for the purposes of deciding this motion to transfer, Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1985);U.S. v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964), but nevertheless the court notes that it does have personal jurisdiction over Lucent, which is headquartered and does business in New Jersey. Because Lucent is subject to personal jurisdiction in this judicial district, the company "resides" here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), and venue thus properly lies in this forum.
Section 1391(c) provides that "[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."
2. The Case "Might Have Been Brought" in the Texas District Court
The court must next establish whether the instant case "might have been brought" in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (i.e., whether at the time the action was originally filed, the Texas District Court would have had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties, and venue would have been proper). Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 487 (D.N.J. 1993). Lucent maintains that this should be a simple exercise because the case essentially had been brought in the Texas district court before the instant case was ever filed and that court accepted the case. Brief in Support of Lucent's Motion to Dismiss at 14.
Merely that the Texas District Court accepted the case, however, is not enough to confirm that the case against Lucent "might have been brought" in it for the purposes of § 1404(a). This is because the Texas District Court could have accepted the case in the absence of a basis for venue and personal jurisdiction so long as Lucent waived any objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1). For the purposes of § 1404(a), however, the transferee court's right to exercise jurisdiction must exist independent of the defendant's wishes. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960) ("`If when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district independently of the wishes of defendant, it is a district where the action might have been brought. If he does not have that right, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is not a district where it might have been brought") (citations omitted); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3845 (2d ed. 1986) ("consent of defendant cannot cure defects with regard to venue or process in the proposed transferee forum"). For this reason this court must undertake an independent evaluation of whether the instant case might have been brought in the Texas District Court.
Rule 12(h)(1) provides that
A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person [or] improper venue . . . is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
The Texas District Court could obviously have exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this action — as the court itself affirmed in its denial of the Texas Plaintiffs' motion to remand — because federal enclave jurisdiction was present under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution. The Texas District Court likewise could have exercised personal jurisdiction over Lucent because the Texas Plaintiffs claim "a substantial portion of the events giving rise to this controversy occurred in Texas," and Lucent, though it contested the proposition that Texas is the best venue for the case (arguing that that honor is reserved for Germany), concedes that Plaintiffs are correct. As the court had personal jurisdiction over Lucent, venue would have been proper under § 1391(c).
Texas Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5 and Response and Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens at 1-2.
See, e.g., Brief in Support of Lucent's Motion to Dismiss at 19 ("the operative facts giving rise to the plaintiffs' claims occurred in places . . . including Texas").
Notably, this court has also written about events important for this action that occurred in Texas. Crackau, et al. v. Lucent Technologies, Civ. No. 03-1376, 2003 WL 21665135 at *3 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003) (discussing the acquisition of radar systems and the development of training programs for their use that occurred at Fort Bliss, Texas).
3. The Convenience of the Parties Witnesses and the Interests of Justice
Because the instant action might have been brought in the Texas District Court, the court must now determine whether transferring it there would be convenient and just. While there is "no definite formula" for making this determination under § 1404(a), courts generally look to a familiar list of private interests and public interests implicated by the potential of transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The private interests that courts weigh in this context include plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice, convenience to parties and witnesses, the location of evidence, and whether the claim arose elsewhere. The public interests that courts take into account include the interests in judicial efficiency and consistency, and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law.
Though courts weigh many factors in a § 1404(a) analysis, different factors are dispositive in different factual contexts. "A transfer analysis under Section 1404 is a flexible and individualized analysis which must be made on the unique facts presented in each case . . . There is no rigid rule governing a transfer determination by a court; `each case turns on its facts.'" Lawrence, 56 F. Supp.2d at 450 (quoting Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988)). In this case, the dispositive factor — as is often the case with transfer motions when a related case is pending in a different district — is the interest of all (parties, witnesses and the court) in avoiding wasteful duplication of efforts.
Lacey involved a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Despite the differences between § 1404(a) motions and motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds discussed in Section IV(A), the inquiry for resolving these motions is generally the same and "[c]ourts routinely look" to the factors weighed in deciding a forum non conveniens motion for guidance in deciding a § 1404(a) motion. See Lawrence, 56 F. Supp.2d at 450 n. 4.
In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, the Supreme Court noted that "to permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to wastefulness of time, energy and money that 1404(a) was designed to prevent." 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960). This court frequently has heeded this admonition and transferred a case to another forum when a related action was pending there. See, e.g.,Lawrence, 56 F. Supp.2d at 453-55; Ricoh Co., 817 F. Supp. at 487; A.T. T. v. MCI, 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1307-1308 (D.N.J. 1990); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 708 F. Supp. 1440 (D.N.J., 1989).
This court has called the rule that a could should transfer a case under these circumstances the "related case doctrine." A.T. T., 736 F. Supp. at 1310.
Because an identical case has been filed in another district, the central inquiry for the court is not — as it usually is in the context of motions to transfer — whether the case would be better litigated in one district or another. The case is already being litigated in Texas, and nothing the court decides here will change that fact. Thus, the sole question before the court is whether adequate reasons exist for this action to be litigated twice (once here and once in Texas), as opposed to only once. The court concludes that there do not.
i. Private interests: convenience to witnesses and parties location of evidence
The evidence in this case and the Texas case is identical. Transfer would thus create a logistically simpler reality for all those involved (witnesses, Plaintiffs and Lucent).
Transfer would clearly be more convenient for the witnesses who would have to offer the same testimony in two states if this action and the Texas action were allowed to proceed independently of each other. Transfer would also be more convenient for the plaintiff class and for Lucent because they are obliged (respectively) to prosecute and defend the case in El Paso anyway; if the court denied the motion to transfer, the parties would merely have to prosecute and defend it a second time in Newark. Nothing Plaintiffs argue mitigates these propositions.
The location of the relevant documents in this case does not weigh against transfer. Most of the documents and records relevant in this case, Lucent claims, are located in Germany. It will already be inconvenient for Lucent to produce them in the United States; how much more inconvenient would it be for the company to have to produce duplicate copies of them in two different states?
Apparently, the only relevant documents that are in New Jersey are Lucent's own, and according to the affidavit of Charles F. Rysavy, an attorney at McCarter English, Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel for Lucent have already agreed that Lucent will produce documents as images on computer disks. As Lucent points out, "[c]omputer disks can be shipped at negligible cost to plaintiffs' counsel anywhere in the world, so the physical location of the hard copies of these documents is completely irrelevant" to this inquiry. Lucent's Reply Brief at 11. More importantly, the company is already obliged to produce documents relevant to this case in Texas so transfer would not create obligations for it that do not already exist.
Plaintiffs claim that insufficient discovery has occurred for the court to know the location of most witnesses and evidence. It is true that while plaintiffs' class is on record as arguing that "[i]f this controversy has a center . . . it is Fort Bliss [Texas]," Texas Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds at 23, Lucent has not produced an avalanche of evidence showing that relevant evidence exists in the Western District of Texas. However, under these specific circumstances — i.e., because the Texas case is already pending — the dispositive factor will not be the location of the evidence, but rather how many times the parties will have to produce it. Again, the choice before this court is not whether the case should proceed in Texas or New Jersey, but whether it should proceed once or twice.
Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate that most of the relevant evidence and witnesses are in New Jersey, the public interest in allowing related or identical cases to be tried in the same forum would outweigh this demonstration. See, e.g., A.T. T, 736 F. Supp. at 1310 (noting that "this cases raises a somewhat novel question: whether the public interests in transferring a case to a forum in which a related case is pending is sufficient to outweigh the private interest balance which does not favor transfer," and answering that question in the affirmative).
The private interest that usually weighs most heavily against transfer is respect for the plaintiff's choice of forum. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 ("in ruling on defendants' motion the plaintiff's choice of venue should not be lightly disturbed."). That factor is here offset by the costs of duplicative litigation. See Lawrence, 56 F. Supp.2d at 453. ii. Public Interest in Judicial Economy Consistency
Even in the absence of the Texas case, Plaintiffs' choice of forum would not necessarily weigh heavily against transfer here, as the facts of this case are centered in Texas, not New Jersey. See A.T. T., 736 F. Supp. at 1306 ("Where the operative facts of a lawsuit occur outside the forum selected by the plaintiff, that choice is entitled to less deference.").
If these identical cases were allowed to proceed in both this court and the Texas district court, the U.S. court system — as well as the parties and witnesses — would be forced to spend twice the money, time and energy that would be called for if the court transferred this case to Texas. The Court of Appeals noted in 1941
In view of the constant increase in judicial business in the federal courts and the continual necessity of adding to the number of judges, at the expense of taxpayers, public policy requires us to seek actively to avoid the waste of judicial time and energy. Courts heavily burdened with litigation with which they must of necessity deal should therefore not be called upon to duplicate each other's work in cases involving the same issues and the same parties.Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine Corporation, 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941). This is certainly at least as true today as it was in 1941.
Allowing this case and the Texas case to proceed independently would not only be costly, but also would create the possibility of inconsistent results. In the context of the "first filed rule," the Court of Appeals has noted that "[i]t is of obvious importance to all . . . litigants to have a single determination of their controversy, rather than several decisions which if they conflict may require separate appeals to different circuit courts of appeals. Comity must serve as a guide to courts of equal jurisdiction to exercise forbearance to avert conflicts and to avoid `interference with the process of each other.'"E.E.O.C. v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted in part, 488 U.S. 992 (1988) (citations omitted).
The first filed rule "gives a court `the power' to enjoin the subsequent prosecution of proceedings involving the same parties and the same issues already before another district court." E.E.O.C. v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir),cert. granted in part, 488 U.S. 992 (1988).
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Plaintiffs claim that Lucent's motion to transfer is predicated on the "first filed rule" which is grounded in equitable considerations, and that Lucent should not be allowed to avail itself of the rule because the company's motives are suspect. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the only reason Lucent urges the court to transfer this action to Texas is because it wants the case dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, and the standard for a forum non conveniens dismissal is more relaxed in the Fifth Circuit than it is in the Third Circuit. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Lucent's Motion to Transfer at 41-43.
First, while Lucent's alternative motion to stay the action is predicated on the first filed rule, its transfer motion is not explicitly predicated on that rule. The public and private interests in avoiding duplicative litigation are sufficiently weighty under a § 1404(a) analysis to justify granting Lucent's transfer motion; there is no need for the court to address the first filed rule, which is ordinarily applicable in the context of motions to enjoin or stay proceedings, rather than motions to transfer, anyway. Second, and most importantly, even assuming Plaintiffs' characterization of Fifth and Third Circuit caselaw on forum non conveniens is accurate, their argument appears to be moot as the Texas District Court has already denied Lucent's forum non conveniens motion; indeed, it had done so before Plaintiffs submitted their brief. Thus, any argument that Lucent seeks transfer to Texas due to its hope that the court there will grant its forum non conveniens motion no longer makes sense.
The first filed rule allows courts to enjoin actions pending in other courts. See Crosley, 122 F.2d at 927; E.E.O.C., 850 F.2d at 971; Martin v. Townsend, Civ. No. 90-2616 (CSF), 1990 WL 159923 at *4 D.N.J. Oct. 15, 1990). Lucent asks this court to transfer the instant action rather than asking the Texas District Court to enjoin it.
In fact, only the opposite argument makes any sense. At this point, if Lucent truly wanted the case dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, its only hope would be to attempt to keep the case in this court and urge that this court dismiss. (Of course even then, as discussed above, Lucent might not prevail as the Texas District Court's denial of the forum non conveniens motion might preclude this court from considering the renewed motion). Instead, Lucent urges the court to transfer to Texas.
Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that the Texas District Court might have to apply New Jersey law with which it is unfamiliar to the claims against Lucent weighs against transfer. This fact does not affect the court's consideration, however, because if New Jersey law applies to the claims against Lucent, the Texas District Court will have to apply it whether or not this case is transferred because Lucent is a defendant in the Texas case.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Lucent's motion to transfer to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. An appropriate order will be entered.