), where the summons and complaint was properly forwarded by the Secretary of State via certified mail, return receipt requested, and the postal service made three attempts at delivery without success before returning the mailing to the Secretary of State and then the Secretary of State made its statutorily required return and notice, the summons and complaint were deemed served on the defendant upon return of the Secretary of State. Similarly, in Davis v. Wilson, 619 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Ky.App. 1980), the Court concluded that where certified mail, return receipt requested, containing the summons was properly served upon and forwarded by the Secretary of State but was returned to the Secretary of State marked "unclaimed" the defendant was properly served. See Haven Point Enterprises, Inc. v. United Kentucky Bank, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1985) (certified letter from Secretary of State never returned nor return receipt returned was sufficient for service, presumption received); Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky.App. 1979) (notice of registered letter which was discarded as junk mail sufficient for valid service). A signed return receipt is not required for completion of service pursuant to the long arm statute.

Under this authority, as long as the Kentucky Secretary of State complies with the requirements of the long-arm statute, service on a nonresident via this method is generally deemed perfected, regardless of extenuating circumstances. See Deskins v. Estep, 314 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that service via the long-arm statute was perfected because Secretary of State complied with statute, despite defendant's refusal to accept the mailing); Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (holding service via long-arm statute was effective even though the corporation's registered agent discarded the summons and complaint as junk mail).

Yet, "actual notice of the lawsuit is not required to effectuate service as long as it is done in compliance with the applicable statute." HP Hotel Mgmt., Inc. v. Layne, 536 S.W.3d 208, 214-15 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky. App. 1979)). Here, as previously discussed, Hyde complied with the service requirements upon Defendants; therefore, actual notice was not required.

Layne states, correctly, that actual notice of the lawsuit is not required to effectuate service as long as it is done in compliance with the applicable statute. SeeCox v. Rueff Lighting Co. , 589 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky. App. 1979). However, the Court in Cox went on to state that "[a]ccepting that in personam jurisdiction can be acquired without actual notice to a defendant does not a fortiori create a rule that a showing of no actual notice may not constitute good cause sufficient to warrant the setting aside of a default judgment.

Minix's alleged lack of actual notice of filings resulted from his "fail[ure] to take available steps which could have protected his interests" (i.e., updating or providing an accurate address). Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Therefore, his failure to protect those interests does not negate that he was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the state court for purposes of this appeal.

See Ashford v. Bollman Hat Co., No. 10-cv-192, 2011 WL 127153, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 14, 2011) (citing Haven Point Enters., Inc. v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky.1985) (holding that a signed, returned receipt is not necessary from the addressee as part of the return by the Secretary of State)). See also Davis v. Wilson, 619 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (finding proper service pursuant to the long-arm statute even though the envelope containing the summons was returned to the Secretary of State marked "unclaimed") (citing Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.3d 606, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)). The Mississippi Secretary of State's website lists the members for Outdoor as Jimmy Edwards and Billy Alexander. Billy Alexander is listed as the Registered Agent. (DE 25-1).

KRS § 454.210(3)(b). See also Haven Point Enterprises, Inc. v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a "signed, returned receipt is not necessary from the addressee as part of the return by the Secretary of State"); Davis v. Wilson, 619 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Ky.Ct.App. 1980) (finding proper service of process pursuant to the Kentucky long-arm statute even where the envelope containing the summons was returned to the Secretary of State marked "unclaimed") (citing Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606 (Ky.App. 1979)). Therefore, we hold that the formal summons process was completed under Kentucky law and jurisdiction over Defendant Louisville Realty was established as of June 17, 2001, when the Secretary of State made its return.

The court rejected this argument and found service to be proper under KRS 454.210(3), citing Davis v. Wilson, 619 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Ky. App. 1980), wherein the court also found service sufficient even though the process mailed by the Secretary of State was returned marked "unclaimed." This holding is also in keeping with Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. App. 1979), in which the court noted that the "authorities generally hold that actual notice is not required to effectuate good service under a long-arm statute insofar as due process considerations are concerned." Id. at 607.

Haven Point Enters., Inc. v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1985) (holding that a signed, returned receipt is not necessary from the addressee as part of the return by the Secretary of State). See Davis v. Wilson, 619 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (finding proper service pursuant to the long-arm statute even though the envelope containing the summons was returned to the Secretary of State marked "unclaimed") (citing Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.3d 606, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)). ii. Bollman's notice of removal was untimely.

As we observed in our initial opinion, actual notice of the proceedings is not required to effectuate service. HP Hotel Management, Inc. v. Layne, 536 S.W.3d 208 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co., 589 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. App. 1979)). Similarly, the lack of a signed return receipt of delivery does not render the service invalid.