Cox v. Miller

19 Citing cases

  1. Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp.

    323 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 13 times
    Recognizing implied duty to produce and market

    The fact that there was no available market for gas from the well at the time did not in law excuse the lack of production. Stanolind Oil Gas Co. v. Barnhill, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 746, er. ref.; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 323, er. ref.; Giles v. McKanna, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 709, er. ref., n. r. e.; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783. And appellee offered no other excuse for its failure during so long a period of time to put the well into production.

  2. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid

    337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960)   Cited 70 times
    Holding that the lease expired automatically at the end of the primary term when there was neither production nor a substitute therefor

    (1) An oil and gas lease such as the one we have before us created a determinable fee in the land which terminates upon the happening of the events upon which it is limited. Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304, 255 S.W. 601; W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 764, err. ref.; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 323, err. ref.; (2) the word 'production' as used in the habendum clause of this lease is equivalent to the phrase 'production in paying quantities.' The [161 Tex. 55] term 'paying quantities' embraces not only the amount of production, but also the ability to market the product at a profit.

  3. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States

    364 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1966)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that, although the plaintiff was entitled to entry of a separate final judgment, payment of the judgment should be stayed pursuant to Rule 62(h) because the validity of the defendant's counterclaim had not yet been determined

    See generally, 96 A.L.R.2d 345 (1964). Another Texas case cited by plaintiff, Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944), did discuss the matter of termination, but the lease in question was dependent upon actual production. As the Government contends, Cox v. Miller is of limited relevance.

  4. Buchanan v. Sinclair Oil Gas Company

    218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955)   Cited 20 times
    In Buchanan v. Sinclair Oil Gas Co., 5 Cir., 218 F.2d 436, because of an error in determining acreage, rent was not paid on approximately four acres.

    While, therefore, we are strongly impressed with the equities of appellee's position and with its contention that its first and third reasons are also sufficient to support the conclusion of the district judge, we pass the questions which the first and third reasons present without undertaking to decide them. Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355; Mitchell v. Simms, Tex.Com.App., 63 S.W.2d 371; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 323; McCoy v. Texon Royalty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 124 S.W.2d 877; Panhandle Refining Co. v. Swope, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 597. Cf. Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 and St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 778.

  5. St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co.

    193 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952)   Cited 20 times
    In St. Louis Royalty v. Continental Oil Co., 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 778, 779, this court declared that, while the general, the prevailing, rule in Texas is that where the title of the lease is subject to defeasance upon the happening of events clearly set out in the lease, when those events come to pass the title of the lease ceases to exist, the cases do not hold that an ambiguous term in a lease can be so relied upon.

    Ryan v. Kent, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 1007; Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 103, 188 S.W.2d 564; Decker v. Kirlicks, 110 Tex. 90, 216 S.W. 385; Bouldin v. Gulf Production Co., Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 1019; McCallister v. Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W. 859; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rudd, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 464; United Dredging Co. v. United States, 6 Cir., 81 F.2d 118; Ransome Const. Co. v. VonSchroeder, 34 Cal.App. 475, 167 P. 1144. Gillespie v. Bobo, 5 Cir., 271 F. 641; Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Saunders, 5 Cir., 22 F.2d 733; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App., 103 S.W.2d 775; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 323; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783, 137 A.L.R. 1032; Gas Ridge, Inc., v. Suburban, Agricultural Properties, 5 Cir., 150 F.2d 363. Coming next to the defense that full title to the leasehold interest "precluding all claim", had been acquired by adverse possession, we are of the clear opinion that if, contrary to what has been said above, the lease did in fact and in law lapse, plaintiff was still not entitled to recover.

  6. Carrothers v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company

    134 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Tex. 1955)   Cited 9 times

    The applicability of the familiar principle of Jones v. Risley and related authorities, supra, becomes even more apparent when consideration is given to the character of leasehold estate which is created by the ordinary form of "unless" type oil, gas and mineral lease, such as is involved in the case at bar. Basically, this lease creates an estate on common law limitation as distinguished from an estate on condition subsequent. 5th Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, S.W.Leg.Fnd. p. 9, citing W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App. 1944, 184 S.W.2d 323. Its nature is generally defined in Summers, Oil and Gas, Per.Ed. Vol. 2, Sec. 339, p. 223, as follows: "An important distinction in the legal relations between Lessor and Lessee under the drill or pay type of lease and the unless type of lease which has been heretofore mentioned, is that under the drill or pay lease the Lessee expressly promises to drill or pay; but under the unless lease the contract merely provides that if the Lessee does not drill within a stipulated time the lease is void unless he pays. There being no promise on part of the Lessee under the unless lease to pay the delay rental there is no duty to pay, and an action consequently cannot be maintained to recover it. The provision for payment is looked upon as merely stating a condition upon which, in absence of drilling, the lease may be continued or terminated."

  7. Sandtana, Inc. v. Wallin Ranch Company

    318 Mont. 369 (Mont. 2003)   Cited 8 times
    Stating it “is well established that a court, in interpreting a written instrument, will not isolate certain phrases of that instrument in order to garner the intent of the parties”

    Without extraction, the lease will automatically terminate at the end of the primary term unless it is being held under other provisions of the lease. In addition, the majority position implicitly requires marketing as well as extraction, especially where gas is concerned. For example, in both Stanolind Oil Gas Co. v. Barnhill (Tex.Civ.App. 1937), 107 S.W.2d 746, and Cox v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App. 1944), 184 S.W.2d 323, gas was found in quantities sufficient for paying production, however, no market was available. Consequently, as no physical production was present at the end of the primary term, the courts in those cases held that the leases had terminated under the particular provisions of the habendum clauses at issue.

  8. Clifton v. Koontz

    160 Tex. 82 (Tex. 1959)   Cited 120 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding “[t]here can be no arbitrary period for determining the question of whether or not a lease has terminated....”

    These factual situations, when considered in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court, support its finding and judgment that there was not a cessation of production in paying quantities through July 12, 1956. Petitioners argue that it is settled under the Texas law that, after the primary term, the ordinary oil and gas lease absolutely terminates when its income no longer exceeds the cost of its operation, and that since the operations showed a loss for the months of April and May, 1956, the lease terminated. Citing Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509, and Holchak v. Clark, Tex.Civ.App. 284 S.W.2d 399, er.ref. Also Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339; Cox v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 323, er.ref. The further argument is made that such established rule applies as well to a lease with a 60-day termination clause, except a period of 60 additional days is allowed in which to begin additional drilling or reworking operations.

  9. Kline, Executrix, Etc. v. Pearl

    109 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1959)

    IV. If the $6400 claim of Pearl was the personal obligation of Kline, same was barred by the statute of limitations. Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323; Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66; Grace Securities Corp. v. Roberts, 164 S.E. 700; Glassey v. Sligo Furnace Co., 96 S.W. 310; Haworth v. Hubbard, 44 N.E.2d 967; Imes v. Globe Oil and Refining Co., 84 P.2d 1106; Magee v. Mercantile Commerce Bank Trust Co., 124 S.W.2d 1121; Parks v. Whitney, 19 N.E. 161; Phoenix Furnace Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 16 F.2d 789. V. The Court should dismiss the claim of Pearl as Pearl after the decision of the Lower Court waived his rights under the decision by filing a new action and asking for the same relief against new parties.

  10. Holman v. Meridian Oil, Inc.

    988 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that a "term or covenant will not be implied unless it appears from the express terms of the contract that such term or covenant was clearly contemplated"

    The termination date of an "unless" lease serves to mark the limit of the estate granted. See Cox v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex. Civ. App. — Eastland 1944, writ ref'd) (stating that an "unless" lease, unlike forfeiture, does not require the existence of a condition subsequent to terminate the lease). The interest maintained is a determinable fee simple which, once terminated, automatically reverts interest to the lessor without any action on behalf of the lessor.