Even with respect to other Events of Default, the law of New Jersey is that acceleration clauses are entirely for the benefit of the mortgagee. Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 177, 24 A. 1032 (Ch. 1892), cited in R. Cunningham S. Tischler, 29 N.J. Practice § 172 at 768 n. 32 (1975). In Cox, the mortgagor, like Riveredge here, attempted to trigger a default and acceleration in order to prepay.

Attention has also been called to the fact that to hold such provisions as the one in question to be self-operative would be to confer on the debtor the right to take advantage of his own wrong; that is, to mature an indebtedness which was intended as an investment for a given period, in advance of the time specified on the face of his note or bond, by failing to keep his engagements. ( Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176 [24 A. 1032]; Mason v. Luce, 116 Cal. 232 [48 P. 72]; Richards v. Daley, 116 Cal. 336 [48 P. 220]; Lowenstein v. Phelan, 17 Neb. 429 [22 N.W. 561]; First Nat. Bank of Snohomish v. Parker, 28 Wn. 234 [92 Am. St. Rep. 828, 68 P. 756, 757]; Watts v. Creighton, 85 Iowa, 154 [52 N.W. 12]; Batey v. Walter, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 46 S.W. 1024; Nebraska City Nat. Bank v. Nebraska City Gas Light Coke Co., (C.C.) 14 Fed. 763; Phillips v. Taylor, 96 Ala. 426 [11 So. 323].)"

Counsel for Clinton Capital Corporation, at another point in the memorandum, suggests that the reference to an involuntary prepayment prevents a mortgagor from having a right of prepayment by defaulting and thus precipitating a foreclosure. In Cox v. Kille, et al., 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 24 A. 1032 (Ch. 1892), the court held that a person responsible for the payment on a mortgage which contained a provision of an automatic acceleration clause by defaulting could not convert the acceleration clause into one giving him an option to prepay. The court said: "Authorities need not be cited in support of the general doctrine that equity will not permit a party to take advantage of his own wrong."

'" Coman v. Peters, 52 Wn. 574, 100 P. 1002. In Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 24 A. 1032, 1033, the mortgage was given for the life of S.M.R., with a provision that if at any time default should be made in payment of interest, for the space of thirty days, then the principal sum and all interest in arrears should immediately become due and payable. The court said:

We have here adopted the view that such acceleration clause is for the benefit of the mortgagee, and is not intended to grant to the mortgagor a right, by his own default, to change his unconditional promise to pay at a given date as disclosed by his notes. In 2 Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.) § 1515, holding to this view, is cited Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 24 A. 1032, 1033, which sustains the text, and notes as analogous like provision for re-entry in contracts of landlord and tenant, with the observation: "It is entirely optional with the lessor whether he will avail himself of this right of re-entry or not, although, by the terms of the proviso, the term is to cease or become void for the nonperformance of the covenants; and, if the lessor does not avail himself of it, the term will continue, for the lessee cannot elect that it shall cease or be void." Like reasoning was applied by this court concerning the relation of vendor and vendee in Jones v. Hert, 192 Ala. 111, 68 So. 259, and was in harmony with that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Stewart v. Griffith, 217 U.S. 323, 30 S.Ct. 528, 54 L.Ed. 782, 19 Ann.Cas. 639. And speaking to the same question, this Court in George E. Wood Lumber Co. v. Morris, 225 Ala. 281, 142 So. 508, 509, said: "Construing such a contract, this court held in Jones v. Hert, 192 Ala. 111, 68 So. 259, in line wit

The right to declare the whole debt due belongs to the mortgagee and not to the mortgagor. Fletcher v. Daugherty, 13 Neb. 224, 13 N.W. 207; Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 24 A. 1032; 41 Corpus Juris, 850. The inclusion, by means of a supplemental complaint, of the interest payments accruing subsequently to those covered by the original complaint was permissible and proper. § 188, Rules, Practice Book, p. 286; Woodbridge v. Pratt Whitney Co., 69 Conn. 304, 334, 37 A. 688; Duessel v. Proch, 78 Conn. 343, 350, 62 A. 152; Beach v. Isacs, 105 Conn. 169, 176, 134 A. 787. Separate foreclosure actions upon the after-accruing interest payments would unnecessarily multiply suits, complicate adjudication, and impose an additional burden of costs upon redeeming defendants.

" ("Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper," 32 Harv. Law Rev. 747, 767, Zechariah Chafee, Jr.) The same view is expressed in the decisions in many other jurisdictions. ( Richardson v. Warner, 28 F. 343; Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 242; Mason v. Luce, 116 id. 232; 48 P. 72; Richards v. Daley, 116 Cal. 337; 48 P. 220; Watts v. Hoffman, 77 Ill. App. 411: Summers v. Wright, 231 Ala. 372; 165 So. 87; Lowenstein v. Phelan. 17 Neb. 429; 22 N.W. 561; Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176; 24 A. 1032; Meadows v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 398; 142 S.E. 487; Watts v. Creighton, 85 Iowa 154; 52 N.W. 12; First National Bank v. Parker, 28 Wn. 234; 68 P. 756; White v. Krutz, 37 Wn. 34; 79 P. 495; Wall v. Marsh, 9 Bax. [Tenn.] 438; Puthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228.) Under the rule as enunciated by these authorities, it is immaterial whether or not the acceleration clause expressly states that it is to be effective at the option of the creditor, for the courts will regard it as having been so intended even though the provision seems to be absolute on its face.

In the event of a default, a mortgagee may also elect to demand the entire mortgage debt, if an acceleration clause exists. Cox v. Kille, 50 N.J. Eq. 176, 177 (Ch. Div. 1892). An answer that denies the allegations in the complaint or raises separate defenses, contesting the validity or priority of the mortgage or the lien being foreclosed, or creating an issue with respect to the plaintiff's right to foreclose it, would rebut a plaintiff's prima facie right to foreclose.