Cox v. Chicago Great Western Railroad

13 Citing cases

  1. Lundblad v. Erickson

    180 Minn. 185 (Minn. 1930)   Cited 22 times

    The rule should apply that a new trial on the issue of damages may be granted so long as it is not shown that any passion or prejudice affected the decision of the jury upon other issues in the case. Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675. We have searched the record of the first trial and are unable to find anything therein in any way likely to arouse passion or prejudice.

  2. Thompson v. Byram

    228 N.W. 546 (Minn. 1929)   Cited 4 times

    Charge as to damages objectionable. 3. The large damages, of which defendants complain, may have been unduly increased by reason of instructions permitting duplication of items of damages and held objectionable in Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675.Immaterial whether employment was in interstate or intrastate commerce.

  3. In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig.

    339 F. Supp. 3d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that allegation of lost time established injury for purposes of GBL § 349

    This broad area of damages is typically bifurcated into loss of time and decreased earning capacity with the time of trial dividing the two."); Kinney v. Folkerts , 84 Mich. 616, 624, 48 N.W. 283 (1891) ("The actual loss of time while he was sick and unable to work should be awarded to him."); Gilson v. City of Cadillac , 134 Mich. 189, 192, 95 N.W. 1084 (1903) ("We think the jury were given to understand very clearly that it was only for loss of time in connection with her own business she was entitled to recover."); Lepan v. MacKinnon Boiler & Mach. Co. , 178 Mich. 18, 28, 144 N.W. 693 (1913) ("[Plaintiff's] loss of time at 90 cents a day is the only item of damages in the case.").• Minnesota:Cox v. Chi. Great W. R.R. Co. , 176 Minn. 437, 440, 223 N.W. 675 (1929) ("Loss of time and loss of earnings, as covering the same period of time, are a duplication."); Gilbert v. Megears , 192 Minn. 495, 502, 257 N.W. 73 (1934) ("[I]t was the loss of plaintiff's own earnings resulting from his disability, or, in other words, the value of the time lost by him that should measure his special damages."); see also, e.g.,Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 420 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1020-21 (D. Minn. 2006) ("Plaintiffs contend that the time and money they have spent monitoring their credit suffices to establish damages.

  4. Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    420 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that bank customers whose personal information was stolen from a company that had been retained by the bank did not suffer any present injury or reasonably certain future injury

    However, a plaintiff can only recover for loss of time in terms of earning capacity or wages. See Cox v. Chi. Great W.R.R. Co., 223 N.W. 675, 677 (Minn. 1929). Plaintiffs have failed to cite any Minnesota authority to the contrary.

  5. Genzel v. Halvorson

    248 Minn. 527 (Minn. 1957)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that a physician committed a battery even though he acted with helpful intent because he did not have the patient's consent to perform surgery on her right ear instead of her left

    It has been consistently held in this state that the trial court has the power to use remittitur when excessive damages appear to have been given under the influence of prejudice or passion "so long as the prejudice or passion is not shown to have affected the decision of the jury upon the other issues in the case." Cox v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 441, 223 N.W. 675, 677; Kugling v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.2d 534; Whitney v. Kaliske, 131 Minn. 261, 154 N.W. 1100; Goss v. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 113 N.W. 690; Craig v. Cook, 28 Minn. 232, 9 N.W. 712. However, when the passion and prejudice may have affected the other issues in the case, a new trial should be granted rather than using remittitur.

  6. Kugling v. Williamson

    231 Minn. 135 (Minn. 1950)   Cited 28 times
    Declining to address some of appellant's arguments on the basis that they were mere assertions without supporting arguments or authority

    Whatever may be the merits of this rule, it is well established in Minnesota, except as to actions brought under federal statutes. Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675; 16 Minn. L.Rev. 185; 5 Dunnell, Dig. Supp. § 7138. We find no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial on the condition that plaintiff consent to a remittitur of $1,000.

  7. Gilbert v. Megears

    192 Minn. 495 (Minn. 1934)   Cited 5 times
    Stating that district court did not err in submitting question of negligence to jury with regard to this duty

    Accurately speaking, it was the loss of plaintiff's own earnings resulting from his disability, or, in other words, the value of the time lost by him, that should measure his special damages. Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675; Stynes v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co. 206 Mass. 75, 91 N.E. 998, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 737. But it is clear to us that what he paid hired help for the work he would have done if not injured was less than the value of the loss of his time or the loss of his earnings. The time of an able-bodied farmer operating a sizable farm is generally worth more than the going wages of hired help to do the farmer's work. Hence, if technically erroneous, the instruction must be regarded as not prejudicial to defendants.

  8. Northern States Power Co. v. Barnard

    245 N.W. 609 (Minn. 1932)   Cited 9 times

    "The trial judge ought not to grant a second new trial for excessive damages, unless they are so excessive as unmistakably to indicate that the verdict must have been the result of passion or prejudice." In Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 438, 223 N.W. 675, 676, Mr. Justice Olsen wrote: "We follow the rule here that where one verdict has been set aside as excessive this court will exercise great caution in setting aside or reducing a second verdict as excessive."

  9. Carlson v. Naddy

    232 N.W. 3 (Minn. 1930)   Cited 8 times
    In Carlson v. Naddy, 181 Minn. 180, 181, 232 N.W. 3, 4, this requested instruction was held properly refused: "Contributory negligence would be such negligence as contributed in the slightest degree to the injury."

    "You may take into consideration * * * to what extent, if any, it [the injury] will interfere with his carrying on his work, and its effect, if any, upon his earning capacity; the time that he has lost already because of it and is reasonably certain to lose in the future." The argument is that that instruction permitted a double recovery for the same items of damage within the rule of Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675. The instruction was in effect that the jury might consider to what extent, if any, the injury would interfere with plaintiff's carrying on his work; that is, its effect upon his earning capacity, to be determined by the time that he had lost already because of it and was reasonably certain to lose in the future. The explanatory phrases were used simply in apposition to and explanation of what preceded.

  10. Klaman v. Hitchcock

    231 N.W. 716 (Minn. 1930)   Cited 10 times
    Stating "[w]hile `proximate cause' is often . . . defined to the jury in the charge of the court, we cannot say that it must necessarily be defined. . . . The words are common English words and reasonably well understood even by the layman"

    " Cox v. C. G. W. R. Co. 176 Minn. 437, 223 N.W. 675, is to the same effect. The record before us discloses nothing which could reasonably induce passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.